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Al Qaeda killed over 3,000 US citizens on September 11, 2001, and terrorism 
leapt to the fore of US strategic and political priorities. Yet, after nearly six year of 
concerted effort by the United States, the dominant power in the international system, Al 
Qaeda survives and is still acknowledged as a potent threat. This begs the question not 
just of why, but of what the United States can do to redress the situation.  
This dissertation seeks answers by examining the four key aspects of Al Qaeda 
that enable it function as a successful terrorist entity – strategy, organization, financing, 
and politics. These factors area analyzed relative to the dynamics of the phenomenon of 
terrorism in the US-Al Qaeda struggle. For each variable, Al Qaeda’s perspective and 
efforts, as well as the perspective and efforts of the United States, are scrutinized. 
This dissertation assesses Al Qaeda is primarily a political threat, not a military 
one. Terrorists subvert legitimate political processes to achieve political ends. Al Qaeda 
challenges not only specific US political decisions, but also the very nature of the US 
political system, a classical liberal democracy, and the nature of the US-created post 





As such, this dissertation concludes that US efforts to combat such a threat cannot 
be limited solely to a hard power approach. Such a component must be present in US 
strategy, for it alone directly degrades Al Qaeda’s capacity for violence, the source of its 
power. The US approach must, however, include a greater emphasis on the US-Al Qaeda 
struggle’s political dimension.  
The political aspect both drives the conflict and frames its execution, thus shaping 
the possible outcomes in both the near and far term. Fortunately, as the leader of the 
international system, the United States is in a position to politically undercut Al Qaeda. 
The United States can do so by adhering to globally revered traditional US political 
values and foreign policy emphases – the rule of law, a participatory political system 
emphasizing the importance of international institutions, and democratic values, such as 
human rights – in not just the execution, but also the formulation of US policy.  
The potential impact is significant. Internally, manipulating the US-Al Qaeda 
struggle’s political dimension in accordance with traditional US values can weaken Al 
Qaeda’s internal cohesion. Externally, the United States can narrow Al Qaeda’s room for 
maneuver by depriving it of political support, thus strategically degrading Al Qaeda’s 
operational capability. In the process, the United States will also stunt the terrorism 
process’s subversive effects on the United States’ political character. In short, addressing 
the US-Al Qaeda struggle’s political dimension in a manner consistent with traditional 
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“When people are entering upon a war they do things  
the wrong way round. Action comes first, and it is only  
when they have already suffered that they begin to think. 
Thucydides (as quoted in Berner 2005, 
prologue) 
 
“If you wish to conduct offensive war you must know  
the men employed by the enemy. Are they wise or stupid,  
clever or clumsy? Having assessed their qualities, you  
prepare appropriate measures.” 
Sun Tzu (Tzu and Griffith 1963, 148) 
 
After more than five years of concerted effort by the United States, the most 
powerful state in the international system, to politically and organizationally neuter Al 
Qaeda, a numerically small, resource-poor, transnational terrorist group hunted by every 
state, Al Qaeda is not only not defeated, it remains a potent threat. Operating on the 
premise that “the experience, charisma and organizational skills of Al Qaeda’s top men 
would be difficult or impossible to replace,” the United States has pursued a “kill or 
capture” strategy to decapitate Al Qaeda’s leadership akin to taking down an organized 
crime family.1 The United States has done so almost exclusively via hard power. 
Traditional US foreign policy political norms and values – the rule of law, a participatory 
form of governance executed via an embrace of international institutions, and democratic 
values such as human rights – that have historically governed US decisions to use and 
implement force have held little sway.  
 Though initially impressively damaging Al Qaeda by stymieing attacks and 
killing and/or capturing thousands of terrorists, the US counterattack has stagnated. “This 
‘decapitation strategy’ (now) appears to be failing against the organization – especially as 





sentiment to attract new recruits and sources of funding.”2 The realist US hard-power 
approach has proven to be a necessary but not sufficient effort.  
The problem is that Al Qaeda is primarily a political threat, not a military one. 
Terrorists subvert legitimate political processes to achieve political ends. Al Qaeda 
challenges not only specific US political decisions, but also the very nature of the US 
political system, a classical liberal democracy, and the nature of the US-created post 
World War II international order. The character of the US political response is critical. “It 
is not the people Al Qaeda might kill that is the threat. Our reaction is what can cause the 
damage. It’s al Qaeda plus our response that creates the existential danger” (David 
Kilcullen as quoted in Fallows 2006, 62).  
This dissertation will explore the relationship between political values and power 
in the context of the US-Al Qaeda struggle. This dissertation purports that the US use of 
hard power against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the world in a manner that 
ignores traditional US political values and foreign policy emphases, while yielding some 
hard power gains, ultimately politically undermines itself. This is an Achilles heel in a 
conflict that is fundamentally political, not military, in nature, and it can deny the United 
States victory. Traditional US political values and foreign policy emphases must guide 
both US strategic decision-making calculus and execution. Such an approach defends US 
political integrity from terrorism’s subversion, and it also furthers US national advantage.  
RESEARCH QUESTION/HYPOTHESIS 
From September 11th until the present, the United States has been confronted by 
the question of: how does the United States, a liberal democracy, defeat Al Qaeda, a non-





democratic character? Al Qaeda’s continued menace shows that the US realist-oriented 
response emphasizing the state, focusing on national security, and employing a 
preponderance of coercive hard power tools to include military, intelligence, and law 
enforcement abilities is inadequate. The US strategy needs revision.  
The central hypothesis of this study is: the failure of Coalition forces to quickly 
subdue Al Qaeda as was suggested would occur in the first months of the war is a result 
of the US government’s failure to place sufficient emphasis on the US-Al Qaeda 
struggle’s political dimension. In other words, the administration’s heavy emphasis on 
hard power tactics to the near exclusion of soft power ones, weakened the ability of the 
US to effectively deal with Al Qaeda. Instead of comprehensively addressing the Al 
Qaeda phenomenon by both blunting the group’s hard power capabilities and engaging its 
political agenda in a manner consistent with traditional US political values and foreign 
policy emphases – most notably the rule of law, a participatory political system 
emphasizing the importance of international institutions, and democratic values, such as 
human rights – the US approach has given Al Qaeda political appeal.  
In contrast to the tactical dimension of the US-Al Qaeda struggle, which plays to 
the non-state transnational terrorists’ hard power strengths and the state’s hard power 
weaknesses, the political dimension is an open playing field. Because Al Qaeda is not a 
nation-state, a natural political entity with multiple bonds uniting its members, the 
political dimension of the US-Al Qaeda struggle takes on dramatically increased 
importance as this dimension becomes the primary inspiration to increase the group’s 





action, and the means to appeal to non-members for assistance. These factors must be 
blunted. Hard power, while necessary, is not a sufficient approach.   
BACKGROUND 
 Support for the United States swelled from both foreign governments and foreign 
populations in the wake of the September 11th attacks.3 The US had moral and political 
authority as a victim. Traditional US political values, as crystallized by the US citing of 
Chapter 7 of the UN charter, UN condemnation of the 9/11 attacks, and the UN approval 
of US retaliation, positioned the United States to retaliate. The world’s states and publics 
overwhelmingly stood behind the United States on the cusp of its 9/11 response to 
destroy Al Qaeda, which at that time was effectively unbloodied and at its peak.   
 Four key Bush administration decisions then governed the US 9/11 response. 
First, President Bush drew a distinction between Al Qaeda and Islam writ large by 
emphasizing that bin Laden’s “extremism… has been rejected by Muslim scholars.”4 
Second, he declared the enemy as “a radical network of terrorists, and every government 
that supports them.”5 President Bush stated that, from the US perspective, “either you are 
with us, or you are with the terrorists.”6 Third President Bush ruled out politically 
engaging Al Qaeda’s agenda. All US efforts would attempt to disrupt Al Qaeda’s 
organization and structure. All responsibility for political change was thus placed upon 
Al Qaeda. Fourth, by overthrowing the Taliban and proclaiming Iran, Iraq, and North 
Korea an “axis of evil,” President Bush expanded terrorism to include nation-states.7  
 Four main post 9/11 US actions have flowed from this framework. First, contrary 
to Post Cold War norms, the Bush administration unilaterally deposed Afghanistan’s 





Second, beyond the rule of US law, the Bush administration has partnered with select 
allies around the world to set up a secretive prison and detainment system publicly 
acknowledged to have violated human rights.8 Third, contravening international law, the 
United States unilaterally invaded Iraq in the name of combating Al Qaeda and denying it 
potential access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) after sidestepping UN approval 
and in spite of outright allied opposition.9 Fourth, repeating past patterns, the United 
States is politically pressuring Iran on its nuclear program and its purported Iraq 
involvement while intimating militaristic warnings under the guise of Iran hindering US 
counterterrorism efforts in Iraq and Iran’s potential to aid terrorists if it acquires WMD. 
 Collectively, in the eyes of both other states and the world’s publics, traditional 
US political values and foreign policy emphases provide US political leadership with 
legitimacy, the key to combating a transnational terrorist actor attempting to lead a global 
insurgency against the US-led world system (Fallows 2006).10 The US response to 9/11, 
however, significantly violated these pillars of US foreign policy. As a result, the US 
world position situation is dramatically different and less promising as of fall 2007. 
 Support from foreign governments is waning. International participation in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, which was largely symbolic to begin with, continues to decline. The 
European Union is actively condemning secret US prisons, and sanctioning suspected 
European participants. Individual European states are indicting US counterterrorism 
operatives for executing US policies, such as secret arrests and extraditions to countries 
that use torture, that run counter to their political norms.11  
 Support from foreign publics is also falling. Despite the spiked decrease in 





public support continues to decline. Reversing the moral amplification of US political 
power stemming from US victimization, the United States is no longer generally 
perceived as a force for good in the world despite its highly publicized campaign to 
combat Al Qaeda, whose violence and goals garner low international public support.12  
 Though bloodied in the fighting – Al Qaeda’s Afghan sanctuary has been 
destroyed, roughly two thirds of its pre 9/11 leadership has been killed or captured, and 
hundreds if not thousands of its operatives have been killed and/or detained – Al Qaeda 
has become a potentially even more potent, albeit different, terrorist entity.13 Initial post 
9/11 losses have been reversed. Al Qaeda has appointed new leaders (“Fighting 
Zarqawi’s Legacy” 2006).14 It has regained sanctuary in Pakistan while carving out a 
niche in Iraq.15 Its ranks have become numerically deeper while new expansion wings 
have increased Al Qaeda’s breadth.16 
JUSTIFICATION FOR STUDY / OBJECTIVES 
 Al Qaeda, the leading embodiment and organizer of a global jihadi movement 
comprised of over 100 militant political Islamist movements to emerge since the 1980s, is 
the most immediate, potent short to medium term threat to US national security. No 
serious state competitors to US supremacy exist (Hoffman).17 It alone combines the will 
and the ability to inflict sustained harm unto the US polity proper and US interests 
abroad. The Al Qaeda-published Wills of the Washington and New York Battle Martyrs18 
states that the 9/11 attacks were but the start. There has been a marked annual jump in the 
volume of attacks in the years after 9/11 with no signs of abatement.19  
The US and international response to Al Qaeda will be crucial to determining the 





it will signal to other would-be terrorists the consequences of executing mass casualty 
attacks. If Al Qaeda thrives, more groups are likely to emulate it.  
This dissertation scrutinizes the US political and military approach to Al Qaeda 
and contrasts it against the dynamics of terrorism as a phenomenon. After identifying 
these systemic disconnects, this dissertation will explore these shortcomings in relation to 
the Al Qaeda case study to provide policy recommendations to better combat Al Qaeda, a 
real, immediate threat to life, liberty, and prosperity in the international community. 
LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
 Terrorism is a multifaceted and amorphous phenomenon. That it materializes in 
context means that terrorism scholarship has largely reflected political trends. 
Scholarship on Al Qaeda is thus reflective of and has tracked with unfolding US policy.   
 While the original policy literature on modern terrorism stems from the Bolshevik 
Revolution’s Mikhail Bakunin (Stillman 1952). early academic work began in earnest 
during 1960’s decolonization era non-state violence reached the US political agenda. 
Much of this scholarship was focused on the definition of the term. Unique to this field of 
study, there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, and over 100 definitions 
had been proposed by the latter 1980’s (Schmid 1987). Sufficient progress has been 
made, however, such that consensus exists regarding terrorism’s elemental properties and 
their interrelationships.  
This dissertation will herein define terrorism as an illegitimate act of violence 
against a symbolic, innocent victim intended to induce a state of terror in a target group 
beyond the immediate victims in the process of challenging authority to coerce political 





It is, however, more precise than is often cited to ensure it is distinguishable from 
insurgency, a term explicated in Chapter Two that also applies to the US-Al Qaeda 
struggle. 
 Prior to September 11th 2001, no US Administration had adopted the destruction 
of Al Qaeda as a national strategic priority. As such, there was not an intense scholarly 
focus on Al Qaeda either in the United States or the West in general. That Afghanistan 
was engulfed in an internal war, was geographically remote, and of a different culture 
only added to the difficulties of gathering data and/or conducting serious scholarship in 
the United States. 
Much of the literature produced on Al Qaeda and/or southwest Asia was 
journalistic and/or historical in nature; it was not policy-oriented. Rohan Gunaratna 
(2002b), Peter Bergen (2001), and James Burke (2004) are three known and generally 
well regarded authors whose work has defined the contours of Al Qaeda’s history and 
produced corroborative, research. Most of the more timely Al Qaeda-specific literature 
was journalistic work by journalists, such as Pakistan’s Ahmad Rashid (2001, 2002) and 
US journalist Robert Kaplan (1990, 2000). Barnett Rubin (1995, 2000, 2002, 2003; Labin 
and Rubin 1988), who was heavily consulted by the US government following 9/11, was 
one of the only Afghanistan specialists in all of US academia.  
The secretive nature of the subject matter, and this dissertation’s author’s limited 
resources and governmental obligations stemming from his employment by the 
Department of Defense, dictates drawing upon this established information and publicly 
available data. Rather than producing new, unique Al Qaeda data, this dissertation’s goal 





a concerted, multi-year campaign. This question has not been answered satisfactorily in 
the literature to date. Thus far, two main trends have emerged. 
First, there has been a secular strand of literature. The 2001 US invasion of 
Afghanistan sparked numerous retroactive histories and contemporaneous journalistic 
accounts focusing on the strategic, organizational, economic, and social aspects of Al 
Qaeda (Crile 2004; Coll 2004). This perspective viewed Al Qaeda as a criminally 
murderous entity little different from pirates that earlier rejected civilized society, whose 
only means of defense then and now is to reduce the enemy’s capacity for violence by 
forcibly dissembling it.  
The right’s neo-conservatives, as symbolically embodied by President George W. 
Bush, Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld, sought to combat Al Qaeda 
using any means necessary means with all due haste. Al Qaeda’s existence only increased 
the chances of another strike. This perspective has manifested itself in the hard power-
dominated Bush administration real politik policies targeting Al Qaeda and actual or 
potential supporting states, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, to be eliminated by military 
action uninhibited by precedent, thus effectively disregarding traditional US political 
values and foreign policy emphases adhered to in conflicts past.21  
Policy attention, and thus scholarly analysis, is primarily focused on Iraq, the 
Administration’s counterterrorism centerpiece. Afghanistan is a distant second. Al 
Qaeda’s diffuse global presence receives only tertiary policy and scholarly attention.  
This creates a gap relative to the problem set. As denoted by the July 2007 
National Intelligence Estimate, the Pakistan-based node of Al Qaeda, and by extension 





which is focused on events inside Iraq.22 As denoted by this report’s assessment that Al 
Qaeda is increasing its potency around the world, particularly when contrasted against the 
dramatic rise in attacks beyond Iraq since 9/11, there is a gap in US policy emphasis and 
supporting scholarly analysis. This dissertation will speak to this gap.  
Second, a separate but parallel vein of scholarship has examined Al Qaeda’s 
version of militant Islam from a religio-political point of view and emphasized how this 
perspective clashes and/or melds with modernity. This tack is typified by the work of 
John Esposito (1996, 1997, 1999, 2002), Bernard Lewis (1993, 2002, 2003), and Samuel 
Huntington (1996). The relative constancy of Al Qaeda’s political views and objectives 
juxtaposed versus the fluctuating and malleable international system means this body of 
thought plays an integral role. This dissertation builds upon the work of these scholars 
from a political, not theological perspective.23  
Different segments of the US political spectrum, however, view the problem 
differently. Differing political prescriptions have followed. No consensus yet exists. 
The US political right, as embodied by the George W. Bush administration, 
refuses to politically engage Al Qaeda. This perspective equates acknowledging Al 
Qaeda politically as validating Al Qaeda, and by extension its agenda. Conversely, the 
US political system is subverted. A hermetic political seal is necessary for US protection. 
Al Qaeda’s continued political popularity and increasing operational potency, however, 
suggest that this tack has not been, and is not likely to be, successful. Alternative US 
approaches that incorporate a political dimension must be considered. 
 The left’s neoliberals, as symbolically embodied by Michael O’Hanlon, Ivo 





(Katzenstein 2002). They have disagreed, however, with failing to frame the application 
of US hard power via the prism of traditional US political values and foreign policy 
emphases. The question for them has been not whether to crush Al Qaeda militarily, but 
how best to employ politics to guide and enable the use of force to do it (Kurth 2002; 
Klare 2002; Daalder 2003). While the left has generally called for a less unilateral 
approach and pointed out potential disconnects between democracy-promotion efforts 
and combating Al Qaeda, no coherent alternative approach exists (Daalder, Lindsay, and 
Steinburg 2002).24  
There is a shortage of literature focusing on the US-Al Qaeda struggle’s political 
dimension. This is so both in terms of an interactive US-Al Qaeda dynamic and in terms 
of political impact of US actions upon the United States as a polity. This dissertation will 
also speak to these two gaps in the literature. 
SCOPE 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is Al Qaeda’s ability to exist as a successful 
terrorist entity. Al Qaeda is defined as the organizational apparatus that, either directly or 
indirectly, is ultimately under the nominal control and/or preponderant influence of the 
leadership node associated with Usama Bin Ladin. Success is defined as the ability to 
exist as a coherent entity and execute terrorist attacks to further a political agenda.  
Independent Variables 
 Assessing Al Qaeda to develop a more robust policy response requires evaluating 
the factors that make it a viable terrorist entity. Every terrorist entity requires, at a 





First, a terrorist entity must have a political agenda. Terrorism is motivated by 
political grievances, which are colored and determined by the terrorists’ particular 
ideology. In the case of Al Qaeda, this variable addresses the religio-political doctrine 
that Al Qaeda uses to justify and guide its actions as well as recruit and sustain itself.  
Second, a terrorist entity must have a strategy to enact its political agenda. Its 
strategy will seek to maximize its well being against its opponents in pursuit of its 
ideological agenda in a manner consistent with its ideological outlook. In the case of Al 
Qaeda, this variable addresses Al Qaeda’s strategic plan to implement the real world 
manifestation of its religio-political doctrine. 
 Third, a terrorist entity must have a formal organizational structure to enact the 
strategy meant to achieve its political agenda. This structure will seek to survive 
contesting a stronger opponent while adhering to the strictures of the terrorists’ 
ideological vision. This variable addresses the formal organizational structure and 
managerial practices of Al Qaeda as it operates in its main locations around the globe. 
 Fourth, a terrorist organization must have resources to carry out its political 
agenda. In practical terms, this means cash. In the case of Al Qaeda, this variable 
addresses the means by which Al Qaeda acquires, transfers, and expends its money to 
finance its terrorist activities. 
Boundaries of Study 
 This dissertation focuses on the period from September 11, 2001 to the present. 
Post-2001 US counterterrorism policies were devised and have been executed under 
George W. Bush’s watch. Few, if any, serious changes have been made to US 





include temporary troop increases in Iraq and adjusting the nuances of US detainee 
policies and trials. None of these, however, have led to major troop withdrawals or 
altered the Administration’s political and/or legal policy framework While the next 
administration may act differently, it is a reasonable expectation that the current 
administration will continue both its general approach and specific policies.   
 Although Al Qaeda is a terrorist entity with a global presence, the primary focus 
of this dissertation will be on where Al Qaeda is most potent and prominent: the Middle 
East, Europe, and South Asia. Of these regions, the one that received the most attention 
are the Middle East and South Asia. 
METHODOLOGY 
 This study uses a blend of methodologies to address Al Qaeda. Though some 
quantitative measures are used per the rule of inference, the primary method is 
qualitative. Specifically, this dissertation emphasizes the case study approach with other 
methods playing a supporting role. Critics may argue that this is a small “n” study, thus 
implying less validity for a study addressing such a large topic. Six main points, however, 
justify this approach.  
First, Al Qaeda is the preeminent example of an international entity espousing 
militant political Islam. It operates on a global scale, and it is atop of the pyramid of 
similar organizations in the same movement. No other case so exemplifies the threat.  
Second, Al Qaeda is very complex. It is a manifestation not just of terrorism, a 
multidimensional phenomenon, but a religio-political terrorism specific to Islam. It 





This dissertation does not address Al Qaeda in its entirety. It is focused upon Al 
Qaeda’s most prominent organs – Al Qaeda’s central node under Usama bin Laden and 
Al Qaeda’s presence in Iraq. Critics will charge that this restricts the study to only one 
region of the world. The Middle East, Asia, and Europe, however, are where Al Qaeda is 
most potent and most threatening to the United States and its interests.  
Third, intensely scrutinizing Al Qaeda may clarify and/or refine associated 
existing theories of terrorism and militant political Islam (Guy 1998). Deeper lessons 
with potential applications for other similar terrorist groups and movements may be 
developed. 
Fourth, the nature of Al Qaeda necessitates a case study approach. Terrorism is, 
by nature, dangerous and inherently secretive. It is also politically sensitive.25 
Fifth, a case study approach permits “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomena and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2003).  Al Qaeda, an 
example of terrorist phenomena, exists in a greater sea of militant political Islam. While 
the ends of the spectrum are clear, the precise dividing line is not. 
Sixth, and lastly, a case study approach facilitates “triangulation” (Peters 1998). 
Terrorism’s multidimensional nature means that no one single source of evidence 
comprehensively addresses the topic. A case study approach creates the chance to better 
address the topic. 
Unique to the research for this dissertation, the author has spent extensive time in 
Afghanistan since the September 11th attacks as a member of the Department of Defense. 





of Islam as it is practiced and understood in this part of the world, as well as a general 
sense of political sentiment, through interaction with the local population. This 
experience has also provided the opportunity to interact with a multitude of US 
government officials engaged in the US “war on terror.” Interviews with these 
individuals consistent with university standards for doctoral research, however, were not 
possible due to the security and privacy constraints inherent in being a US government 
employee and being in a war zone. At the same time, this experience has provided insight 
and understanding that has heavily informed the author’s thinking.  
Of a more traditional nature, sources of information used included government 
publications and announcements, periodicals, scholarly journals and texts, historical 
texts, monographs, and the internet. More current events rely upon more sources, 
particularly primary ones. Older, more established events from the Cold War and 
immediate post Cold War era rely primarily on secondary sources. 
 Archival analysis addressed Al Qaeda’s organizational, financial, strategic, and 
political dimensions. Finding public statements, segments of long-established scholarly 
texts, and historic documents played a key role. Actual sources of information consisted 
of government publications and announcements, periodicals, scholarly journals and texts, 
historical texts, monographs, and the internet. 
 Polling primarily addressed Al Qaeda’s political dimension, and it secondarily 
spoke to Al Qaeda’s organizational dimension. Professional polling organizations and 
public opinion associations - such as Pew, Zogby, Gallup, the British Broadcasting 
Corporation, Worldopinion.org, etc – conducted multiple polls over time and space. They 





Their audiences spanned the world, but with a focus upon the Middle East and Islamic 
countries. 
STRUCTURE OF STUDY 
 This study is broken down into ten chapters. The initial three chapters will 
establish the issue prism to scrutinize Al Qaeda while providing background knowledge 
to place the case study chapters in context. The next six case study chapters address each 
of the independent variables discussed above and the US response. Lastly, the conclusion 
will place the case study chapter findings in context and make policy recommendations.  
More specifically, chapter two, the analytic framework, constructs the theoretical 
issue prism used to analyze the Al Qaeda case study. This chapter lays out the dynamics 
of the US-Al Qaeda struggle. This theoretical scrutiny identifies macro-level points of 
vulnerability for both the United States and Al Qaeda.    
Chapter three provides historical and political context. It also provides the 
necessary factual background to each of Al Qaeda’s key dimensions outlined in case 
study chapters four through eight. Those chapters then conduct a more focused, detailed 
examination of current information.    
Chapter four, Al Qaeda’s strategic dimension, describes Al Qaeda’s overall 
strategic baseline approach that speaks to each of the other key dimensions. Specifically, 
this chapter provides an overview of Al Qaeda’s political goals and intermediary 
objectives. It then does a pre and post September 11th comparison of Al Qaeda’s strategy. 





Chapter five, the US strategic response, assesses the US level of success. The 
George W. Bush strategic approach is denoted and analyzed per the chapter two 
framework. Shortcomings are identified. 
 Chapter six, Al Qaeda’s organizational dimension, provides a pre and post 
September 11th comparison of Al Qaeda’s organizational structure. It examines Al Qaeda 
central’s European, South Asian, and Middle Eastern presence and operational dynamics. 
It heavily emphasizes Al Qaeda central’s current role in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater 
and in Iraq.  
 Chapter seven speaks to US efforts to counter Al Qaeda on an organizational 
level. It describes the three-pronged US assault on the organization. After assessing the 
level of success, this chapter discusses strengths and weaknesses in the approach to date. 
Chapter eight, Al Qaeda’s financial dimension, provides a pre and post September 
11th comparison of Al Qaeda’s financial arrangements, level of success, and the US 
response. Political and cultural factors are especially noted. Levels of success, as well as 
the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches of both sides, are also discussed. 
 Chapter nine addresses the political dimension of the US-Al Qaeda struggle. It 
assesses the interplay between Al Qaeda’s political agenda and sources of support, and 
the US post September 11th response and sources of support. The gap between these two 
competing agendas and its impact upon the US-Al Qaeda struggle is emphasized.   
 Chapter ten, the final analysis and recommendations, provides macro level 
recommendations for a general US approach to countering Al Qaeda that speaks to the 





context with competing US foreign policy priorities. It then submits guidelines for a 
















































Chapter Two  
    Analytic Framework 
“Without an adequate theory, reality  
is irrelevant.”26  
 
 “If theory without policy is for academics,  
 then policy without theory is for gamblers.” (Schmid and Jongman 
1998) 
 
 This chapter will review the phenomenon of terrorism. It will do so in context of 
the US-Al Qaeda struggle. Together, these two steps will provide an analytical 
framework to assess the post 9/11 US approach to combating Al Qaeda.  
 The US response, as of fall 2007, has heavily emphasized hard power, the 
coercive military, intelligence, and legal means of the state, nearly to the exclusion of soft 
power, i.e. the political values, interests and nature of the actors contrasted against the 
political context of the fight. Initial progress against Al Qaeda as an organization has 
been made. This hard power approach, however, neglects the inherent political dimension 
of the US-Al Qaeda struggle in which terrorism is a tactic employed to influence the US-
Al Qaeda political struggle. As a result, the US approach has not been comprehensive.  
 This chapter will highlight that while the current US approach was sufficient for 
the initial US counter-attack, it is highly unlikely to yield further substantial gains. The 
current US strategy can now achieve a holding action at best. A more comprehensive 
approach with an increased emphasis on political considerations is necessary. 
Root Premise 
 Al Qaeda’s September 11th attack was a “purposive, goal-directed activity” 





presupposes both a decision-making authority and alternative options.27 It exemplified Al 
Qaeda’s policy, “the realization in a number of particular instances of an objective,” to 
use terrorism in pursuit of its goals (Allison and Zelikow 1999). Al Qaeda and its actions 
thus have a consistent internal logic. As such, both Al Qaeda and its actions can be 
subjected to systematic scrutiny with the reasonable expectation that such a process, if 
properly executed, will create deeper understanding of the subject matter. Neither 
terrorism in general, nor Al Qaeda in particular, constitutes irrational violence.  
The Process of Systematic Scrutiny  
 Four crucial questions must be asked to conduct a comprehensive, systematic, and 
logical analysis of the US-Al Qaeda struggle. If successfully conducted, this approach 
can potentially identify not only Al Qaeda’s strengths and vulnerabilities, but also those 
of the United States. This initial level of understanding is the cornerstone for constructing 
a strategy that allows US policymakers to pit US strengths against Al Qaeda’s 
weaknesses while simultaneously defending US vulnerabilities. These questions are: 
1) Who are the participants? 
 Two main antagonists are in the fight. The United States, backed by a loose 
coalition of allied states, is engaged with Al Qaeda, which is backed by a loose coalition 
of allied non-state terrorist groups.28 They are diametrically opposed. 
 The antagonists have significantly differing roles in the world. The United States 
is the international system’s military, economic, and political leader. Al Qaeda, by 
contrast, is not even a legitimate member of the Westphalian nation-state system. One 
step further, it is a political leadership node and symbolic standard-bearer for a particular 





As such, it is both a combatant command and a global coordinator/facilitator of violence 
perpetrated by coreligionists who adhere to its political agenda.   
 The United States and Al Qaeda also have significantly differing internal 
structures. The United States is a nation-state with multiple social, political, and 
economic bonds uniting its members. Al Qaeda, on the other hand, is a non-state 
transnational terrorist group composed of members from every Muslim society. It is 
structured as a network - multiple decentralized nodes linked together primarily by loose 
horizontal ties, not vertical integration, wherein authority is heavily delegated and all 
work towards the same common purpose (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini 1999).29 The 
multiple semi-autonomous points – the most significant of which are Usama bin Ladin’s 
Al Qaeda central in Pakistan, Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia begun by Abu Musab Al 
Zarqawi, and numerous lesser, yet important, nodes in the form of affiliated, associated, 
and self-militating groups and individuals that exist and operate around the world – act in 
concert.30  
  Further, the antagonists have significantly differing forms of internal cohesion. 
The United States is a democratically governed nation-state consistent with the tenets of 
classical liberalism. Al Qaeda is the opposite of a modern nation-state - a natural entity 
with multiple, mutually-reinforcing social, political, and economic bonds independent of 
a particular political agenda. Al Qaeda is a terrorist entity, an artificial creation congealed 
by a common political purpose. Its members are drawn from other natural entities, such 
as nation-states. Its doctrine is the chief means of both unity and identity.  
 Lastly, the antagonists are rooted in differing political traditions. Each tradition 





each is a proactive, proselytizing school of thought. On a conceptual level, each is 
threatened by other traditions. The result is perpetual ideological conflict, which enables 
real world conflict when this situation is married to conflicting real world interests. 
 The US political system’s ideological origin and guiding framework is Western 
Europe’s Enlightenment. Its’ essentially internally unquestioned expression of these 
sentiments via governance is representative democracy. Ideologically, the US system’s  
firmly rooted niche in the political spectrum is that of classical liberalism.  
 Al Qaeda’s ostensible guiding framework is a line of Islamic jurisprudence 
stemming from 13th century jurist intellectual and political activist Taqi al Din Ahmad 
Ibn Taymiyya. After witnessing the 1258 Mogol conquest of the Baghdad-based Abbasid 
Caliphate, an empire inspired by and ruled in the name of Islam, Ibn Tamiyya called for a 
literal interpretation of sacred sources of guidance. The early Muslim community found 
at Medina was held up as the model for an Islamic state. The Quran, the revelation of 
God, and the Sunnah of the Prophet were to be taken at face value. 
 Ibn Tamiyya’s vision melded thought with action. On the one hand, Ibn Tamiyya 
saw an inseparable tie between religion and the state so that the purpose of the state was 
to rule by religious tenets. On the other hand, he drew distinctions between religion and 
culture. Religious practice trumped all other concerns, thus legitimating conflict with 
anyone not copasetic in the eyes of the adjudicating religious authority regardless of their 
ethnic, religious, cultural, familial, and/or national background (Esposito 2002).  
 This vision created a set of dynamics that future leaders would exploit. A sharp 





non-Muslims or excommunicated Muslims, were thus legitimated as possible objects of 
jihad. Crucially, no adjudicating religious authority was specified (Esposito 2002).    
 These reformers sought to purify Islam’s practice to properly renew and reform 
society. This would lead to regaining power and glory, which was perceived to have been 
lost due to human error by straying from the identified path of God (Esposito 2002). 
Rigorous implementation of the original sources of divine guidance was held up as the 
way forward. Because Islam officially recognizes no secular-religious divide and 
provides a comprehensive, detailed code of conduct emphasizing action, as opposed to 
the Christian emphasis on belief, this interpretation has the potential to conflict with the 
modern international system on social, political, and economic levels.  
 Ibn Tamiyya’s work has influenced numerous influential figures in Islamic 
history that have rejected the greater jihad (personal and spiritual betterment) in favor of 
the lesser jihad (military action). Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahab, the religious pillar of 
the religio-political team lead by Muhammad ibn Saud who became the founder of 
modern Saudi Arabia, for example, took Ibn Tamiyya’s work as his cornerstone. In the 
early 20th century, Hassan al Banna, the founder of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, and 
Mawlana Mawdudi, the founder of Pakistan’s Jamiat-e-Islami, took Ibn Tamiyya as their 
inspiration as they expanded religio-political reform efforts in the modern political realm.  
 For al Banna and Mawdudi, the question was the same – how to cope with the 
challenge of modernity and its impact upon Islamic society. In the politico-military 
realm, Islam appeared to be falling victim to Western imperialism. At the same time, 





and/or ethnicity, was challenging the universal, pan-Islamic ideal of the equality and 
solidarity of all Muslims.  
 These two reformers saw Islam as the alternative to the failures and/or limits of 
Marxism and Western-style capitalism, and they preached six main mutual points. First, 
Islam is a total, all-encompassing way of life that guides the individual and the 
community on both a personal and political level. Second, the Quran, the Sunnah of the 
Prophet, and the early Muslim community are the foundations of Islam and are a guide 
for daily life. Third, shariah, Islamic law, is the ideal for a modern Muslim society, and it 
is independent of Western models. Fourth, straying from Islam, and by default relying on 
the West, is the cause of Muslim decline. Conversely, returning to the true path can 
restore greatness. Fifth, science and technology should be harnessed in an Islamic context 
that filters out the impact of Western culture to avoid an infection of Westernization and 
secularization. Sixth, and lastly, jihad – individually and collectively, in both ideas and in 
action – will Islamicize both society and the world (Esposito 2002).  
 Islam was thus competing not as a means of political, social, and economic 
organization belonging to a particular faction as a means to gain advantage, but rather as 
a comprehensive alternative capable of reshaping the world and achieving a just and 
equitable social order for all. Jihad, which differs from war, which is fought for selfish or 
material reasons, was to be the means to this noble end. The jihad was to be 
simultaneously offensive by attacking opposing subversive alternative principles and 
ideology, though not the opponents’ land, while also being simultaneously defensive, for 





 Mawdudi and al Banna sought to work within the system to achieve evolutionary 
change. Though initially resistant, both leaders accepted nationalism and democracy, 
albeit with qualifications consistent with furthering their religio-political principles. In 
the end, they created the prototypes of contemporary Islamist political parties. 
 Sayyid Qutb, who is generally acknowledged as the godfather of al Qaeda-style 
terrorism, radicalized this body of thought. Qutb saw implementing an Islamic 
government not as an option for which to strive, but as a divine commandment to be 
realized. In contrast to Mawdudi and al Banna, Qutb assessed this could only be achieved 
through violent, revolutionary change. The combination of differences between Islam and 
the world as it was with the power of vested interests perpetuating the world system 
negated any chance of successfully initiating reform from within the system (Esposito 
2002).   
 Qutb did not allow for middle ground. As with Ibn Taymiyya, Qutb divided the 
world into a good camp, that of Islam, and a bad camp, which consisted of all others. 
Even within Islam, however, all less pure Muslims were to be counted among the enemy. 
As with Mawdudi and al Banna, the West was perceived as a political, economic, and 
religio-cultural threat, as borne out by the Crusades, European colonialism, and the Cold 
War. Going beyond them, however, Qutb counted secularized, Westernized Muslim elites 
as atheists and decreed them subject to obligatory holy war (Esposito 2002).   
 Akin to Ibn Tamiyya, Qutb sought to combine thought with action. Drawing upon 
Mawdudi, Qutb emphasized the need to create a special vanguard group of true believers. 





ignorance to awaken and lead all true Muslims to the way of God. It was then the duty of 
all true Muslims to participate in the struggle against injustice and evil (Esposito 2002).  
 An enduring trait of the faith’s history is political activism with an eye to reform 
and renewal premised upon differing interpretations of Islam in response to an ever-
changing world. The 18th century revivalist movements that spanned from modern Sudan, 
Libya, and Nigeria across the Arabian Peninsula and the Indian subcontinent to South 
Asia laid the basis for the 20th century evolutions that occurred in response to European 
colonialism. This renewal-reform dynamic preceded Al Qaeda, and it will very likely 
continue independent of Al Qaeda. The terrorist entity Al Qaeda, however, straddles 
Islam’s dual tradition of peaceful and violent political activism.  
 On the one hand, Al Qaeda is a particular manifestation of a broader socio-
politico movement premised upon a specific interpretation of Islam that is unlikely to 
dissipate in the short to medium term. Though this particular broader socio-political 
dimension has been decisively rejected everywhere in the world with the possible 
exception of the Taliban’s Afghanistan, it exists as an enduring and vibrant minority view 
in virtually all Muslim societies. A combination of Al Qaeda’s notoriety from its violence 
and ignorance on the part of observers has at least partially colored peaceful Islamic 
political activism with Al Qaeda’s image. At the same time, Al Qaeda can and does usurp 
the image, if not actual resources and political support, of these non-militant Islamic 
political activists to artificially inflate its strength.   
 On the other hand, Al Qaeda also fits a very specific and narrow niche. It is the 
leading manifestation of Islamic militancy on a global scale. Al Qaeda is engaging the 





defined as “a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the 
non-ruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g. organizational expertise, 
propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate or sustain the basis 
of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics” against a US-led world order (O’Neil 
2005, 15).  
2) Second, what are the actors’ interests?  
 Both the United States and Al Qaeda have multiple, diverse interests. These are a 
reflection of the needs generated by their differing traits.  Enabled by ideological 
justification and reinforced by the differing traits of the antagonists, the genesis of the 
US-Al Qaeda struggle, and its practical driver, is broad political interests that are 
mutually exclusive and whose conflict cannot be avoided or minimized.  
 The United States has three compelling interests in the US-Al Qaeda struggle. It 
seeks to 1) ensure its political character, 2) ensure its security, and 3) preserve the 
international order from which it derives sustenance and sustains its dominant world 
position. The George W. Bush administration interprets preserving US primacy as 
ensuring the 2001 international status quo.    
 Al Qaeda, whose interpretation of Islam is both the inspiration and justification 
not only for its self-defined interests but also for its means, claims to act on behalf of the 
Muslim peoples. Al Qaeda perceives US policies as ensuring US prosperity via systemic 
US-created disadvantages in the international system at the Muslim peoples’ expense. As 
will be detailed in chapter four, Al Qaeda refuses to permit this continued exploitation.   
 Al Qaeda’s grievance against US exploitation of Middle East oil is unlikely to be 





(International Institute for Strategic Studies 2003).31 The United States has the largest, 
most innovative, and nearly the most independent economy in the world.32 The premise, 
and thus chief vulnerability, for post industrial, information age US economic might is 
securely meeting US energy needs. In practical terms, the United States must have a 
stable, reliable, source of affordable oil for both itself and its allies. The Middle East, 
notably the Persian Gulf, is key.  
 While no one disputes oil’s importance as technology has yet to find a viable, 
large-scale, alternative, critics argue that relying upon oil from the Middle East, Al 
Qaeda’s heartland, creates unnecessary friction. Other sources of supply – Mexico, 
Venezuela, Russia, Nigeria, the Caspian Basin – exist. Disengaging from the Middle East 
on the oil issue would place distance between the US and Al Qaeda. At the same time, it 
would create US leverage over key Al Qaeda-related states, such as Saudi Arabia, that the 
United States currently lacks because of oil dependence. 
 A close scrutiny of the world’s energy situation, however, reveals flaws in these 
arguments about alternative supply and political advantage. “The oil market is seamless: 
no matter where the United States buys its oil, any reduction in the supply will result in 
price increases everywhere and will affect the entire global economy. The question is not 
where one buys oil so much as it is who has the capacity to supply oil and affect the 
market” (Telhami 2002a, 134-136).  
 The Middle East remains critical for future energy supplies. Although the Middle 
East currently produces only a quarter of the world oil supplies, it holds between two 
thirds and three quarters of all known oil reserves. Although natural gas and other energy 





accounts for 40 percent of the world’s energy consumption and is not projected to drop 
below this level for the next 20 years. The United States and the West will have to 
continue to define the region as vitally important (Telhami 2002a). 
At the same time, other regions around the world are likely to increase their need 
for Middle East oil and to compete with the West for these resources. China, for example, 
now imports 60% of its oil from the Persian Gulf, and forecasts for the next two decades 
show a possible increase of up to 90%. In fact, China has already begun investing in 
energy exploration in Iran, and Iran is now China’s main supplier (Telhami 2002a). 
 Since the 1970’s, the Gulf’s share of the world oil market has dropped as local 
production levels have slowed and other states’ exports have increased. Not only do other 
states not have the production capacity, but their political reliability is also not assured. 
Venezuela, a promising new source of oil in the 1990’s, for example, is now run by a 
dictator anathema to the United States who cites oil as a potential weapon. Mexico and 
Nigeria are a shadow of the Gulf. Caspian Basin development, whose lure is ever present, 
has been stymied since Cold War’s end by regional political instabilities, which also 
prevent a guarantee of reliable delivery. Lastly, the United States has no desire to depend 
upon a reassertive, Caspian-dominating Russia, which has only 5% of global reserves and 
will deplete them by 2040 at current extraction rates (Telhami 2002a).  
Only the Gulf monarchies, who share a mutual dependency with the United 
States, are at least relatively reliable. Ultimately no state around the world has the current 
impact on and the potential for future importance to the oil market as Saudi Arabia. Its 





significantly by withholding or increasing supply. No other country commands such a 
capacity, and therefore such power in the global energy market (2002a). 
 Al Qaeda’s grievance against US forces on the Arabian Peninsula and in the 
Persian Gulf, therefore, is also unlikely to be resolved soon or easily. The United States is 
wed to the region. Regional animosities, such as the US-Iran rivalry, can deny the United 
States guaranteed access to its resources. From the US perspective, its regional 
involvement is necessary to secure its interests. 
 Al Qaeda’s grievance against US support for Middle East monarchical and/or 
authoritarian regimes, therefore, is also unlikely to be resolved soon or easily. These are 
the very countries who supply US oil needs. Current and future US prosperity is tied to 
their well being. A situation of mutual dependency exists. 
 These regimes also facilitate other US interests. Most immediately, they combat 
Al Qaeda. Given low US public standing in the world at large and the Middle East in 
particular, it is not safe to say that other regimes would be as cooperative on this key US 
interest. These regimes, particularly Saudi Arabia, are also vital to countering Iran. 
Lastly, these regimes surround Israel, a cultural and strategic US regional ally, and 
different regimes might take a more hostile position towards it.    
Al Qaeda’s grievance against US validation and acknowledgement of other 
regimes that oppress Muslims, such as China and Russia, is also unlikely to be resolved 
soon or easily. Russia suppresses a Chechen Islamic insurgency. China oppresses the 
Uighurs, a restive Muslim minority in western China. While the United States has 
registered objections to these acts, the United States has multiple economic, security, and 





While the oppression of Muslim minorities is a key factor in Al Qaeda’s world view, it is 
not reasonable to expect that this Muslim oppression will trump all other US interests, 
and thus cause the United States to sever ties. 
 Apart from whatever US-Al Qaeda issues may be ameliorated, these cannot be. 
Short of one side surrendering or significantly altering its interests to the point of 
wholesale reinventing itself, avoiding a fight is not an option. The US-Al Qaeda struggle 
is an enduring one. A long term view is necessary.  
3) How are the antagonists now working to secure their interests?  
 
The US Utility Function 
 The US utility function, as determined by the George W. Bush administration, has 
been to rebuff the impact of Al Qaeda’s terrorism. The administration has thus far used a 
state-centric, two-pronged approach. These initiatives have been concurrently executed. 
Operationally, the Administration is ensuring the defense of the United States, 
and, by extension, its interests, via a strong offense. Both domestically and 
internationally, it has cast Al Qaeda as a national security threat. It is attempting to locate 
Al Qaeda operatives and proactively disrupt their activities predominantly through 
military and/or other coercive means. From spring 2003 to fall 2007, the United States 
has pursued parallel efforts by concentrating on Iraq an Afghanistan with a supporting 
effort for the remainder of the world on the premise that countering Al Qaeda abroad 
makes the United States safer at home. 
Politically, the Administration is attempting to blunt Al Qaeda. Domestically, it is 





Bush is refusing to politically engage Al Qaeda’s agenda. Internationally, President Bush 
is attempting to isolate, discredit, and ignore both Al Qaeda and its political agenda. 
Al Qaeda’s Utility Function 
 
Al Qaeda’s utility function is persuasion through political advertising. Al Qaeda’s 
specific technique is terrorism, a form of political conflict herein defined as an 
illegitimate act of violence against a symbolic, innocent victim intended to induce a state 
of terror in a target group beyond the immediate victims in the process of challenging 
authority in order to coerce political change.33 “Indifference (following terrorist acts) is 
impossible. Those who originally did not even ask themselves what ‘those lunatics’ were 
after are forced to take notice of them, to discuss their ideas, and to take a stand for or 
against. Through deeds which attract general attention, the new idea (promulgated by the 
terrorists) insinuates itself into peoples’ heads…Such an act does more propagandizing in 
a few days than do thousands of pamphlets” (Thornton, 82-83). 
Unable to impose its agenda through established political processes or outright 
war, Al Qaeda seeks to give its unpopular political agenda a greater chance of success by 
employing terror-inspiring asymmetric violence difficult for conventional forces to 
counter. Terrorists thus force the polity that they violently engage to react predominantly 
politically, not militarily (Pape 2005). This militarily insignificant political 
communication through violence seeks to force political changes under the auspices of 
the existing political structure in line with the message communicated by the details of 
the terrorists’ violence.   
Though it uses violence, terrorism differs significantly from war.   Unlike war, 





destruction on a comparable scale with either guerilla or conventional war.34 Also unlike 
war, terrorism cannot yield a conclusive military victory, thereby creating a chance to 
implement an agenda in a militarily-created political vacuum. The attack also serves an 
entirely different purpose in terrorism as opposed to war – political agitation rather than 
securing a military objective. Additionally, the target set differs with terrorists focusing 
on “counter-value,” innocent, noncombatant, and symbolic victims. Lastly, in contrast to 
war, which has a direct and essentially two-sided nature, terrorism is a multi-sided 
equation that involves an interlocking series of direct and indirect relationships, each of 
which must occur in a specific, sequential order. 
Terrorism is a four step process:  
First, the terrorists choose a specific target set. They must be symbolically 
relevant to the terrorists’ agenda to ensure the impending violence is flavored with 
politics. They must also be morally innocent to ensure an attention-getting reaction.  
In the case of 9/11, Al Qaeda attacked innocent civilians at the World Trade 
Center. This facility was a preeminent symbol of US economic prowess, which Al Qaeda 
states derives from unjust US policies. And, it was populated by innocent civilians. 
Second, the terrorists challenge the existing authority by publicly and brutally 
killing their intended victims. The victims’ apparently random selection combined with 
their innocence magnifies the resulting tragic, victimizing, and fear-inducing feelings as 
the general public – the real political targets of the attack - now feels endangered. This 
socio-political disorientation is intended to loosen the targeted public’s tie to the status 
quo, which operates counter to the terrorists’ political agenda, and shake the target public 





In the case of the September 11th attacks, Al Qaeda attacked not only a symbol, 
but also killed over 3,000 innocent civilians. The US public’s reaction was indeed a sense 
of shock, horror, fear and anger. Surveys showed fear of another attack. Social and 
political complacency was shattered. People groped for explanations.  
Third, the attack manifests and relays the terrorists’ political message through the 
victims’ deaths. The defining traits of the victims correspond to specific terrorist political 
grievances. The victims’ deaths serve to highlight the hitherto ignored contentious issue.   
Al Qaeda communicated its 9/11 political message in two ways. First, the 
symbolism of hitting an iconic US economic entity radiated. Second, to ensure that there 
was no misinterpretation, Al Qaeda released videos directly explaining the attacks and 
their purpose to both the US government and US public. These actions not only raised 
awareness of Al Qaeda, but also of its motivating political grievances.  
Fourth, the targeted public’s role switches. The terrorists’ hope is that their 
“propaganda by the deed” will cause the general public to internalize the terrorists’ 
message, reevaluate the status quo, and find it unacceptable (Rappoport 1977, 47). 
Ideally, the targeted public then pressures its government for political change in line with 
the terrorists’ political agenda, which offers a means of respite from continued violence 
and horror. A triangular dynamic exists. The terrorists use symbolic innocent victims to 
reach the general public to induce them to pressure their government, who is opposing 
the terrorists, to execute political change consonant with the terrorists’ agenda. The 
targeted public thus goes from supporting the established authorities’ policies to 





In the case of 9/11, Al Qaeda sought to induce the US public to pressure the US 
government for a series of changes to US foreign policy with a particular emphasis on 
economic and security issues. Al Qaeda did not, however, successfully execute stage 
four. Al Qaeda’s violence deafened its target audience to its political grievances. Its 
message did not resonate with the US public and convert to calls for political action. 
Looking outward from the terrorists’ point of view, Al Qaeda’s 9/11 terrorist 
violence largely backfired. Al Qaeda did shake the US public from its complacency. The 
US public now has an awareness of Al Qaeda. The US public, however, is bent on 
revenge and defense of its perceived interests as largely defined in pre 9/11 terms. 
Looking inward from the terrorists’ point of view, Al Qaeda’s 9/11 terrorist 
violence was largely successful. Terrorism has three secondary goals – provocation, 
morale / unity building, and eliminating opposing forces. The 9/11 attacks clearly 
provoked the United States, thus keeping Al Qaeda in the public eye. Al Qaeda’s 
stunning 9/11 victory, its most ambitious undertaking to date, certainly buoyed the 
organization’s morale and empowered its leadership, thereby increasing team unity. 
Having killed thousands of Americans and having inflicted economic pain, Al Qaeda also 
weakened its foremost opponent, whom it had just antagonized. 
From spring 2003 to fall 2007, akin to the United States, Al Qaeda has pursued 
parallel efforts. Operationally, and in sync with US foci, Al Qaeda has employed both 
terrorism and guerilla war with an emphasis on stymieing US efforts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan while lessening its emphasis on the US homeland. Al Qaeda has launched 





demanded. Politically, in contrast to US efforts, Al Qaeda has attempted to amplify, 
manipulate, and exploit the political dimension of the US-Al Qaeda struggle.  
4) What are the strengths and weaknesses of these respective approaches? 
An aggressive, hard-power approach is necessary to counter the raw security 
threat inherent in terrorism. Yet, it is not sufficient. It speaks past the political dimension. 
This political dimension not only creates micro level problems for the hard power aspect 
of the struggle, but, on the macro level, it also determines the struggle’s duration. As of 
2007, the dynamics of the US-Al Qaeda struggle favor Al Qaeda.  
The US Perspective – Strengths 
The US position and approach is not without merit. As the leader of the world 
system, the United States has extensive leverage to shape its own future. Shutting out Al 
Qaeda’s political agenda to US society will somewhat mitigate the effects of the 
terrorism process and further stymie Al Qaeda from securing its interests at US expense. 
At the same time, short run US security may be bolstered as military and political 
resources are both husbanded for and channeled against Al Qaeda’s violence. 
The US Perspective – Weaknesses 
Given US military capability, it is natural for the Administration to employ one of 
its most formidable tools. That the business end of terrorism is killing only makes this 
choice appear more natural. There are, however, fundamental shortcomings in this US 
hard power approach that fail to speak to the US-Al Qaeda struggle’s very nature. 
Particularly damning in a political contest, the bar for victory based upon hard 
power is exceptionally high. A military-oriented approach requires the United States to 





victory via hard power against each of Al Qaeda’s key aspects – organization, money, 
strategy, and politics – is unrealistically hard.  
From an organizational perspective, a hard power focused US approach reliant 
upon military means systemically disadvantages the United States. By definition, Al 
Qaeda has tactical advantage - its members are unknown, its membership self selects 
from a global population, and it chooses the place, time, and means of attack on a global 
scale. Furthermore, Al Qaeda’s violence is militarily insignificant. It attacks civilians and 
does not challenge the state in combat. Its violence speaks past US war power. The US 
military may damage Al Qaeda by capturing and/or killing some of its members, but it is 
highly unlikely to solve the problem by wholly obliterating Al Qaeda.  
Deterrence does not apply. This concept requires data, and the communication of 
that data, so that comparative loss-to-gain judgments can be made. In the US-Al Qaeda 
struggle, the identities of all relevant actors are not known, the ability to effectively 
communicate between the actors does not exist, and the ability of both sides to credibly 
guarantee the ability to inflict pain on one’s opponent does not exist. 
Furthermore, the logic of terrorism, particularly in the example of Al Qaeda, 
precludes deterrence from working. The terrorists, by definition, are inherently 
overmatched. Political ideology and the terrorists’ tenacity, not raw military power 
calculations, drive the train. Al Qaeda makes its decisions per a vision that cannot be 
falsified. And, Al Qaeda is ready and willing to accept death as a cost of doing business.  
While necessary to save innocent life, efforts to directly combat acts of terrorism 
and Al Qaeda’s organizational capacity for violence through hard power cannot be the 





Al Qaeda as an organization must also be confronted via the political dimension from 
which it derives strategic operational capacity and breathing space. It is necessary for US 
efforts to capitalize on vulnerabilities in Al Qaeda’s nature to exploit internal political 
tensions. It is also necessary for US efforts to focus upon both the general populace from 
which Al Qaeda derives its strategic viability and the state structures that govern these 
foreign populations to strategically undermine Al Qaeda and reduce its organizational 
resources such as manpower, operational support, and area of operations. Such US 
political activity framing US hard power efforts has the potential to empower them and 
magnify their impact and results.  
Relying upon hard power means to disrupt Al Qaeda’s financial capability is also 
fraught with difficulties. While the United States dominates the formal international 
nation-state system, it is overmatched when competing against Al Qaeda. The US-Al 
Qaeda struggle pits one nation-state’s potential, as harnessed by the state, against the 
potential of the disenfranchised, angry, and otherwise disaffected members a wealthy 
civilization - who constitute Al Qaeda’s actual and potential adherents and supporters - as 
harnessed by a non-state transnational terrorist entity that spans the globe. Al Qaeda’s 
resource needs are lesser compared to US forces, and its resource base is broader and 
deeper.  
As with Al Qaeda’s terrorist operatives, its financiers’ identities are secretive, 
they operate largely beyond the bounds of state, particularly US, power, and they are able 
to self select into the organization, thus presenting the United States with an ever shifting 





detain financiers, and/or comprehensively deter people from giving financial support to 
Al Qaeda is minimal.   
While necessary to reduce Al Qaeda’s capacity for violence, efforts to reduce Al 
Qaeda’s financial capability through hard power cannot be the primary US emphasis. 
Hard power efforts against Al Qaeda’s financial structure will likely cause damage, but 
neutering it will be virtually impossible. Monetary support for Al Qaeda is analogous to a 
barometer of its popular support. Al Qaeda’s standing vis a vis the United States in the 
struggle’s political dimension must be weakened. It is necessary for US efforts to focus 
upon both the general populace from which Al Qaeda derives its strategic viability and 
the state structures that govern these foreign populations to strategically undermine Al 
Qaeda to reduce its financial potential. Doing so has the potential to increase the 
effectiveness and impact of the hard power efforts now being pursued directly against Al 
Qaeda by political authorities.  
 The US strategy, the US’s big picture plan to optimally employ its resources to 
secure its interests against Al Qaeda’s efforts to do the same, must take account not only 
of its opponent, but also of the nature of the US-Al Qaeda struggle. Time is a crucial 
factor. The US cannot determine the struggle’s duration, but it also cannot remain on a 
war footing indefinitely. And, the duration of a fight directly impacts its political 
dynamics. Unfortunately, a US hard power focused strategy does not bear out along a 
timeline favoring the United States.  
As there is no inherently obvious, recognizable end to the struggle because there 
is no clear, objective military yardstick, the decision to continue the US-Al Qaeda 





relative to their achievements compared against their losses weighed against their 
willpower. Al Qaeda, unfortunately, has grandiose secular political goals and a deep will 
rooted in a religio-political vision. Akin to guerilla warfare, the path to political victory 
through violence is paved with willpower.  
Al Qaeda’s vision is premised on the idea that it is doing God’s work by fighting 
against unbelievers, who now dominate an unjust world. The massive power disparity 
means that an Al Qaeda operative can only truly expect to advance the cause, and likely 
die in its service, rather than defeat the enemy. This paradigm cannot be falsified. An Al 
Qaeda victory directly validates the ideology. An Al Qaeda loss, however, only validates 
the premises and meets the expectations of its adherents. A struggle with any group so 
motivated is likely to be long. 
Terrorism is more effective the longer the struggle. In contrast to war where 
political change happens at the end when one side can no longer fight it off, forcing 
political change via terrorism does not first require an opponent’s military defeat. In 
theory, the intimate, extreme, and violent nature of terrorist action within a society 
provokes an extreme, out-of-character political response because the pain caused is so 
deep and wounding it cannot be permitted to be repeated. The longer the struggle, the 
more numerous and intense the reactions of the terrorists’ target are likely to be. 
The political dimension in charting US strategy thus has a two-fold role. Looking 
inward, the United States must adhere to its traditional political values in the wake of Al 
Qaeda’s terrorist attacks. To do otherwise allows the US political system to be subverted 
by terrorism through self-inflicted, intrinsic loss stemming from abandoning the political 





as it attempts to manipulate the US polity. Looking externally, the political dimension 
plays a key role because of the inherently long term nature of the US hard power 
approach. Altering the political context of the struggle is the one malleable variable that 
can enhance US efforts against Al Qaeda’s organizational and financial dimensions, and 
thus potentially alter the US-Al Qaeda’s struggle’s timeline in US favor.  
Engaging the US-Al Qaeda struggle’s political dimension that envelops Al 
Qaeda’s organizational, financial, and strategic aspects requires the United States to 
speak directly to the antagonists’ root political and ideological conflict, the last of the 
four key aspects the United States must counter. The Administration’s political standing 
and credibility is the United States’ enabling factor. The problem is that the 
Administration’s political standing and credibility is ebbing.  
Domestically, the Administration’s controversial policies are weakening the US 
public’s unity. This increasingly restricts the US government’s freedom of action. The 
ability to sustain current efforts, as well as to undertake new ones, is hobbled barring 
another attack altering the political environment.  
Internationally, US efforts to combat Al Qaeda abroad are hindered amongst both 
foreign states and foreign publics. At the state level, even if cooperation has been 
obtained, it will likely be harder to maintain under duress. A low threshold of political 
pain borne of weak public support when confronted by Al Qaeda-induced violence versus 
US allies may be enough to disrupt US alliances. Amongst foreign populations, the 
United States now has the added problem of not just persuading people to its position, but 





Directly politically engaging Al Qaeda is not without risk. Political engagement 
gives Al Qaeda a measure of recognition, and thus validation. And, Al Qaeda’s political 
agenda is introduced into the political debate with the force of fear and violence behind it. 
To the degree that it is successful, the US national interest will be significantly harmed.  
 Therefore, consideration must be given to denying Al Qaeda political 
engagement. Doing so prevents the phenomenon of terrorism from gaining traction in US 
society since closing the political sphere to Al Qaeda effectively blunts the political 
process of terrorism. Standing US government policies are reinforced as no alternative 
for comparison or critical perspective that could be usurped by the terrorists is permitted. 
 The flaws in this approach, however, far outweigh the gains. The durability, 
viability, and US commitment to the liberal democratic system is weakened when the US 
government artificially truncates the public debate. The United States is effectively 
hollowing out its own political character, one of the issues in contention in a terrorism 
struggle. This response also disavows the political dimension of terrorism, and by 
extension Al Qaeda, a political actor. Given that terrorism is a political phenomenon, 
restricting US policy to hard power means completely talks past the fundamental nature 
of the problem. Proactively moving toward a resolution is effectively precluded as this 
hands Al Qaeda the initiative and places the United States in a defensive crouch. 
 Ultimately, the United States must attempt to sway the foreign public. This is 
where Al Qaeda is nestled, and this is the fulcrum from which the freedom of action of 
foreign governments pivots. Because US words ring hollow due to the gap between the 
United State’s words and traditional public image and US actions post 9/11, US efforts 





political and ideological aspects of the struggle important not just to the United States, 
but to Al Qaeda’s actual and potential supporters and adherents wherein it is possible to 
do so without sacrificing core US interests. Traditional US political values and foreign 
policy emphases, which are largely embraced by the antagonists in the US-Al Qaeda 
struggle, must be a guide for both US political decision-making and implementation.  
The United States is faced with a conscious trade-off that goes to the heart of the 
US position as leader of the international system. On the one hand, there is total freedom 
of action through the unilateral, power-based pursuit of US interests that is rooted in 
actual or potential coercion. On the other hand, there is a somewhat restricted US 
freedom of action that takes into account the political interests and sensitivities of other 
actors relevant to the fight, such as both states and world publics where Al Qaeda is 
present. The gain achieved through this potentially somewhat limiting US course of 
action is the increased perception of the legitimacy of not only the US world position, but 
also of both its actions and interests, in the eyes of the international community at 
international organization, state, and world public levels in combating Al Qaeda. Actions 
within these guidelines are likely to generate public support, and they will give the 
United States the political capital it needs to engage the political dimension to isolate and 
undermine Al Qaeda. 
 Al Qaeda’s Perspective – Strengths 
The US-Al Qaeda struggle’s dynamics as of fall 2007 presents Al Qaeda with one 
long run crucial advantage - Al Qaeda’s unaddressed political grievances are an 
exploitable source of political angst for actual and potential adherents. Al Qaeda thus has 





operational support. Al Qaeda will very likely be able to recover from any short term 
tactical losses inflicted by superior US hard power capabilities, and Al Qaeda’s 
operational potency will very likely continue to increase in the long as the cumulative 
effect of politically inciting US hard power actions becomes manifest.   
Al Qaeda’s Perspective - Weaknesses 
Al Qaeda also suffers disadvantages from the dynamics of the US-Al Qaeda 
struggle. At a base level, the Muslim peoples from whence Al Qaeda springs remain at a 
systemic disadvantage in ensuring their survival and prosperity in the international order. 
The societal resources for Al Qaeda to draw upon are lesser compared to those of the 
United States and its Western allies. Additionally, Al Qaeda must always work to avoid 
the US’s long arm, which exists not just via unilateral efforts but through US alliances 
with various Muslim and non-Muslim states throughout the world. 
Resulting State of Play as of Fall 2007 
The United States has achieved mixed results at best. To the positive, the US 
homeland has not sustained another catastrophic terrorist attack. To the negative, the 
United States is not making significant and sustained political headway. Internationally, 
Bush administration actions to combat Al Qaeda, such as placing detainees in Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) “black sites” for torture beyond US law and invading Iraq as 
well as the Administration’s general unilateral foreign policy tenor, have made the United 
States deeply unpopular. At the same time, the Administration’s chosen utility function of 
blunting Al Qaeda’s political impact on US society by ignoring Al Qaeda’s grievances 





for the global war on terrorism is faltering because of Iraq, and the US public lacks a 
clear understanding of the Al Qaeda threat’s political nature.   
Al Qaeda, by contrast, is strengthening. Simply put, “many US, Pakistani, and 
European intelligence officials now agree that al Qaeda’s ability to launch operations 
around the globe didn’t diminish after the invasion of Afghanistan as much as previously 
thought.”35 Politically, Al Qaeda has exploited the every increasing international political 
angst against the United States by adding a media arm, al Sahab, that is “perhaps the most 
effective propaganda machine ever assembled by a terrorist or insurgent network” to 
reach new heights in recruiting and fundraising.36 Operationally, Al Qaeda has drawn 
upon its “deep bench of lower-ranking…veteran jihadists” to recoup initially heavy 
personnel losses while forging a Pakistani sanctuary, which enables training akin to pre 
9/11 while safeguarding leadership, which has not lost a key player in 18 months.37 
Conclusion 
The United States and Al Qaeda are at an impasse. They possess mutually 
exclusive political agendas. Peaceful political discourse cannot bridge the gap.  
Al Qaeda has opted for terrorism. This political strategy engages the United States 
on a hard and soft power footing to achieve political ends it could not achieve via 
political means alone. Values are backed with muscle.  
Given the US-Al Qaeda disparity, the United States can effectively do as it 
chooses. The Bush administration has opted to partner its hard power emphasis treating 





power with political non-engagement. This approach furthers national security by 
protecting the lives of US citizens and thus strengthens the US government’s sovereignty.  
This approach also protects US politics versus illegitimate violent foreign influence, thus 
ensuring the suzerainty of the US people over their government.  
 What this approach fails to address, however, is the US-Al Qaeda struggle’s 
inherent political nature. Politics shapes the conduct of the fight because of it impacts the 
key variables necessary for Al Qaeda to sustain the struggle – organization, finances, and 
strategy. It also impacts the driving force of the struggle – the conflicting Al Qaeda and 
US political interests and ideologies.  
 This dissertation posits that the current US posture cannot win the US-Al Qaeda 
struggle. Current US efforts to win the US-Al Qaeda terrorism struggle, a political 
contest, are structured as if the US were trying to beat an opponent in war, a military 
contest. From the hard power perspective, US and Al Qaeda efforts cede no ground to 
each other. From the political, soft power perspective, however, the current US approach 
pairs finite and tangible US hard power drawn from the resources of the US public 
against infinite and intangible political grievance and anger drawn from the world’s 
disenfranchised, angry, and otherwise disaffected Muslim population.  
 United States’ action on the political front has been incomplete. Domestically, the 
Bush administration has taken the necessary, inward-looking step of shoring up domestic 
political support against Al Qaeda. It has done so, however, in manner that sacrifices a 
measure of the US political character. Internationally, the Administration has not taken 





dimension, which the United States can impact, to undercut Al Qaeda’s religio-politico 
vision, which the United States cannot impact.  
  Blunting an enemy’s strike is not the same as defeating an enemy, particularly 
when an enemy expects a long fight and interprets temporary setbacks as further 
validation of the righteousness of its cause. At best, this approach is a holding action that 
hopes to exhaust the enemy. At worst, this approach is a defensive crouch that gives Al 
Qaeda the political initiative. Engaging the US-Al Qaeda struggle’s political aspects with 
traditional US political values and foreign policy emphases as guide for both decision-
making and implementation is crucial to dissipating the political and security threat posed 
by Al Qaeda to the United States.  
  The next chapter will provide a brief historical and political background to Al 
Qaeda before the September 11th attacks. The broader social, political, and historical 
forces and events from which Al Qaeda sprung will be articulated. With this context, Al 
Qaeda’s political grievances will then be examined. The case study chapters will build 























   Historical and Political Background 
 
“With a rank and file vastly inferior to  
our own, intellectually and physically,  
(the Army of Northern Virginia) had,  
by discipline alone, acquired a character  
for steadiness and efficiency unsurpassed,  
in my judgment, in ancient or modern times.” 
…Major General Joseph Hooker, c. 1863 (Tsouras 1998, 
17) 
 
“Until this day, Saladin remains a pre- 
eminent hero of the Islamic world. It was  
he who united the Arabs, who defeated  
the Crusaders in epic battles, who recaptured 
Jerusalem, and who threw the European  
invaders out of Arab lands.” 
…James R. Reston Jr. (2001, xiv; Tsouras 1998, 103) 
 
Stretching from its inception at the Cold War’s end up to the September 11th era, 
this chapter provides historical and political background for each of Al Qaeda’s key 
dimensions – structure, finances, strategy, and politics.38 After setting the stage with a 
discussion of the broader historical and international political context at the time of Al 
Qaeda’s formation, three main eras will be consecutively scrutinized in reviewing Al 
Qaeda’s evolution as an organization. The chapter begins with Al Qaeda’s role in the 
anti-Soviet Afghan jihad. The chapter then follows Al Qaeda in the post jihad years as it 
congeals from a guerilla force and morphs into a transnational global insurgency support 
node. Lastly, the chapter will trace the Al Qaeda’s final steps towards the transnational 
terrorist entity it is today. Scrutinizing these three main eras in Al Qaeda’s history not 
only provides the necessary background for the more contemporary analysis found in 
later chapters, but it also provides insight into the difficulties Al Qaeda faced and the 





context and understanding that the United States can exploit to Al Qaeda’s detriment in 
forming a new approach.  
Formation of Al Qaeda – Greater International Context 
 The year 1979 provided both the impetus for an Islamist awakening as well as 
opportunities for Islamists to act upon their political beliefs. The Egyptian-Israeli peace 
deal enraged Islamists. The Islamic Revolution took place in Iran. The Soviets invaded 
Afghanistan. Wahhabi-sect ideologues occupied the grand mosque in Mecca, Saudi 
Arabia under the banner of a non-nationalistic, pan-Islamic religious idealism. This 
ideology threatened not only the legitimacy of the house of Saud, but, by extension, all 
secular Middle East state establishments. 
Governments in Muslim states, particularly in the Middle East, responded by 
increasingly persecuting politically active Islamists. These governmental authorities drew 
a distinction, however, between individuals committing unlawful acts threatening the 
state and the unquestioned moral authority of Islam. The practical result was to vilify 
individual regime opponents without vilifying their inspiring cause.  
Formation of Al Qaeda – The Role of Afghanistan 
 
Afghanistan served two contradictory roles in mitigating the mounting domestic 
Islamist pressure against dictatorial Middle Eastern regimes. From an Islamist point of 
view, Afghanistan was an actionable cause de guerre. Soviet brutality against the 
Afghans was intense. Over one million Afghans were killed, and approximately five 
million, roughly one third of the country, was forced into exile. This situation both 
demanded and provided an opportunity for action. From the perspective of Middle 





a socially and politically respectable outlet for Middle Eastern regimes to purge their 
societies of politically active Islamists who were political agitators. Given the fighting’s 
intensity, these Islamist activists would also likely die, thus permanently eliminating the 
problem.  
 Foreign aid – military, logistical, financial, and political – began to flow as the 
Afghan populace began a home-grown resistance movement against the Soviet occupiers 
and their Afghan sycophants. Foreign fighters increasingly traveled to Afghanistan to 
take up arms against the Soviets as the war continued. Because no accurate, systematic, 
comprehensive records were maintained during the fighting, estimates vary tremendously 
about the exact size and composition of the anti-Soviet foreign fighter forces. Four 
observations, however, are generally accepted.  
First, representatives of virtually every Muslim society, even if only in the single 
digits, were present. The bulk of the volunteers, however, “came from Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen, Egypt and Algeria.” In total during the war, estimates are that 25,000 – 50,000 
foreign fighters ultimately augmented the approximately 175,000 to 250,000 indigenous 
Afghan insurgents that presented themselves on the field of battle in any one given year 
(Burke 2004).  
Second, unlike the International Brigade of the Spanish civil war, the foreign 
fighters did not form one cohesive combat unit. The vast bulk of volunteers arriving in 
Afghanistan arrived in small numbers at a time and lacked any prior military training. 
Initially, most were sent to one of the myriad mujahedeen bases for basic instruction on 
small arms and heavy weapons (Burke 2004). As a general rule, after their initial 





Third, unlike the Afghan insurgents, who were primarily focused on fighting the 
Soviets and did so throughout the country, the foreign fighters, who came to be known as 
Afghan Arabs, engaged in both front line fighting and rear area support functions. These 
foreign fighters filled an important enabling gap for the front line forces that any effective 
fighting force engaged in sustained combat requires. As a result, likely more than half of 
the foreign fighters never saw combat (Burke 2004). 
Fourth, the Egyptian contingent, which was “known as the ‘thinkers and the 
brains’ among Arab Afghans,” deviated from the norm (Burke 2004). They did so 
politically, militarily, and organizationally, and they rose to the fore amongst the foreign 
fighter community. Politically, the Egyptians were well connected throughout the 
Islamist movement, and to their Afghan hosts. Militarily, the Egyptians were a cut above 
the rest and fought as a cohesive entity. Organizationally, unlike other volunteers, the 
Egyptians arrived with coherent, intact capacity.  
Formation of Al Qaeda – Organizational Precursors 
 
In 1984, Abdullah Azzam, an intellectual who played a key role in articulating 
and proselytizing an Islamist jihad doctrine tailored to rally volunteers to fight the 
Soviets, partnered with Usama bin Laden. Azzam had met bin Laden when he joined the 
jihad in 1980, and together they set up the Maktab al Khidmat lil Mujahidin al Arab 
(MAK), whose English monikers became the Afghan Service Bureau, the Afghan 
Bureau, the Office Bureau, and/or the Service Bureau. The purpose of the Afghan 
Bureau, which was set up just as the volume of foreign fighters rose to its 1984-86 peak, 





Outside of the war zone, MAK developed a global outreach capability to recruit 
personnel and solicit donations. It did so mainly through mosques and charities around 
the world, as exemplified by the Kifah refugee center and its mosque in Brooklyn, New 
York. The MAK extensively piggy-backed on the Muslim Brotherhood’s networks.  
Inside the war zone, MAK built guest houses, training camps, and logistics nodes 
along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to receive, train, equip, dispatch, and assist foreign 
fighters combating the Soviets. In particular, bin Laden, drawing upon family 
construction resources, built cave complexes hiding field hospitals and munitions. He 
also dug tunnels able to accommodate hundreds of fighters.  
Liaison assistance came in the form of donations from other governments and, 
from private sympathizers. The latter were managed by either state entities or non-state 
proxies established by their intelligence services.  
General Zia ul-Haq, the Pakistani leader who took power in a 1977 military coup, 
predicated providing his help to the US plan to create a Soviet “Vietnam” upon 
channeling all US assistance through Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Directorate 
(ISID). The United States complied. In practical terms, ISID served as the local state cut-
out in directly funneling arms, logistics, money, training, and other war-related 
assistance. This gave plausible international deniability to the donor states, a key factor 
during the rising US-Soviet tensions of the early to mid 1980’s. On a domestic level, this 
arrangement eased donor involvement politically while simultaneously enabling it to 
deepen militarily – a dynamic which became important as US aid shifted from plausibly-
deniable World War I rifles to US Stinger missiles and satellite imagery of Soviet troop 





While financial support from state authorities was important and the United States 
tapped its allies as a force multiplier, especially the Saudis who matched US donations 
dollar for dollar, non-state aid ultimately dwarfed any state funding. “In fact, as little as 
25 percent of the money for the Afghan jihad was actually supplied directly by states” 
(Burke 2004). “The Saudis were not alone in their support. Sheikhs, emirs, princes, and 
devout businessmen throughout the Gulf made huge donations, developing a complex 
network of personal associations and channels for funding, often through specially 
created charities, that were to be of critical importance” for Al Qaeda’s post Soviet 
operations (Burke 2004, 57-58).39  
General Zia’s ISID disproportionately directed assistance to the Islamists (Burke 
2004). Pakistan ultimately wanted the war to end with a compliant, pro-Pakistan 
government in Kabul. The Pakistan-based Islamists were not only fighting to bring this 
situation about, but a genuine ideological and personal sympathy had also built up over 
several years between Pakistani Islamists, especially Jamaat-e-Islami, and their Afghan 
counterparts. The result was that “four of the seven mujahedeen groups allowed to 
operate by Pakistan were hard-line Islamist, (and) the other three could be characterized 
as moderate Islamists, or Islamist traditionalist” (Burke 2004, 65).  
Formation of Al Qaeda – Usama bin Laden During the Jihad 
 
 Usama bin Laden’s behavior during the anti-Soviet jihad largely ingratiated him 
amongst the foreigner mujahedeen. Primarily, bin Laden operated in a strategic support 
role managing the administrative side of the MAK, engaging in political work, and 





Secondarily, bin Laden participated in front-line military actions later in the war. Most 
significantly, he fought at Jalalabad, Jaji, and in the Lion’s Den Operation.  
 The United States tabulated that there were over three hundred notable guerilla 
commanders during the struggle (Crile 2003). In an insurgency that was composed 
overwhelmingly of indigenous Afghans, the foreign fighter community played a minor 
and militarily insignificant, though politically notable, role. Usama bin Laden largely 
played a very important, politically influential but behind-the-scenes support role within 
that segment at a strategic level. As noted by Marc Sageman, a former Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) case officer who served as a liaison to the mujahedeen from 
1986-89, Usama bin Laden simply did not register on the CIA’s radar at that time.40  
Formation of Al Qaeda – Impact of the Afghan Jihad’s End 
 
 The war did not end for the Afghans with the Soviet 1989 withdrawal. Their 
country was in political, economic, and social ruins, and the most radical elements in 
Afghan Islam, which had been marginalized before the war, were now armed and 
organized, which put them in a position to thrust for power amid the post-Soviet chaos. 
With the unifying force of the Soviet threat gone, a five year civil war ensued. The 
jihad’s Pakistani-supported Islamist groups, which had been very marginal players in pre 
Soviet Afghanistan, came to dominate national politics.  
 The jihad also continued for Pakistan. Islamabad’s central policy was still to 
secure a pliant government in Kabul. Pakistan itself, however, had been altered by the 
Afghan war. The ISID hardliners and the army were in as strong a position as ever. Over 
the next years, the war’s pernicious effects became apparent as attempts in Pakistan to 





 Though possessing high political visibility and a measure of social standing and 
importance, the foreign fighter contingent played only a minor military role (Burke 
2004). The Soviets were beaten primarily by Afghan blood supported by foreign treasure, 
which came primarily from private donations derived from throughout the Muslim world 
and secondarily from the United States and Saudi Arabia, who between them provided 
approximately six billion dollars in aid (Bergen 2001). Rather, “it was the lessons that 
they (the foreigner mujahedeen) learned from the jihad, rather than their contribution to 
it, that proved significant” (Bergen 2001, 56).  
From the perspective of religious political ideology, the anti-Soviet war in 
Afghanistan was a milestone evolution in militant political Islam. However right or 
wrong, the foreign mujahedeen perceived themselves to be responsible for defeating the 
Soviets, a global superpower. This real-world, tangible victory simultaneously validated 
and empowered Azzam’s theological modifications, and thus the resulting world view 
and political agenda they inspired as well (Bergen 2001). Defeating a global superpower 
replaced the Palestinian’s struggle in the popular Arab imagination. The Afghan jihad 
transformed Arab nationalism into Islamism (Bergen 2001).  
From the perspective of organizational development, the necessary friendships, 
alliances, socio-professional networks were formed to constitute the organizational 
capacity for a global entity. Foreign jihadist leaders from dozens of countries rubbed 
shoulders and were indoctrinated in the same interpretation of jihad. Most notably, bin 
Laden met and was befriended by Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri, who had traveled to Peshawar 





As the light at the end of the jihad tunnel began to show, the natural question of 
what to do after victory arose. The MAK leadership did not want to simply dissipate. As 
Abdullah Azzam noted in his best-known book, Defending the Land of the Muslims is 
Each Man’s Most Important Duty, “the duty will not end with victory in Afghanistan; 
jihad will remain an individual obligation until all other lands that were Muslim are 
returned to us so that Islam will reign again: before us lies Palestine, Bukhara, Lebanon, 
Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, the Philippines, Burma, southern Yemen, Tashkent, and 
Andalusia” (Esposito 2002, 7).  
Formation of Al Qaeda – The Organization Coalesces 
 
Abdullah Azzam envisioned the mujahedeen as an elite vanguard that could serve 
as a strong foundation (al Qaeda al sulbah) for remaking society in the Islamist vision.41 
The foreign mujahedeen, however, lacked unity. Problems existed on spiritual, political, 
and organizational levels.  
First, the foreign mujahedeen had no unifying spiritual authority on a moral or 
intellectual level. Because they rejected, and had effectively been rejected by, the state-
backed ulema, nearly anyone with any formal training could claim leadership of a group 
and a degree of religious authority (Burke 2001). This gave Azzam space to form a new 
group, but it also created chaos. 
 Second, infighting broke out on a political level. National, ethnic, and ideological 
divisions amongst the volunteers, all of which had been subordinated to the common, 
immediate goal of defeating the Soviets, rose to the fore. The Arab Afghans “split into 
scores of different groups, each focusing on the problems of their own homeland” (Burke 





Third, the fighters were also in disarray organizationally. The pattern of foreign 
fighters operating in small groups attached to a multitude of commanders did not allow 
for strong unity of command in the international element. The mujahedeen’s disunity was 
further aggravated by fears of infiltration by government agents from the fighters’ 
homelands, which were worried about Islamist movements in their own countries and 
how these hardened Afghan war veterans might affect their domestic situations (Bergen 
2001).  
At some point between 1988 and 1989 in Peshawar, Pakistan, Usama bin Laden 
and several close associates, acting upon Abdullah Azzam’s suggestion and at his 
direction, formed the militant organization that would eventually become known as Al 
Qaeda. The group was small, comprising not more than a dozen men. Complete with a 
charter, Usama bin Laden was its leader, and members swore an oath of loyalty to him.  
The group’s express purpose was to overcome the mujahedeen’s national, ethnic, 
and ideological divisions. The group was to channel resources into a quick-reaction 
“Islamic army” that could come to the aid of oppressed Muslims around the world. This 
group would be the muscle of political Islam, which it saw as the solution to all problems.  
Though this organization was to form a secure, inner core for the broader religio-
political movement Abdullah Azzam envisioned, it did not have the monopoly on 
internationalizing the struggle. There was little to distinguish it from the scores of other 
groups operating, forming, and dissolving in Pakistan, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the 
Islamic world.  Though most of the larger groups were focused on campaigning against 





Laden’s that were radicalized by their Afghanistan experiences and were committed to a 
wider battle (Burke 2004).  
Al Qaeda – Displacing to and Congealing in Sudan 
 
 In the 1989-90 timeframe as the Soviet presence in Afghanistan was dissipating, 
Usama bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia, and his cohorts took the lead in forging Al 
Qaeda. Shortly after his arrival, the Saudi monarchy invited US troops to help defend the 
kingdom following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Usama bin Laden subsequently fled to 
Pakistan in April 1991 upon learning of his impending arrest after joining Saudi 
dissidents in calling for an overthrow of the monarchy, which was sparked by the foreign 
troop presence in what many Islamists consider to be the land of Islam’s holiest sites.  
 Al Qaeda’s situation in Pakistan, however, was becoming untenable. Saudi Arabia 
and Pakistan enjoyed close relations (Burke 2004).42 After funding a failed no-confidence 
motion versus Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and then sponsoring assassination 
attempts against her on two occasions, it was not safe for bin Laden to remain in 
Peshawar. Also, India was pressuring the US government to designate Pakistan a terrorist 
sponsor in the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, an attack that was carried 
out by independent, Afghan-trained, Pakistan-based terrorists.  
In response, the United States demanded Islamabad expel or register the 
mujahedeen in Pakistan. For the United States, it was a chance to engage an emerging 
threat. For Pakistan, it was a chance to arrest, deport, or register armed internal dissenters 
who could challenge the state (Burke 2004).43  
 The National Islamic Front (NIF) came to power in Sudan during this same time. 





training NIF members in guerilla warfare to oppose the largely animist and Christian 
separatist Sudan People’s Liberation Army in the country’s south. The training request 
included an invitation to take up residence (Gunaratna 2002b).     
Sudan was a sanctuary close to the Arab world, the home of most Al Qaeda 
leaders and members (Gunaratna 2002b). And, it was a chance for an able but mission-
less force to “get back to work” (Gunaratna 2002b). From late 1989 to late 1991, most of 
Al Qaeda’s best trained and experienced fighters, numbering 1,000-1,500, moved to 
Sudan, though bin Laden retained an extensive training and operational infrastructure in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.  
The ending of the Afghan jihad had created a free-floating pool of mujahedeen 
extending from New York to Algeria to the Philippines. Fearful that these men could 
upset the political balance, many veterans of the Afghan campaign were being arrested by 
their regimes. The resources at Al Qaeda’s disposal in Sudan brought many of them there 
for refresher training and finance. Al Qaeda’s combat strength, drawing from trained 
recruits around the world, rose from roughly 1,000 to about 2,000 (Gunaratna 2002b).   
 Apart from developing its own capabilities, Al Qaeda also took on a train and 
equip role for the broader Islamist movement. With Sudan as a base, Al Qaeda developed 
a communications network linking its regional offices in London, New York, Turkey, 
and elsewhere. After establishing links with about twenty Islamist groups engaged in 
guerrilla warfare and terrorism, bin Laden supported them with funds, training, and 
weapons. 
 Al Qaeda’s own actions, however, made Sudan untenable. International pressure 





Laden became intense after he sponsored an unsuccessful assassination attempt against 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, a pillar of US and British policy in the Middle East. 
After an initial Sudanese rebuff, the United States increased its pressure by providing 
military assistance to Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia - Sudan’s often-hostile neighbors. 
Though Sudan ultimately caved, bin Laden’s departure to lawless and geographically 
isolated Afghanistan deprived the world of its ability to monitor him (Gunaratna 2002b). 
Al Qaeda – Returning to Afghanistan  
 
 The Taliban, a word which translates into English as seekers of knowledge (i.e. 
students) emerged in the Pashtun portion of southern Afghanistan in Qandahar Province 
in response to the lawlessness and chaos of the brutal, anarchic post-Soviet civil war. 
With direction and assistance from ISID, the Taliban branched out beyond its Pashtun 
center and seized two thirds of Afghanistan within five months of bin Laden’s arrival. 
Initially welcomed by the common people as a force for peace and stability amidst chaos, 
the Taliban, with further monetary and materiel assistance from ISID and Saudi Arabia as 
well as Gulf donations, went on to seize roughly 90 percent of the country. The country 
soon devolved into a long-running, but fairly stable civil war between the majority 
Pashtuns, and its domestic allies, based in the south against the minority Tajiks, and their 
domestic allies, based in the north.  
International politics indirectly favored the Taliban. Pakistan, ever fearful of 
being encircled by enemies with India to the east and Russia to the north, still had 
securing a safe border to the west via a pliant government in Kabul as its overriding goal. 
In response to Pakistani pressure spurred by international pressure stoked by India 





commanders, both foreign and native to the region, were forced to flee Pakistan, thus 
shaking off Pakistani control. The Pakistanis needed a new proxy force to ensure their 
Afghan interests, and the Taliban, shunned by the rest of the world, possessed nearly 
exclusive loyalty to Islamabad. The fact that India, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and 
Iran – Pakistan’s enemies – were aiding the Tajik-led Northern Alliance, the Taliban’s 
primary opposition, only further boxed Pakistan into supporting the Taliban. Given the 
ascendancy of a more hard-line conservative religious element in Pakistani military and 
political circles resulting from the anti-Soviet jihad, there was no effective opposition at 
Pakistan’s senior levels to propose alternative policies. The Taliban were solidly nestled 
in Afghanistan with Pakistani support (Rashid 2002). 
 A quid pro quo arrangement existed between Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Usama 
provided money and materiel to the Taliban in its fight against the Northern Alliance. Al 
Qaeda even developed a guerilla unit of 1,500 – 2,000 Arabs known as the 055 Brigade 
to aid Taliban forces. The Taliban, in return, gave Al Qaeda sanctuary as well as 
weapons, equipment, and training facilities. Al Qaeda was also allowed to use 
Afghanistan’s national aircraft to transport members, recruits, and supplies from 
overseas” (Rashid 2002, 54). Al Qaeda exploited this sanctuary to turn itself into a potent 
terrorist entity.  
Preparing to Turn the Corner – The Shifting International Political Context and Militant 
Islam Enables Al Qaeda 
 The failure of the first generation of Middle Eastern post-colonial native elites, 
who had previously been co-opted by the dominant colonial power, paved the road for 





economic, social and political problems perpetuated the colonial era’s social, economic, 
and political inequalities. This also did not eliminate the cultural tone deafness that 
plagued the colonialists. The distance between the government, albeit now under local 
control, and the general public continued to increase.  
These post-colonial leaders were replaced by more nationalist, socialist, secular 
rulers in the latter 1960’s and 1970’s. Though local faces not tainted with foreign 
collaboration, they were also unable to address political, economic and social problems in 
a culturally valid manner. Publicly failing major tests, such as Israel’s victory in the Six 
Day War, and an inability to stay unified under a universal Arab nationalist approach in 
the ethnically homogenous Arab Middle East significantly discredited this leadership 
generation.  
Islam as a political ideology began to gain traction, and the latter 1980’s are often 
perceived as the high water mark for legitimate Islamist political activity. On the whole, 
the tenor was peaceful and main-stream. In 1990, in Algeria, for example, “the Front 
Islamique du Salut, relatively moderate activists who had engaged with the democratic 
process, made huge gains in the first free elections since independence. In Sudan, a 
military coup d’etats allowed one of the key ideologues of contemporary political Islam, 
Hassan al Turabi, to come to power. Nor did the Iranian Revolution appear to have run 
out of energy. A fatwa pronounced by Ayatollah Khomeini on the British author Salaman 
Rushdie ambitiously extended the authority of the Iranian Islamist state and, by 
implication, ‘true’ Islamic practice throughout he West. The Communist system was 





The jihadist elements appeared nearly non-existent. Their existence, however, was 
real but low profile. It was simply submerged beneath the very public presence of more 
peaceful, main-stream political Islam.  
Recruits had not stopped flowing into Pakistan and Afghanistan throughout the 
1990s. Rather than focusing on fighting the Soviets, their primary purpose was to prepare 
themselves and then return to their homelands to combat their own governments. “In the 
seven years (bin Laden) was absent from southwest Asia, tens of thousands, possibly 
hundreds of thousands, of militants trained for terrorism and combat in the scores of 
training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan” (Burke 2004, 79-80).  
Two parallel yet juxtaposing trends enabled this situation. On one side of the coin, 
the Middle East saw increasing stability during the 1990’s. On the international level, the 
Oslo Accords followed the end of the Cold War. On the domestic level, there was a 
simultaneous changing and convergence of domestic politics within the United States, 
Israel, and Palestine. The tolerance for political violence decreased as hopes for peace 
rose. Individuals and/or groups who wished to pursue militant Islamist activities had to 
find a non-Middle Eastern geographic area in which to train. On the other side of the 
coin, and in direct contrast, southwest Asia witnessed increasing instability. Political 
attention faded from Afghanistan after the Soviet defeat. It was a region devoid of 
effective state control, awash with weapons, and close to multiple regional conflicts. 
Turing the Corner: Al Qaeda Becomes a Terrorist Entity 
 
In the late 1980’s and through 2001, Afghanistan was the central node in 
international terrorism. The Afghan jihad eclipsed the Palestinian struggle in terms of 





to serve as a ready-made base for further asymmetrical warfare training and preparation. 
Through residing in Afghanistan and controlling the training infrastructure, Usama’s Al 
Qaeda was at the global terrorist crossroads (Gunaratna 2002b).44 It was perfectly 
positioned to unite the jihadists and focus their power. 
Due to the harsh and often brutal domestic counter-insurgency measures of both 
Middle Eastern and Asian regimes, many of their guerilla and terrorist groups developed 
a robust external presence specifically to target those regimes from abroad. Al Qaeda 
established both strategic and tactical relationships with these and other Arab and Asian 
Muslim political, guerilla, and terrorist groups. This conglomeration of roughly two 
dozen entities scattered around the world gave Al Qaeda the global reach it needed to 
harness the untapped Muslim resources on a global scale, and thus target enemies on a 
global scale. On February 23, 1998, Usama announced the World Islamic Front for the 
Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders (Gunaratna 2002b). 
Conclusion 
 
 Al Qaeda, created by anti-Soviet mujahedeen guerilla fighters, evolved 
dramatically over fifteen years. What began as an organizational refuge with minimal 
clout or capability for the world’s Islamic militants following the Soviet war in 
Afghanistan evolved into a rear area support organization for Islamic militants engaged in 
struggles elsewhere. It then morphed into a fully functional transnational terrorist 
organization in its own right. It then gained sufficient stature to become a unifying 
coordinator amongst the world’s diverse Islamic political militants.  
Having established a historical baseline, the remainder of this dissertation 





factors that enabled it to become, and remain, a potent transnational terrorist entity. The 
next chapter will review Al Qaeda’s strategy. This will establish the overarching 













































 Chapter Four 
   Al Qaeda’s Strategy: Incremental Progress 
  “They tell us, sir, that we  
are weak – unable to cope  
with so formidable an adver- 
sary…Sir, we are not weak,  
if we make proper use of  
those means which the God of 
nature hath placed in our power.” 
    …Patrick Henry (Anonymous 2002, 195) 
 
The goals and world view of Usama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda have not altered since 
its inception. Its strategies for their implementation, however, have evolved in response 
to world affairs and Al Qaeda’s own capabilities. Al Qaeda now uses terrorism inside the 
United States and a blend of terrorism and guerilla war versus US interests abroad.  
 This chapter will begin with a discussion of Al Qaeda’s political goals. It then 
reviews Al Qaeda’s goal-achieving intermediary objectives, the political agenda that 
manifests Al Qaeda’s value choices. The evolution of Al Qaeda’s strategy to achieve 
these goals will then be explored in the context of the international political climate 
created by the US hard power approach and Al Qaeda’s persevering operational capacity 
despite US blows as contrasted against Al Qaeda’s efforts to exploit the political context 
internationally and democratic societies domestically who are opposing it.   
Al Qaeda’s strategy has been partially successful. Current underlying political, 
economic, and military trends favor Al Qaeda. If the US tack remains constant, Al Qaeda 
is likely to score several short to medium term power and political victories.  
Al Qaeda’s Political Goals  
 Al Qaeda has a singular worldly mission. It seeks to restore the fallen position of 





United States, subjects Muslims to “an ocean of oppression, injustice, slaughter, and 
plunder” on a global scale (Berner 2006, 189). This viewpoint holds that the West, 
especially the United States, primarily victimizes the Muslim peoples because of their 
adherence to Islam.45 In practical terms, this mission is spelled out via executing three 
main goals. First, Al Qaeda wishes to wipe away current international boundaries, which 
it perceives as artificial, Western-imposed demarcations that divide rather than unite 
Islam. Al Qaeda seeks to reestablish the caliphate, which will then rule a multinational, 
unified Islamic empire. Second, pursuant to establishing a caliphate, Al Qaeda seeks the 
withdrawal of all US and allied forces from Islamic countries. Third, Al Qaeda seeks to 
establish sharia. Only by closely adhering to all facets of Islam, which Al Qaeda views as 
God’s instructions and so by definition supreme and correct, can victory be achieved.  
  Al Qaeda intends to do achieve these goals operating in the capacity of a politico-
military “vanguard of the Muslim nation” to provide the “ummah with the inspiration it 
requires” in order to right the wrongs being inflicted upon the world’s Muslims. 
Operationally, “Al Qaeda was set up to wage jihad against infidelity, particularly to 
encounter the onslaught of the infidel countries against the Islamic states” (Mir 2006, 99). 
Al Qaeda thus aims to accomplish worldly political objectives. Politically, as Usama bin 
Laden stated just after 9/11, “I must say that my duty is just to awaken Muslims to tell 
them as to what is good for them and what is not” (Mir 2006, 99). As such, Al Qaeda will 
never surrender to the “crimes and vices” of the US and its allies.46  
 The chief religio-political organizing principle upon which Al Qaeda relies and 
executes its operational activity is the concept of jihad, sometimes referred to as “the 





moral struggle. Such a struggle may be entirely of a non-military nature.48 In a world 
view that does not distinguish between church and state, however, jihad can materialize 
in military form in pursuit of political objectives ensconced with religious justification. 
The military version of jihad receives great emphasis in Islamic history, writings, and 
scholarship.49  
 There are two types of military jihad – offensive and defensive. Each differs not 
only in the authorities necessary to invoke it, but also in the responsibilities to adhere to 
it. Defensive jihad is the chief threat in contemporary times. 
 Offensive jihad is meant to bring new lands under Muslim control and/or convert 
new adherents to Islam. This type of jihad is a collective responsibility of the Islamic 
people as a whole. It is not an individual responsibility, so no direct, personal action on 
the part of each Muslim is required. The only person who can launch an offensive jihad is 
a Caliph, the recognized leader of the Muslim nation as a whole whose successors 
derived from the Prophet. The last Caliphate, however, was deposed in the Anatolian 
segment of the Ottoman Empire in 1924.  
 Defensive jihad is meant to respond to an attack by non-Muslims. An attack can 
be upon Muslims as a people, upon Muslim lands, and/or upon Islam as a faith.50 Not 
without at least some justification, Al Qaeda claims that all three have occurred.  
 Defensive jihad is a personal responsibility, and so every Muslim must contribute 
to the fight as they are best able once Islam, in any of these forms, has been attacked. 
This obligation, at least in theory, cannot be avoided under the rubric of a defensive jihad. 
Such an individualistic orientation to this mode of religio-political action enables Al 





with religious justification. The nature of defensive jihad means that “each individual 
faces a fateful decision, one that will decide where he or she spends eternity. If bin 
Laden’s argument is accepted, he or she must take up arms or otherwise support the 
mujahedeen, or face eternal damnation for not performing a duty mandated by 
God”(Anonymous 2004, 8). Politics and all-permeating religion are thus mutually 
reinforcing.  
 Usama bin Laden argues that Islam and its people are under attack by the United 
States and its allies. He is calling upon Muslims throughout the world to recognize this 
fact and respond. Usama bin Laden is “inciting others to join, not because he orders them 
to, but because God has ordered them to do so in what He revealed in the Koran” 
(Anonymouse 2004, 7). 
 Unlike in an offensive jihad, a defensive jihad does not require a universally 
acknowledged leader to declare it. No approving authority is necessary, and any secular 
or clerical authority that hinders a response against external aggression is in the wrong. 
Despite not being an educated Islamic scholar, bin Laden is not doctrinally prevented 
from attempting to invoke a defensive jihad.  
 There is precedent for bin Laden’s actions. “The historical model for such action 
is the medieval hero Saladin, who though only a regional commander organized and led a 
successful defense against the armies of the second Crusade” (Johnson 2002, 12). Usama 
bin Laden, a noted leader in the successful anti-Soviet jihad, is of the same mold. His 
high personal standing permits him to speak to the Muslim, particularly the Arab, world. 





combined with his eloquence, Usama bin Laden strikes many cultural chords amongst 
Muslims in general and Arab Muslims in particular.  
 Not only has Usama bin Laden been fighting the perceived enemies of the Islamic 
peoples, but he has also been at least partly successful. In the eyes of his potential and 
actual adherents, that he is so actively hunted by the United States and its allies not only 
proves his potency at possibly unsettling an immoral world order, but it also vindicates 
the righteousness of his cause and its ultimate, existential, if not worldly, triumph (Iqbal 
2002).52 His calls for a defensive jihad would thus resonate amongst actual and/or 
potential adherents.  
As noted by a Pakistani political commentator who explicates the bond that bin 
Laden has forged with many actual and/or potential adherents, “Usama bin Ladin is a 
symbol of the peoples’ hatred of the United States. Usama bin Ladin has become as 
dangerous as a nuclear bomb. The United States can never catch Usama bin Ladin 
because he lives in the heart of every Muslim.”53 Usama bin Laden has, in effect, become 
a larger than life personification of political sentiment. 
Al Qaeda’s Intermediary Objectives 
 Al Qaeda central under bin Laden’s stewardship has been consistent and focused 
in its goals. Its intermediary objectives to achieve those goals, however, have evolved 
over time in relation to current events and organizational needs. As of 2007, bin Laden, 
via jihad, seeks to redress six specific, worldly political grievances.54  
 First, bin Laden routinely cites the Palestinian plight. He, as well as the vast 





Palestinians utterly contemptible. That the Israelis are empowered by the United States 
and perceived to operate with unfettered US backing makes the United States a target.  
 Second, US and Western troops are present on the Arabian Peninsula, the holy 
cradle of Islam. This is defamation in the militants’ eyes. Further, the presence of such 
troops only goes to show the weakness and apostate character of the supporting regimes.  
 Third, Al Qaeda claims that the United States supports corrupt, tyrannical Muslim 
governments that repress their own peoples to curry US favor. These governments are 
sell-outs who could not exist without US succor. Worse than Western governments allied 
with the United States, these governments are apostates, and so they must be eliminated. 
 Fourth, the United States supports governments that repress and/or are engaged in 
counter-insurgency efforts against their Muslim minorities. Russia, India, and China are 
leading examples. Al Qaeda charges that what the United States cannot do directly, it is 
doing indirectly via other world powers.  
 Fifth, the United States economically exploits Muslims. The United States 
pressures oil suppliers, especially Arab ones, to keep prices low for US benefit. This 
comes at the expense of potential wealth that the Muslim masses could accumulate to 
better their lives were it not for US actions.  
 Sixth, the United States has directly occupied Muslim lands. Allied and US forces 
are in Afghanistan, which holds a special place in Islamic lore due to the anti-Soviet 
jihad. The United States has also attacked and occupied Iraq, an Arab country in the heart 
of the Gulf crucial to human civilization in general and Islam in particular.  
Trends in Al Qaeda Thinking 





 First, Al Qaeda is not attempting to conquer new lands.  Per defensive jihad, it is 
responding to aggression. All of the issues annotated apply to political objectives that 
derive from either Islamic history and/or existing Muslim communities.  
 Second, these political objectives are defensive and not invasive or transformative 
in nature. Usama bin Ladin is not attempting to either destroy or convert the United 
States and its allies to Islam, though he has offered to aid this process, a necessary 
condition before attacking a non-Muslim foe in Islamic just war theory. He is not trying 
to excise US immorality. He simply does not wish it impressed upon Muslims.  
 As bin Ladin explains, “many people in the West are good and gentle people….I 
have already said that we are not hostile to the United States. We are against the system 
(US foreign policy) which makes nations slaves of the United States, or forces them to 
mortgage their political and economic freedom” (Mir 2001, 1). “This is an unfair 
division. The time has come for us to be equal” (Anonymous 2004, 153). “We are 
defending ourselves against the United States. This is why I used to say that if (Muslims) 
do not have security, the Americans also will not have it. This is a very simple 
formula…This is the formula of live and let live” (Mir 2005, 139).  
 These sentiments are not consistent with the oft asserted idea by President Bush, 
as summarized herein by Paul Bremmer, that “there is no point in addressing the so-
called root causes of (Al Qaeda’s) terrorism. We are the root cause of his terrorism. He 
doesn’t like America. He doesn’t like our society. He doesn’t like what we stand for. He 





 Certainly, Al Qaeda takes issue with some US cultural practices and priorities. Al 
Qaeda tolerates no deviation from the social and religious values it seeks to further. In 
these areas, there are clashes with US culture.  
 Al Qaeda’s primary grievance, however, is in relation to specific US actions. In 
fact, after 9/11, Usama called upon the US public “to understand the lesson of the New 
York and Washington raids, which came in response to some of your previous crimes. 
The aggressor deserves punishment” (AJSCT 2002). The United States is not hated for its 
existence. It is not simply misunderstood. It is understood. And, while perhaps not 
admired for cultural choices, its actions are reviled. 
 Third, bin Laden’s Al Qaeda is replying in kind to the treatment that he perceives 
Muslims to be receiving. As bin Laden explained when speaking to the US people, “just 
as you kill, you are killed. Just as you bombard, you are bombarded” (Anonymous 2004, 
153).  
 Muslim’s security is the item bin Laden sees as most chiefly threatened. Speaking 
to the United States, bin Laden stated on behalf of Al Qaeda that “we renew our pledge to 
Allah, our promise to the nation, and to the nation, and our threat to the Americans and 
Jews that they shall remain restless, shall not feel at ease, and shall not dream of security 
until they take their hands off our nation and stop their aggression against us and their 
support for our enemies. And soon will the unjust assailants know what vicissitudes their 
affairs will take” (Anonymous 2004, 153). 
 Fourth, bin Ladin places blame for the current US-Al Qaeda struggle, and the 
ultimate decision to change it, in US hands. As the United States is the world’s dominant 





United States) begins by (the United States) lifting oppression” (Anonymous 2004, 153). 
Muslims, whom bin Ladin perceives as global victims, are simply responding to a 
situation created by the United States and its allies. 
 Quite simply, bin Ladin argues that because it is the dominant power, the United 
States can choose to behave otherwise. He suggests Al Qaeda will not go away until the 
United States does so. The United States, because it intentionally does not choose to 
behave otherwise thus chooses to engage Al Qaeda rather than alter any of its policy 
decisions that run counter to Al Qaeda’s political agenda meant to redress grievances. 
 “So the case is easy, America will not be able to leave this ordeal unless it leaves 
the Arabian Peninsula, and stops its involvement in Palestine, and in all the Islamic 
world. If we give this equation to any child in an American school, he will easily solve it 
within a second. But, according to (President) Bush’s actions the equation won’t be 
solved until the swords fall on their heads, with the permission of Allah…” (Anonymous 
204, 153).  
 In fact, bin Laden has beseeched the US public to use its democratic system to 
alter its government’s actions. In mid November 2001 interview, bin Laden asked “the 
American people to check the anti-Muslim policies of their government. They had 
described their government’s policy against Vietnam as wrong. The American people 
should prevent the killing of Muslims at the hands of their government” (Mir 2005, 151). 
Al Qaeda’s Employment of Terrorism 
 Al Qaeda has opted to pursue its intermediary objectives via terrorism. Such a 





as a political minority outside of the mainstream, and the essentially political nature of 
the struggle. Al Qaeda has taken each of these steps. 
 Al Qaeda acknowledges that it is militarily inferior to its opponent, the United 
States backed by its world order. Zawahiri explains “that however far our capabilities 
reach, they will never be equal to one thousandth of the capabilities of the kingdom of 
Satan (the United States) that is waging war on us.”55 The roles of the authority center, 
the United States, and the challenger to authority, Al Qaeda, are clearly acknowledged. 
 Al Qaeda also acknowledges the essentially persuasive political nature of the US-
Al Qaeda struggle. Zawahiri has articulated that Al Qaeda is engaged in a struggle 
wherein “more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media.”56 
Zawahiri notes that “we can kill the captives by bullet. That would achieve that which is 
sought after without exposing ourselves to the questions and answering to doubts.”57  
 Beyond this, Al Qaeda acknowledges its status as a political minority and the 
need to win public support. As Zawahiri explained in his 2005 letter, Al Qaeda’s goals 
“will not be accomplished by the mujahed movement while it is cut off from public 
support, even if the jihadist movement pursues the method of sudden overthrow. This is 
because such an overthrow would not take place without some minimum of popular 
support and some condition of public discontent which offers the mujahed movement 
what it needs in terms of capabilities in the quickest fashion. Additionally, if the jihadist 
movement were obliged to pursue other methods, such as a popular war of jihad or a 
popular intifadah, then popular support would be a decisive factor between victory and 
defeat.”58 Al Qaeda seeks to inspire a political awakening amongst the world’s Muslim 





Al Qaeda’s Strategy Pre September 11th 
Initial Strategy 
Al Qaeda’s initial strategy was guerilla and terrorist campaigns against regimes 
victimizing Muslims. Their international backers would also be fair game. The US forces 
in the Middle East, and Muslim regimes oppressing their people in cooperation with the 
United States, were the key targets. This was essentially a comprehensive, simultaneous, 
system-wide approach. There were several reasons dictating this tack. 
There were historical influences. Nineteenth century European colonialism had 
instilled a nascent sense of nationalism. As such, Islamic resistance movements focused 
first on their own indigenous problems.  
This tendency was reinforced by an injunction from the Prophet Mohammed. 
When fighting his enemies, he had commanded that the “near” enemy be dealt with first 
before attacking the “far” enemy. In contemporary times, this correlated with pursuing 
national Islamic resistance movements first. 
Moreover, there was no pan Islamic leader to alter the national orientation of the 
many Islamic resistance groups. The anti-Soviet jihad was an aberration reflecting a 
unique confluence of political and social trends at the time. No uniting force existed after 
the Red Army’s defeat in Afghanistan (Anonymous 2004).   
 Finally, Al Qaeda needed time to develop. The constituent parts were far more 
powerful than the center. The best manner to act upon its mission and rally support was 





 This approach ultimately yielded very little headway. Country-per-country, “the 
jihadists were overmatched by the security apparatus of the states” (Benjamin and Simon 
2002). Limited and valuable jihadist resources were being squandered.  
Revised Strategy 
 Al Qaeda next opted for a consecutive, piecemeal approach. To fight battles on a 
country by country basis was to combat the symptoms, US proxies in a US-dominated 
system, versus the root disease, US power and influence. The United States, the 
cornerstone of the unjust international system, was the real problem. If it could be taken 
down, the rest of the system would collapse on its own and/or be easily defeated.  
By the late 1990s, bin Laden was working to focus the global jihad and Al Qaeda, 
its vanguard, against the United States (Najm 2002).59 Apart from having greater 
economy and efficiency against the enemy, this US-first tack allowed Al Qaeda to rise to 
prominence. Usama bin Laden kept the hatred of Al Qaeda members focused on the 
United States, a deeply unpopular country. This simultaneously suppressed internal 
rivalries to a higher cause while harnessing a powerful inspiration to draw recruits.  
Attacks continued against the United States during the 1990s under this strategic 
rubric. Independent jihadis inspired by Al Qaeda attacked the World Trade Center in 
1995. Al Qaeda itself bombed American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Al 
Qaeda nearly sunk the USS Cole, a US naval frigate, in Yemen in 2000. Finally, in 2001, 
Al Qaeda launched the 9/11 attacks, its strongest effort yet.    







 The US response to 9/11 has been strong. Politically, Al Qaeda has been made a 
pariah. Militarily, it has been hounded. Though its goals are unflinching, Al Qaeda’s 
strategy has had to adapt to new US-created realities. 
The Operational Dimension - Targeting 
The US response to 9/11 included not just the United States, but also major 
European and other world powers, which possess the other leading militaries. Al Qaeda, 
whether intentionally or not, picked a fight with the Western world as well as many other 
countries. As a result, Al Qaeda’s immediate need was to adjust its strategic balance. 
Most significantly, Al Qaeda has done this by loosening its direct, US-only focus. 
Not forgetting its main enemy, Al Qaeda has temporarily adjusted it focus to reduce the 
number of its opponents to give itself, and thus its cause, a better chance. Striking the 
United States indirectly via US allies, especially the Europeans, became a priority.  
Al Qaeda has had to strike a delicate balance. On the one hand, Al Qaeda cannot 
strike US allies so fiercely it sparks a backlash increasing their efforts against it. On the 
other hand, Al Qaeda must appear to be able to inflict enough pain at will to convey that 
it is best to be on the sidelines during this struggle.  
Each country had to be provided with a clear choice.60 As Al Qaeda was not 
seeking to make new enemies, but rather expel combatants from the fight. The die was 
not permanently cast. As Al Qaeda noted, “there is still a chance for anyone who wants to 
reconsider his position before it is too late” (“Al Qaeda Statement Congratulates 
Yemenis” 2004).  
Once the situation in Afghanistan stabilized in late spring 2002, Al Qaeda began 





contrast, apart from violence inside the war zone, the US itself and its major interests 
overseas have gone virtually untouched since 9/11. “Of the twenty nations al Qaeda 
threatened, eighteen have been attacked, a 90 percent correlation” (Anonymous 2004, 
169). In each case, Al Qaeda made clear the attacks were intended to make the targeted 
country rethink its support for US policies.  
The Operational Dimension – The Political Context 
 The post 9/11 anti-US political climate has framed Al Qaeda’s approach. Since 
9/11, the US and other major world powers, particularly Europe, have been drifting apart. 
In such a context, indirect, warning-style, fringe attacks as opposed to striking allied 
countries on a 9/11 scale appears to have proven sufficient to tip the scales without 
inspiring retribution.  
The 2004 Madrid train bombing exemplified Al Qaeda’s new strategy. It showed 
that not only could Al Qaeda still inflict serious harm inside Europe, but that it could 
influence domestic politics as well. After the attack, which immediately preceded a 
national election, an anti-war president was elected and Spain withdrew from Iraq.   
“Its allies wept with America after September 11th and then swiftly concluded that 
only America was under attack. The idea that Western Civilization had been the target 
was not convincing. While America and its allies stood shoulder to shoulder when they 
faced a common Soviet foe, Islamic terrorism seemed to have America alone in its sights. 
Why cozy up to a primary target, America’s allies asked themselves, when it will only 
make you a secondary one?”62 Al Qaeda’s terrorism was aptly exploiting the political 
processes of its target publics. 





The US response to 9/11 has significantly impacted one of the core tenets of Al 
Qaeda’s strategy - “that radical Islamists must gain control of a nation. Holding a state, in 
their view, is a prelude to knocking over the dominoes of the world’s secular Muslim 
regimes” (Benjamin and Simon 2002, 134). Once a chink in the international system is 
found and a foothold gained, this state will become a base for Al Qaeda to lead its 
adherents to victory.  
Afghanistan 
Initially, Afghanistan served this purpose. The 1996 Taliban capture of Kabul 
made Afghanistan an Islamic emirate under sharia, not withstanding deviations for local 
cultural adaptations. Afghanistan, ruled by Islamic scholar Mullah Omar, was a state that 
could serve as the first step in restoring the Caliphate and thus divide the world between 
the Islamic system and the rest, which constituted not only non-Muslim countries but also 
Muslim countries under “apostate” Muslim rulers who collaborated with the United 
States and other non-Muslim states (“Address from the Shaykh” 2002).63 
 The US thrust into Afghanistan, with its chaotic US troop presence, and the US 
thrust into Iraq, with its chaotic US troop presence, however, creates two cracks in the 
international system for Al Qaeda to pursue. In each case, if Al Qaeda does not attain 
control of a state, it can at least deprive the international system of control. It is highly 
unlikely to give up pursuing either.  
 Tangibly, Afghanistan has the potential to provide a strategic sanctuary. The 
adjacent tribal areas in Pakistan provide a ready base from which to continue the fight as 
well as a safe haven in case the fight fails. Extensive regional infrastructure built up since 





1996 capture of Kabul and the 2001 US invasion, Afghanistan can regain its status as a 
vanguard Muslim state in contemporary international relations.  
 Intangibly, Afghanistan has significant political and historical-religious value. 
The Russian defeat by the mujahedeen was Islam’s first victory over the West in roughly 
eight centuries. This factor resonates amongst Al Qaeda’s leadership and those amenable 
to Al Qaeda’s sway. Such a victory is a recent reassurance that, with the backing of God, 
anything is possible, and that good beliefs and valiant actions can lead to good results.  
 Losing Afghanistan to US forces was an undeniable setback. From Al Qaeda’s 
perspective, however, this is only a temporary state of affairs. As explained by Usama, 
“the one who prolonged us with one of His helping hands and stabilized us to defeat the 
Soviet Empire is capable of prolonging us again to defeat America on the same land, and 
with the same sayings, and that is the Grace of God” (Gunaratna 2002). Akin to the 
battles of Badr and The Trench, victories where the Prophet Mohammad won against 
superior forces, the stage is now set for a replay of events.64 
Iraq 
Tangibly, Iraq has the potential to provide a strategic sanctuary for Al Qaeda. Iraq 
currently has a barely existent state structure with little to no actual authority in the heart 
of the Middle East. Akin to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq is a galvanizing 
event that has served as a radicalizing and recruiting incentive to draw out new 
volunteers. The more damage that Al Qaeda does there only heightens its profile. The 
impact of Iraq simply goes far beyond Iraq itself in militant Islamist circles. From Al 





Intangibly, Iraq has strong political and historical-religious value. Defeating the 
United States, or at least being able to claim credit for doing so, carries tremendous 
political value. To do so in the heart of the Middle East only appeals to historical and 
cultural pride. Lastly, such a victory provides reassurance that, with the backing of God, 
good beliefs and valiant actions get good results.  
The Role of Economics 
Lastly, it is important to recognize that there is also a latent economic dimension 
to Al Qaeda’s strategy. “A Lesson in War,” a 2002 entry on the Al Qaeda-connected Al 
Ansar website, stated Al Qaeda embraced the Clausewitzian dictum of attacking an 
enemy’s center of gravity (Von Clausewitz, Howard, and Paret 1976).66 In contrast to 
Vietnam, where public opinion was the US center of gravity, Al Qaeda argues that the 
new US center of gravity is its economy (“A Lesson in War” 2002).67 Usama bin Laden 
has told the US public that Al Qaeda “will target key sectors of your economy until you 
stop your injustice and aggression” (AJSCT 2002). 
 The economic facts since 9/11 support the view that “aborting the American 
economy is not an unattainable dream” (“A Lesson in War” 2002). The costs of the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, as of fall 2007, are rapidly nearing half of one trillion dollars. By 
contrast, US cost estimates for the 9/11 attacks range from 500,000 to two million 
dollars. At best, this equates to a roughly 1:250,000 Al Qaeda-US spending ratio as of 
2007. Regardless, this ratio only worsens as the fight continues. 
 The underlying economic trends favor Al Qaeda as well. The economics of 
indigenous third world personnel employing terrorism and fighting guerilla wars locally 





against the United States in the long run. Apart from this military spending, overall 
government spending within the greater national security arena has been permanently 
increased. Creating new government agencies, such as the Department of Homeland 
Security, hiring thousands of new federal employees to counter the US terrorism threat, 
veterans’ benefits, and perpetual security upgrades to cope with an ever-evolving 
terrorism threat have added permanent new costs.  
It is an open question as to whether the United States can sustain this level of 
spending long enough to win. This is so not just in terms of raw US economic capacity, 
but also in terms of the domestic political choices such spending forces. Social Security 
and the US health care system will become pressing issues as the baby boom generation 
retires and smaller generations are called upon to support the current social system as the 
record deficit spending now financing the wars eventually comes due. The outcome of 
this looming guns or butter choice is unclear. 
Conclusion 
 Al Qaeda has a clear and grandiose overarching goal at odds with the current US-
led international system – the restoration of historical Muslim glory. This goal is not only 
validated by its religio-political ideology, but the characteristics of that religio-ideology 
also assist in achieving it. Long term conflict rooted in differing religio-political views is 
highly likely.  
To achieve this overarching goal, Al Qaeda has delineated six intermediary 
objectives. These are the redress of the Palestinian’s situation, removal of US troops from 
the Arabian Peninsula, ending US support for Middle East dictatorships, ending US 





exploitation of Middle East oil, and ending US occupations of Muslim lands. Mindful of 
the political dynamics of terrorism, these objectives are not only consistent with Al 
Qaeda’s world view, but they will also help it gain political support on a global scale. 
 Aware of the power disparity between it and the United States, Al Qaeda has 
opted for US-focused terrorism to effect these desired political changes in the world 
order. As exemplified by the US invasion of Afghanistan, this strategy’s power and 
political dimensions reinforce one another, for the US invasion validates Al Qaeda’s 
claims of aggressive US desires while simultaneously inspiring adherents to fight there, 
thus helping it to regain a sanctuary. At the same, per the dynamics of terrorism, this fight 
leverages economics to Al Qaeda’s long term benefit. In contrast to the Administration’s 
approach, Al Qaeda is staying true to its internal political nature and using the 
international political context to frame and guide its application of force to successfully, 
albeit incrementally, achieve its political goals in the US-Al Qaeda political struggle. Al 
Qaeda has embraced the political dimension, and it is gaining.  
Though powerful, Al Qaeda’s approach is not invincible. Progress against it has 
been made. The next chapter will describe and evaluate US counter strategy.   




















US Strategy Against Al Qaeda: Progress and Pitfalls 
 
    “Hope is not a plan!” 
    …LTC Michael Bochna68 
 
As noted by the 9/11 Commission: “The United States did not, before 9/11, adopt 
as a clear strategic objective the elimination of al Qaeda” (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks 2004, 108). Until 1997, in fact, the US government understood bin 
Laden to be an “extremist financier” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004, 
108). As a result, Al Qaeda was unhindered during the 1990’s and became steadily more 
potent as US attention focused on Cold War detritus – Yugoslavia’s breakup, Dual 
Containment in the Gulf, securing the Soviet nuclear arsenal, and peacekeeping missions 
to establish new norms.  
September 11th made terrorism, specifically Al Qaeda, a strategic priority. The 
United States directly retaliated in Afghanistan. To preemptively pursue Al Qaeda, the 
United States invaded Iraq. The question now is how to secure US strategic gains and 
continue pursuing Al Qaeda, which a July 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate says is 
regenerating and has created a “heightened threat environment” for the United States.69 
This chapter will begin with a review of the US post 9/11 approach and an 
overview of current international realities resulting from these US efforts. This review 
will identify current successes, key strengths and weaknesses, and current failures in the 
US approach. The limits of pure hard power will be revealed. Unexploited opportunities 
stemming from US non-engagement of the US-Al Qaeda struggle’s political dimension 





This chapter will then review the emerging US strategy going into the last 18 
months of the Bush administration. A coherent and focused US strategic approach to Al 
Qaeda as an organization has been been lacking. While the United States initially dealt 
with Al Qaeda on its own merits, the US approach has evolved to make combating Al 
Qaeda a function of competing US interests. It is not clear the United States will win.  
Post September 11
th
 US Strategy to Combat Al Qaeda 
 
 The post 9/11 US counterterrorism campaign to date has consisted of two 
consecutive components – an initial reaction to the 9/11 attacks in Afghanistan, Part I, 
followed by a broader pro-active effort around the world, Part II. In line with President 
Bush’s initial four post-9/11 decisions forming the philosophical basis of US strategy to 
combat Al Qaeda, Parts I and II heavily emphasized hard power. These steps made 
progress, but it has proven both partial and tenuous.  
Part I 
 
 Part I, immediate retaliation against Al Qaeda, occurred from 12 September 2001 
until summer 2002. This part of the US 9/11 response centered on directly combating 
Usama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda. It consisted of four steps. 
 The first step was to deny Al Qaeda a safe haven. The November 2001 US 
invasion of Afghanistan deprived Al Qaeda central of its established sanctuary.70 Around 
the world, US troops deployed against major known Al Qaeda allies, such as Abu Sayyaf 
in the Philippines, and helped governments around the world threatened by Al Qaeda-
associated terrorists reclaim their sovereignty.71    
 The second step, which occurred concurrently with the first, was to attempt to 





and eventual adjudication was set up under the stewardship of the Department of Defense 
and headquartered at Guantanamo Bay.72 The other system was a series of secret CIA 
prisons known as “black sites” in allied countries around the world wherein Al Qaeda 
prisoners are interrogated using controversial methods.73 
 The third step, which occurred concurrently with the first two, was to engage 
other states in the capture and detention of Al Qaeda operatives. The United States 
quickly established intelligence liaison relationships to yoke the power of local states to 
detain Al Qaeda operatives within their countries, and Pakistan has played a key role in 
this effort.74 The United States also made arrangements for select allied governments, 
such as Egypt, to assist in interrogating and incarcerating Al Qaeda prisoners so as to 
expand US capabilities beyond US laws.75  
 At first blush, these steps paid real dividends. Roughly 4,000 people have been 
detained world wide since 9/11 as of summer 2005 discounting battlefield detainees in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.76 Pakistan alone has transferred over 700 Al Qaeda operatives to 
the United States.77 No major terrorist attacks have occurred against the United States. 
Several major plots have been disrupted, the most recent being an attempt to hijack 10 
airliners out of Heathrow.78  
 Fourth, the Department of State launched a political effort, the “Shared Values” 
campaign, to improve US public standing. “The effort was designed by a talented 
Madison Avenue advertising executive; she described the task as ‘almost as though we 
have to redefine what America is. This is the most sophisticated brand assignment I have 





CD-ROMs, pamphlets, and a splashy magazine for young Muslims” (Anonymous 2004, 
15).  
 The US political effort, however, was drastically less successful than the 
organizational effort, and the campaign ended in early 2003. One reason for this was 
conceptual. The other factor, however, is an intractable short to medium term problem 
resulting from larger US policy. 
Conceptually, the Shared Values Campaign was “apparently…flawed, with the 
films showing how well Muslims lived and were treated in America, rather than 
explaining or defending US policies. Worse, the countries asked to run the films – Egypt, 
Jordan, and Lebanon – refused, saying they would not ‘run messages on behalf of other 
governments’” (Anonymous 2004, 15). The United States touted US values instead of 
engaging Al Qaeda’s values, as manifested in its political agenda, to explain US actions. 
This effort to assuage political concerns spoke to the US point of view instead of the 
perspective of Al Qaeda and its potential adherents and supporters. The US effort simply 
did not acknowledge the subversion of the political sphere to ideology, which is inherent 
to terrorism, and thus it did not address the conflict’s underlying competing political 
agendas. 
Reflective of deeper problems resulting from US policy, the United States was not 
a credible interlocutor.79 As explained by Professor Shibley Telhami in The Middle East 
Journal, “we in the West, in the United States, cannot wage that war of ideas. For one 
thing, we would not be trusted. I do not think that the US policy right now can be 
oriented at ‘winning hearts and minds’ of the Middle East in the short term. That is not 





part on impression; it is not going to be able to change the paradigm overnight simply by 
a charm campaign… People are not going to trust the message if they don’t trust the 
messenger” (Telhami 2002, 9).  
Actions, not words, therefore, would be necessary to politically engage Al 
Qaeda’s potential adherents and supporters. US actions, however, repeatedly contradicted 
positive-sounding US words, and the United States was unwilling to take substantive 
action on salient issues from the perspective of Al Qaeda’s supporters and adherents, 
such as the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The United States further undermined its own 
credibility, which prevented it from meaningfully engaging Al Qaeda politically.  
 Al Qaeda was defined as a national security threat. The US government rationally 
applied all of the hard power resources it could muster to pursue the national interest, 
which the Administration defined as maximizing its power vis a vis Al Qaeda. Though 
the caveat of ideology was acknowledged, it was given a distinctly secondary emphasis.  
Part II 
 
 Part II, expanding US military action on a global scale under the guise of 
combating Al Qaeda, effectively began when the Taliban’s spring 2002 offensive was 
kept in check and Afghanistan’s military and political situation began to stabilize. It 
continues into the present. Less than a year after the attacks on the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon, the Administration turned to other objectives, most notably preparing 
and executing the US invasion of Iraq. Though not over, as of 2007, the range of likely 
outcomes appears far less positive than the Administration initially predicted five years 





 Starting in the summer of 2002, a post 9/11 hyper-empowered President Bush 
began making the argument that Saddam Hussein was a clear and present danger. 
President Bush asserted that Saddam maintained viable links to Al Qaeda. The President, 
though never drawing a direct connection, repeatedly alluded to Saddam in the context of 
9/11. This persuasion via innuendo proved so effective that, during the summer and fall 
of 2002, roughly 20-25% of Americans believed that Saddam Hussein had been directly 
involved in 9/11. About 48% thought that even if he was not involved, Saddam Hussein 
still retained strong links to Al Qaeda.80 
Even more threatening, President Bush claimed Saddam Hussein was seeking 
weapons of mass destruction. President Bush raised the specter not just of being attacked 
outright by Iraq, but of the possibility of Saddam Hussein not only permitting Al Qaeda 
to operate under his purview, but of Saddam Hussein colluding with Al Qaeda and 
providing them weapons of mass destruction.81 No firm, presentable evidence existed to 
conclusively prove otherwise, and President Bush’s concerns, particularly when 
articulated by Colin Powell before the world at the United Nations, gained traction in a 
public psyche still traumatized by 9/11, which had occurred less than one year prior.82 
 When the United States could not obtain backing from the United Nations for its 
actions, the Bush administration cast the institution aside and proceeded unilaterally with 
a “coalition of the willing,” a collection of states willing to follow the US lead in Iraq in 
spite of a lack of UN approval.83 The US invasion of Iraq commenced in March 2003 
drawing primarily upon US active duty and reserve US forces not engaged in 





Iraqi forces. The country was effectively taken within one month, and US casualties 
totaled a mere 137 losses in defeating the 400,000 strong Iraqi armed forces.84  
 Part II was counterproductive in organizationally combating Al Qaeda.  Political 
and organizational dynamics have been mutually reinforcing to US detriment. The impact 
has been both domestic and international.  
Al Qaeda has organizationally expanded as a result of the US war in Iraq. As the 
September 11th commission has articulated, there were no substantive ties between Iraq 
and Al Qaeda prior to September 11th, and Al Qaeda did not have a discernable presence 
inside Iraq prior to the 2003 US invasion (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
2004). Now, however, Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia not only exists, it is the most active Al 
Qaeda franchise, and its violence has significantly shaped the political tenor of the 
fighting.  
 The US invasion of Iraq has spurred recruiting. The US invasion of another 
Muslim country, and this one in the heart of the Middle East, followed by US backing of 
a Shia -dominated regime effectively rallies actual and potential Sunni jihadists. Al 
Qaeda is now numerically stronger.85 
 Poor US post-invasion political and military execution has created an Al Qaeda 
haven. Force levels were insufficient to either occupy the country or quell a post-invasion 
insurgency.86 Poor political planning for the invasion’s aftermath and inadequate military 
capability employed in conventional means against unconventional foes has resulted in 
an insurgency that has grown stronger every year and an Iraqi national government that is 
largely dysfunctional.87 The necessary ingredients for continued fighting – armaments, 





can be sustained indefinitely. The sanctuary/growth engine that Al Qaeda lost in the US 
invasion Afghanistan has been partially regained.88 
As a result, the United States is now less able to confront Al Qaeda elsewhere, or 
deal with non-Al Qaeda related threats. The US armed forces are wholly occupied and 
straining to maintain the pace of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as of 2007. Now, US 
forces are bogged down, and reserve strength for other action – whether to respond to 
new threats or to reinforce threatened gains – is slim to non-existent.89 Six years into the 
struggle against Al Qaeda, only now is serious talk being given to expanding the US 
armed forces.90 
The United States, which had the world’s sympathy following 9/11, has become 
increasingly politically isolated internationally, at least in relation to its Iraq policies.91 
Actions to date have significantly weakened US credibility and moral validity.92 The 
United States has handicapped itself.   
Terrorism is a political contest, and thus it inherently has a values-based political 
dimension. As noted in chapter nine, the US invasion of Iraq violated not only the 
terrorists’ political values and agenda, but the generally accepted political norms and 
values of the general populations in both developed and developing states, particularly 
Muslim ones, which is the base from which Al Qaeda draws its support. Because Al 
Qaeda cast itself as defending against this broadly unpopular US action – which was 
executed without UN backing and appeared both wanton and unjust in the eyes of much 
of the world, particularly the developing and Muslim worlds – its popularity rose, which 
is the key to increased operational and logistical assistance from the general populace. 





ignores the fact that the terrorists, Al Qaeda, gain support through towing the line to a 
political agenda and contrasting it to their opponents’ actions, the US invasion of Iraq.  
In a terrorism struggle, political values can have hard power implications. Al 
Qaeda’s political ideology has gained increased validation among potential supporters 
and adherents. As a result, as will be explained in the following chapters, Al Qaeda’s 
position has improved in power-based terms of organizational capacity, manning, 
territory, and finances.  
Conversely, the US position is weaker. First, the term “terrorism” has been 
diluted. By blending Saddam Hussein with Usama bin Laden, two very different people 
who are viewed very differently throughout the world, the term’s integrity has 
depreciated. It is now linked to an unpopular war launched without UN backing. Second, 
the damaged US standing with both the world’s Muslim publics, upon whom Al Qaeda 
depends, and US-allied authoritarian Muslim states, whose range of action is reduced by 
pro-Al Qaeda public opinion reduces overall US efficacy against Al Qaeda (Al Qurashi 
and Abu Ubayd 2003).93 Third, the US public is becoming increasingly divided as the 
banner of counterterrorism is increasingly being waived in locations other than directly 
against Al Qaeda and its purported safe-havens in Pakistan. This domestic political 
fragmentation and turmoil limits the freedom of action of the US government.  
Current International Relations and US Foreign Policy:  
 
As of fall 2007, the greater US war effort has reached a temporary strategic 
stability. The underlying trends in Afghanistan, Iraq, and with respect to Iran, however, 
do not favor the United States. Unfortunately, the United States does not have the power 





In response, the United States is employing a new strategic framework to deal 
with the world that has emerged as a result of post 9/11 US actions. Rather than 
defensively focus on securing gains and shoring up weaker positions, the Administration 
is embarking upon a new offensive approach to attack perceived centers of gravity 
threatening existing US initiatives. This effort, however, is not only premised upon 
questionable assumptions and arguable priorities, but it also muddies the fight against Al 
Qaeda, the ultimate purpose, by making it a function of other intermediary objectives.   




 The US situation in Afghanistan is tenuous at best. Mixed progress has been made 
on governance, economics, and security. The overall outcome is still uncertain.  
There are some positive developments. A president and a legislature have been 
democratically elected.94 Sufficient foreign aid continues to sustain the nascent central 
government as the economy continues to expand significantly since the arrival of US 
forces and at double digit rates since 2005.95 And, the army and police forces continue to 
strengthen, albeit not as quickly as the US and its allies would like.96  
Countervailing factors exist, however. The result is that the accomplishments to 
date mask deeper, dominant problems. The Afghani government is in a difficult political 
position. Immediately after the Taliban’s fall, the government claimed victory; now, 
however, it must deliver services to meet people’s rising expectations, needs, and wants. 
The problem is that government’s capacity to do this is virtually nonexistent.97  
Though the economy continues to grow, the government still lacks a significant 





donations.98 At the same time, soaring opium production, which some estimates place at 
more than 50% of the economy, denies it revenue.99 
Though the army and police forces are growing, the overall security situation is 
worsening. In summer 2007, Human Rights Watch announced there were 136 suicide 
attacks intended to terrorize the civilian population, a six-fold increase from 2005.100 
Civilian casualties have also reached unprecedented levels.101 The Taliban, which the 
2001 US invasion swept away, now controls up to four times as much territory as it did in 
2005, With a tripling of attacks on the national government and its international backers, 
the Taliban effectively contests the Afghan national government for sovereignty in the 
south and east of the country.102  
At the same time, Iran, Afghanistan’s most powerful regional neighbor, is 
increasing its influence over Afghanistan’s future.103 A historic host to millions of 
Afghan refugees during the Cold War and Afghanistan’s civil war era, Iran still supports 
roughly one million Afghan refugees as of 2006.104 They play an important bilateral 
political role due to the possibility of their forced return and Afghanistan’s inability to 
absorb them, a socially significant domestic role because of Afghanistan’s extended 
family network, and a vital international economic role via remittances. Iran is also the 
primary actor for Afghanistan’s reconstruction, particularly on the politically sensitive 
topics of electricity and water, and it has done much to develop Afghanistan’s western 
provinces.105  
The burgeoning US-Iran struggle, however, makes Afghanistan a pawn in the 





geographic encirclement. In practical terms, Iran has three options to leverage 
Afghanistan against the United States  
Iran can seek to influence internal Afghan politics. It can try to co-opt the United 
Front, the last vestiges of the Northern Alliance, now the anti-Karzai parliamentary bloc 
whom Iran had militarily backed versus the Taliban prior to 2001.106 Iran can also seek to 
draw the Pashtuns writ large, and the Taliban in particular, into the political process.107 
The closer the Taliban comes to achieving legitimacy, the more potent Al Qaeda becomes 
as a behind-the-scenes actor. As Iran has noted, it played a very constructive role when 
the US entered Afghanistan by providing military and refugee assistance, and it eased the 
US political entry by not opposing US efforts.108 Though it can not only prevent future 
progress and undo existing progress, it would also be willing to be more helpful in 
resolving Afghanistan’s current crises with proper incentive from the United States.109  
Iran can intensify the insurgency as in Iraq. A combination of cultural connections 
with experience from the Afghan jihad gives Iran a thorough knowledge of Afghan 
society. When combined with a long, porous border and a low US and international troop 
presence relative to Afghanistan’s size and population, Iran can covertly intervene in the 
fighting at US expense. To date Iran has already begun aiding the Taliban by providing 
small arms and advanced improvised explosive device technologies that can defeat US 
armor and have caused so many US military casualties in Iraq. That assistance appears to 
be increasing as tensions with the United States rise.110  
Finally, Iran can illicitly assist Pakistan’s President Musharraf, and vice versa. 
Afghanistan’s two chief neighbors are uncomfortably under pressure by and dependent 





– either cooperatively as a united front or in a more conflictive manner by attempting to 
divert US attention to each other. Pakistan and Iran have, in fact, renewed previously 
lapsed ties post 9/11, and Musharraf and Ahmadinejad have engaged in summitry.111 
Iraq 
 
The US situation in Iraq is also tenuous at best. Mixed progress has been made on 
governance, economics, and security, but as with Afghanistan, the future is uncertain.  
As in Afghanistan, a national government has been democratically elected, and it 
has proven durable enough to survive personnel changes.112 While Iraq has been unable 
to finance its own reconstruction via oil sales as predicted prior to the war by then Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, substantial US foreign aid with some backing from 
the world community to bolster domestic revenue is sustaining the nascent central 
government. And, the Iraqi national army and police forces continue to grow in number, 
though their quality is high debatable.113 
Despite this progress, there are many deeper, unresolved issues that could and are 
undoing this progress. The national government has failed to extend its writ over the 
whole country, and sectarian feuding has deprived it of widespread legitimacy, a fact 
recognized in the September 2007 US Senate resolution endorsing a strategy of ethnic 
partition.114 Partisan feuding, particularly within the Shiite confession, has robbed the 
national government of stability and effectively dead-locked it.115 The government’s 
ability to deliver services is minimal, and popular support for its US backers, who 






 Despite sitting atop massive oil reserves, Iraq’s economy is sputtering. The oil 
infrastructure, which was supposed to pay for Iraq’s reconstruction, is not only producing 
insufficiently to cover expenses, but production is also declining due to post-invasion 
wartime violence and infrastructure damage.117 At the same time, extensive capital, both 
monetary and human, is becoming internally displaced and/or fleeing and taking refuge 
inside Iraq’s more peaceful neighbors.118 
Though the army and police are growing, the overall security situation is 
worsening. Violence against US forces and the Iraqi government – in both volume and 
complexity - has grown steadily per annum.119 A de facto civil war has emerged, and 
civilian casualties – both in volume and rate - by far outpaces the military.120 Despite a 
brief lull as the US troop surge began to take effect in spring 2007, the violence has 
effectively returned unabated with trend lines that do not favor US and Iraqi government 
forces.121 
Iran and the Greater Middle East 
 
The 2003 US invasion of Iraq fundamentally altered the strategic balance in the 
Persian Gulf, the heart of the Middle East, which is the regional heart of Al Qaeda’s 
support. The most profound unintended consequence has been Iran’s stark military and 
political empowerment. The faltering US regional position, which is tied to the failing US 
war in Iraq that limits US military options, means the United States cannot dominate the 
region and impose a new order.  
In the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, the United States was the preeminent military 
and political power in the region. The Dual Containment Doctrine, wherein the United 





level perpetuated the US role, presence, and position in the region. Intended as a 
temporary fix, it devolved into a long running policy that slowly unraveled during the 
latter 1990s (Cause 1994).  
Following the US invasion of Afghanistan, which was shortly followed by the US 
invasion of Iraq, Iranian power, influence, and standing vis a vis the United States was at 
its nadir. The United States was politically empowered by 9/11. The US military was 
successfully engaged on Iran’s eastern and western borders while the US navy boasted a 
powerful armada in the Gulf, thus encircling Tehran with combat-ready US forces. And, 
Iran’s historical ties to groups that could be characterized as terrorists, such as Hezbollah, 
put it at a political, and potentially strategic, disadvantage in the post 9/11 era, especially 
given its publicly acknowledged holding of senior Al Qaeda leaders.122 When these facts 
are viewed through the negative light of US-Iranian relations since the 1979 revolution, 
Iran was in a potentially precarious position.  
Iran responded by reaching out. First, Iran explicitly offered immediate assistance 
to the United States in its war effort by allowing over-flights by US planes into 
Afghanistan, offering search and rescue services for US pilots, and aiding refugees. 
Politically, Iran participated in regional discussions about Afghanistan in a manner 
constructive to US interests.123 Beyond not obstructing US war efforts, Iran also 
purportedly offered the United States a “Grand Bargain” to resolve outstanding bilateral 
issues and map a new future.124 
The United States did not, however, exploit this opportunity. Rather, the United 





to amicably engage.125 Only as of 2007 have formal, direct, bilateral negotiations been 
initiated, and, permeated with an adversarial tone, they have accomplished little.126  
As of summer 2007, the situation is dramatically different. Iran’s strategic 
position has improved dramatically. Iran is now more defiant.  
The US invasion of Iraq destroyed the only Arab force able to contain Iran. The 
Saudis, whose military is 75,000 strong, is a distant second to Iran’s military in excess of 
400,000 personnel, even when accounting for the Saudi’s superior, modern US 
technology. Simply stated, US forces are now stretched too thin for any significant 
unilateral ground action, a critical military arbiter.127  
Politically, Iran, acting via non-state proxies, can now needle US interests in 
Lebanon via Hezbollah and in Palestine via Hamas. Militarily, US forces are exposed in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. These troops, who are fully engaged in situations considered to be 
on the brink, are stretched too thin to turn their efforts toward Iran (Hersh 2007). 
Problematically, US strategic depth is lessening. Allies are retiring from Iraq.128 
Those shifting to Afghanistan are having their capabilities consumed by that fight against 
a resurgent Taliban, and many allies forces there have restrictions that bar their troops 
from engaging in combat.129 From the US view, allied strategic reserves are declining.  
It appears that time is on Iran’s side. If Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, it has 
gained several more years of research from when President Bush first labeled Iran a 
charter member of the Axis of Evil. Further delay, even if under sanctions, only enables 
the possibility of further progress. Given that Iran’s conventional inferiority to US forces 
is not disputed, a nuclear capability is the one possible ultimate guarantor of regime 





forced the United States to expend ever increasing amounts of political capital on a non-
existent threat, thereby increasing Iran’s relative advantage in any future dispute. 
Finally, Iran’s sway over its neighbors is higher than it was prior to the US 
invasion of Iraq. In Iraq, a Shiite-dominated state with close ties to Iran has risen to 
power.130 In Afghanistan, as noted earlier, massive reconstruction contracts yielding 
economic and political influence have been signed while Iran also retains the ability to 
manipulate the insurgency. 
Iranian political leadership statements, a barometer of perceived relative power, 
have gone from conciliatory following 9/11 to confrontational as of 2007. Since the start 
of the Iraqi insurgency, Iranian President Amadinejad has publicly called for Israel’s 
destruction.131 He has also made repeated statements expressing Iran’s right to pursue 
nuclear power regardless of the will of the US-led international community.132 In early 
March 2007, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who rarely makes public 
pronouncements, spoke on Iranian state television and said that the “realities in the region 
show that the arrogant front, headed by the US and its allies, will be the principal loser in 
the region” (Hersh 2007).  
Contemporary US Foreign Policy 
 
With faltering wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the November 2008 national 
election in the background, the combined pressure of the November 2006 Democratic 
takeover of Congress and the December 2006 Iraq Study Group’s report release 
established common terms for all sides in the Iraq debate and is forcing President Bush to 





repercussions of the US invasion of Iraq, which the Bush administration touts as the 
centerpiece of US efforts against Al Qaeda, while still combating Al Qaeda elsewhere.134  
In order to save the US effort in Iraq, US effort has moved to countering Iran. The 
Bush administration maintains Iran is aiding insurgents against the US-backed Iraqi 
national government, whose failure, according to President Bush, will give Al Qaeda a 
regional base from which to attack the United States.135 Secondarily, but not 
dismissively, President Bush accuses Iran of pursuing nuclear weapons and claims Iran 
might give these weapons to terrorists, with whom the United States accuses Iran of 
having ties, as well as being menacing to other regional US interests – most notably 
Israeli security, and a stable US oil supply.  
The Administration perceives Iran as more powerful than the non-state actors it is 
engaging. This root of the problem has therefore now become the US regional foreign 
policy issue prism. The United States has subsequently adjusted its Middle East priorities 
and implemented them via a series of four understandings with the Israelis and the 
Saudis, the two chief US regional allies who also see an Iranian threat (Hersh 2007).137  
First, the United States wishes to ensure Israeli security, which also creates a 
favorable US balance of power as Israel is a key US ally and occasional regional proxy. 
The Saudis and other US-allied Sunni states, such as Jordan, share Israel’s concern about 
Iran. The political and military fallout from an attack upon Israel would wreak regional 
havoc. Israeli security is thus a necessary precursor to future regional stability. 
Second, in response to Arab concerns, the United States will make the Israeli-
Palestinian issue a focus.138 Israel’s ceding of Gaza effectively killed President Bush’s 





violence continues.140 A respected Arab interlocutor is required. The Saudis have vowed 
to urge the Palestinians to work together and in earnest with Israel.141   
Directly, achieving an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement will likely increase US 
leverage in the region. A peace agreement will decrease the political space that Iran could 
exploit, for the Palestinians, particularly HAMAS, will not be in desperate need of third 
country backing as they struggle with a US-backed Israeli goliath.142 Also, increased 
peace and stability inside Israel will likely improve Israel’s range of political maneuver, 
both domestically and internationally – a factor that could be exploited to US benefit.  
Indirectly, improving the Palestinian’s plight is to US political benefit. The 
United States is, at a minimum, largely held responsible in the eyes of the much of the 
rest of the world, particularly amongst Muslims, for permitting the beleaguered plight of 
the Palestinians to endure. Improving that situation with an enduring peace ending 
indefinite regional hostilities will be to US political benefit because, in the converse of 
being held indirectly responsible for Palestinian suffering, the United States will very 
likely be indirectly credited with aiding the Palestinians. The US political position, and 
that of its allies, will likely improve.143 To this end, as of fall 2007, Secretary of State 
Condoleeza Rice is laying the groundwork for a major Israeli-Palestinian conference.144 
Third, the United States and its allies will work against Shiite ascendance in the 
Middle East. Virtually all of the Sunni regimes upon whom the United States depends 
have Shiite minorities. In the Administration’s view, any Shiite gains are seen as 
beneficial to Iran. Empowering Sunni regimes against their Shia minorities makes them 





Fourth, the Saudis, acting as a US proxy, will work to weaken Syrian President 
Bashir Assad’s regime, which is most effectively done by engaging his political 
opposition. The Syrians are accused of being a major conduit of fighters, money, and 
weapons for the Iraqi insurgency, which also threatens the Saudis.145 The Syrians are also 
accused of being a conduit for Hezbollah, thereby strengthening a de facto alliance with 
their Iranian backers.146 And, the Syrians are still at odds with Israel over the Golan 
Heights.147 By pressuring Syria, movement on one or more of these fronts might be 
possible.  
Premised upon this framework, the Bush administration has subsequently 
ratcheted up the tension between the United States and Iran throughout 2007. It has done 
so politically and militarily. The United States is now positioned for a military strike.  
On January 10, 2007, President Bush in a televised speech stated that Iran and 
Syria were “allowing terrorists and insurgents to use their territory to move in and out of 
Iraq. Iran is providing material support for attacks on American troops. We will disrupt 
the attacks on our forces. We’ll interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria. And we 
will seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our 
enemies in Iraq” (Hersh 2007, 54). The clear implication was that US difficulties in Iraq 
were due to Iranian malfeasance.  
Evidence bolstering the Bush administration’s position then became public. A 
series of articles in the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Los Angeles 
Times flowed in the subsequent weeks about illicit Iranian activities. On February 11, 
2007, a press conference in Baghdad showed reporters sophisticated weaponry that the 





On January 14, 2007, Vice President Cheney on Fox News warned of “a nuclear-
armed Iran, astride the world’s supply of oil, able to affect adversely the global economy, 
prepared to use terrorist organizations and/or their nuclear weapons to threaten their 
neighbors and others around the world” (Hersh 2007, 54). In an attempt to isolate Iran, 
Vice President Cheney added that “if you go and talk with the Gulf states or if you talk 
with the Saudis or if you talk with the Israelis or the Jordanians, the entire region is 
worried…The threat Iran represents is growing.”149 
The administration has not stood idly by while articulating the Iranian threat. 
Actual military action has been taken. Potential military action has been readied. 
Starting in August 2006, the US military began detaining and interrogating 
hundreds of Iranians in Iraq. “‘The word went out last August for the military to snatch as 
many Iranians in Iraq as they can,’ a former senior intelligence official said. ‘We’re 
working these guys and getting information from them. The White House goal is to build 
a case that the Iranians have been fomenting the insurgency and they’ve been doing it all 
along – that Iran is, in fact, supporting the killing of Americans’” (Hersh 2007, 56). 
During a January 2007 appearance before the Senate Foreign Affairs committee, 
Democratic Chairman Senator Joseph Biden pointedly asked Secretary of State Rice 
about US plans and intentions for pursuing Iranian operatives across the border into Iran 
from Iraq. The Secretary replied that “obviously, the President isn’t going to rule 
anything out to protect our troops, but the plan is to take down these networks in Iraq. I 
do think that everyone will understand – that the American people and I assume the 





57). This vague response allows for the possibility about which Senator Biden was 
concerned.150  
Also in winter 2007, a second aircraft carrier strike group was dispatched to the 
Persian Gulf. Vice President Cheney publicly emphasized that this should not be 
misconstrued as being related to Iraq and that it was intended as a warning to Iran. The 
baseline naval force was indefinitely increased from one carrier strike group to two. Since 
summer 2007, when two more strike groups were dispatched to relieve those on station, 
the Eisenhower and the Stennis, three to four carrier strike groups have been within 
attack range of Iran at one time. With their capabilities, virtually all of Iran would be at 
risk to US forces (Hersh 2007).151  
Emerging US Strategy to Combat Al Qaeda  
These regional priorities address immediate problems affecting US interests and 
those of its key regional allies. If successful, a measure of regional stability conducive to 
US interests may be achieved. The ultimate result, however, has been to make combating 
Al Qaeda a function of competing US interests.152  
The US War in Iraq 
 
As of fall 2007, the US political fate is hitched to Iraq’s Shia leaders. Iraq is now 
an electoral democracy, and Iraqi Shiites form roughly half to two thirds of the 
population.153 It is highly unlikely that the Shiites would peacefully surrender power in 
any significant way to a Sunni minority after decades of Sunni repression.154 Even if the 
faces change, the presence and prominence of Iraqi Shiite leadership will not.   
Unfortunately, this US-dependent national government’s Shia leadership upon 





and by extension the national government, despite its best efforts, has not been able to 
broaden its base of appeal significantly within the Sunni and Kurdish communities. The 
national government Shiite leadership exists in an ever-shrinking space between 
conflicting interests.155  
From the top down, the Iraqi national government’s Shiite leadership is pressured 
by the United States to execute a US vision of Iraq. The United States wants to see a 
federal-style Iraq where the three main religio-ethnic confessions share power in a 
unified, albeit federated, national government. The US has been using its political, 
economic, and military aid to leverage the Iraqi national government.156  
It has not been smooth sailing for the Administration thus far. The Iraqis have 
largely failed to meet the political benchmarks the US troop surge was supposed to 
enable. At the same time, US public opinion, as reflected in the election of a democratic-
controlled congress that largely campaigned on opposing the Administration’s war 
strategy, rose sharply against President Bush. Nonetheless, the willingness of the 
Administration to bypass the failure of Iraq’s government to meet previously identified 
benchmarks means that, at least through Bush’s second term, the United States will 
continue to its efforts to implement this vision.157 
From the bottom up, the national government’s Shiite leadership is pressured not 
just by the Sunni militia leaders who seek to either overthrow it or force substantial 
political change, but also by Shiite militia leaders, who are also political leaders. They are 
seeking to politically capture the national government to ensure national dominance at the 
expense of Sunnis and Kurds. Sunni resistance and de facto Kurdish independence makes 





The Shia and American visions for Iraq are at odds. The Shiite leadership seeks to 
dominate the country to the exclusion of other religio-ethnic groups. From the 
perspective of the United States, these Shiite militia leaders are at best an unwitting 
extension of Iranian influence. At worst, they act at Iran’s behest. From the US view, 
they cannot be allowed to dominate Iraq.159  
Moqtada al Sadr personifies this conundrum. He pressures the Iraqi national 
government to strongly pursue sectarian interests. He and the United States have 
militarily clashed. At the same time, he is effectively sustaining the Iraqi national 
government, a vehicle for national dominance that the Shiite leaders are trying to capture 
for national political success, which makes the US simultaneously dependent upon him.  
The Iraqi national government is caught in the middle. The national government’s 
Shiite leaders need US backing to remain in power. At the same time, the national 
government Shiite leadership is dependent upon Shiite militia leaders for its survival, and 
so the leadership is also beholden to its brethren. The US pressure to crack down on 
Shiite militia leaders seeking to effect political changes counter to US interests is an 
untenable position for the national government that forces it to choose sides in a 
neighborhood that the US does not control.  
These internal Iraqi tensions play out in the realm of US-Iranian relations. When 
the US squeezes Iran, Iran squeezes the Shia militias, who can directly attack US troops 
and indirectly pose stumbling blocks in the political process of the Shiite-dominated, US-
backed national government upon which the United States depends. The national 
government Shiite leadership, when under US pressure to more firmly establish central 





put in an untenable position. Inside Iraq, US efforts to counter Iran, and their perceived 
Arab Shiite proxies by extension, is counterproductive to the effort’s overall success.  
There is an internal contradiction in US policy inside Iraq relative to desired US 
goals. A continued US presence supporting the Iraqi national government will permit the 
existing situation to continue. Pressing for change toward US goals, however, only 
destabilizes the Iraqi national government, and may even unravel it completely.   
This Iraq policy directly impacts US efforts vis-à-vis Al Qaeda both politically 
and militarily. At best, the United States can hope to have its efforts only partially 
impaired.  
The fighting now in Iraq will keep the jihadists busy in Iraq for as long as the US 
is there. Invading Iraq to “fight them there so that we don’t have to fight them here” made 
no sense when the war started because Iraq had no real connection to Al Qaeda.160 The 
statement does, however, have some relevance now owing to US actions as the US 
presence in Iraq does present a target-rich environment upon which jihadists can focus.  
Some day, though, the US combat presence will end. If the US-backed Iraqi 
national government fails and the country descends into chaos, Al Qaeda will benefit. It 
will do so both politically and organizationally.  
Politically, Al Qaeda will be empowered. By virtue of being the last one on the 
field of battle, Al Qaeda will claim and receive credit for having defeated the leader of 
the international system in the eyes of its potential supporters and adherents. Its sacrifices 
will have been validated. Both the righteousness and the functionality of its philosophy 





Organizationally, with such a stunning victory to their credit, Al Qaeda’s 
recruitment efforts will very likely improve. In addition, Al Qaeda will gain some 
sanctuary. A regional proxy war will likely result in Iraq should the US-backed national 
government fail. The Saudis and Iraq’s Sunni neighbors will back Iraq’s Sunni 
confession.161 Besieged Sunnis are likely to embrace Al Qaeda’s firepower against the 
Shiites, the enemy of their enemy, as they do now. The Iranians will very likely continue 
to back the Shiites. The Kurds will likely either be left by the way side or invaded by 
Turkey and/or harassed from all sides in an effort to tamp down stirrings of Kurdish 
independence that might rile up restive Kurdish populations amongst Iraq’s neighbors, 
particularly Turkey and Iran. Should such a situation materialize, the ensuing chaos will 
provide a de facto stateless piece of territory that will be awash in weapons and 
unduplicated combat training and preparation.  
If the US-backed Iraqi national government succeeds, Al Qaeda will still benefit. 
It will do so both politically and organizationally. It will do so, however, to a lesser 
degree. 
Politically, the bar for the United States in jihadist eyes, as well as the eyes of 
Muslim publics around the world is very high. To receive credit for its efforts and claim 
victory, the United States will have to create a capable government in a pacified country 
and completely withdraw its forces. Al Qaeda will claim credit for anything short of this. 
In the eyes of its potential and actual supporters and adherents, Al Qaeda will be 
empowered.  
As of summer 2007, US government predictions are trending towards ensuring Al 





while US forces may be able to draw down, US troops will be necessary for a long time 
to ensure the viability of the national government. President Bush has publicly stated an 
acceptable outcome is manageable violence as opposed to peace.163    
Partial US defeat will mean Al Qaeda will gain some sanctuary, a key 
organizational benefit. The Iraqi national government will not have true sovereignty over 
its territory. Continued inter-confessional war will continue to provide Al Qaeda a 
sectarian niche as it has done thus far so long as it calibrates its activities to the interests 
and sensitivities of its besieged Sunni hosts. Al Qaeda will gain training and experience 
in the process. 
This sanctuary will not be as stable, however, as in a true failed-state scenario. Al 
Qaeda is not popular in Iraq.164 Iraq’s Sunnis embrace Al Qaeda because they fight its 
common enemies – the US and Shia forces. To the extent that inter-communal peace 
develops and the US presence draws down, Al Qaeda’s position will progressively 
weaken. 
The changing US approach to pacifying the Sunni-dominated areas starting in 
spring/summer 2007 raises the possibility of an alternative course of events. As 
exemplified in Anbar Province, US forces are now politically allying with Sunni tribal 
elders and insurgent commanders. These arrangements include the United States 
providing these non-governmental paramilitary forces arms and materiel for use against 
Al Qaeda as well as powers of arrest.165  
This approach has yielded gains. Politically, Al Qaeda’s room for maneuver 





US alliance with Al Qaeda’s former allies have enabled US forces to damage the 
organization and reduce US casualties as well as the overall level of violence.167  
This approach, which is generally accepted to have occurred due to localized 
changes in the balance of power in response to the 2007 US troop increase, is plagued 
with contradictions, however. In direct contrast to the US approach in Afghanistan, where 
US efforts were directed toward consolidating the capacity for violence under 
governmental authority through demobilization and disarmament programs for all non-
governmental entities, US forces in Iraq are actively creating multiple rival power centers 
in Iraqi society. In the short run, this substitutes the stability of US-blessed warlords for 
the writ of the Iraqi national government, which US forces are purportedly defending and 
seeking to expand.168 In the longer run, US forces are only making a future national 
reconciliation, and the potential violence of any post-US presence Iraqi civil war, 
immeasurably harder while also threatening the Shiites, and thus, indirectly, Iran.169 
Sectarian strife is deepening. Compromise and negotiation at the national political 
level on issues key to the country’s fate, such as the distribution of oil revenue and 
internal provincial boundaries, are not making significant substantive headway.170 While 
an eventual US drawdown is inevitable, US troops will likely not leave in their entirety, 
and, as of June 2007, a post-occupation force to support the national government is 
increasingly being discussed.171 A continued US presence will only perpetuate the 
conflictive status quo. 
From the US perspective, no matter whether the Iraq endeavor succeeds or fails, 
the Al Qaeda problem will likely become worse. The fight in Iraq is akin to drawing 





flame of attraction all the while the moths are becoming more numerous. The departure 
of non-Iraqi Al Qaeda jihadists to Afghanistan and other locales to combat US forces and 
strike US interests, both at home and abroad, is highly likely. Prolonging the US 
engagement in Iraq, however, will very likely only increase the number of moths. 
Lebanon and Jihadists 
 
There has also been an increase in US activity in Lebanon to counter perceived 
Shiite ascendance, which the Bush administration equates to Iranian power and influence. 
The United States, and the Saudis at US behest, have leant significant political and 
financial support to Sunni Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora in his political struggle 
with Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah (Hersh 2007). “American, European, and 
Arab officials (stated) that the Siniora government and its allies had allowed some aid to 
end up in the hands of emerging Sunni radical groups in northern Lebanon, the Bekaa 
Valley, and around Palestinian refugee camps in the south. These Groups, though small, 
are seen as a buffer to Hezbollah; at the same time, their ideological ties are with Al 
Qaeda” (Hersh 2007, 59).  
This situation is akin to when the United States, using Saudi Arabia as a proxy, 
yoked the strength of Sunni jihadists to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. The difference 
now is that the United States-Saudi alliance is attempting to manipulate Al Qaeda-style 
jihadists against Iran, a Middle Eastern Muslim, albeit Persian, country. This situation is 
ripe for negative outcomes.  
As evidenced by the formation of Al Qaeda after the Soviet defeat, there is no 
guarantee that this movement can be controlled once it is stoked. These jihadists are not 





rejectionists of the modern nation-state system. They have their own goals, objectives, 
and desires. Once made capable and self sufficient, state leverage over them decreases. 
The summer/fall 2007 fighting in Beirut at the Nahr al Bared Palestinian refugee camp 
against Fatah Al Islam exemplifies this (Hersh 2007, 59). 
At best, the United States will have manufactured more of the very radical Sunni 
jihadists who comprise Al Qaeda. They will execute the goals that the US-Saudi alliance 
intends for them. And, they will effectively be destroyed and/or sufficiently weakened in 
the process. 
At worst, the United States will have increased the pool of potential enemy 
recruits. They will not execute the goals that the United States intends for them. And, 
they will turn on their regional benefactors once becoming self sufficient.  
From the US perspective, there are no enduring good outcomes. In the short term, 
the United States will be playing one of its enemies against another so that US aims are 
achieved at their expense.172 In the long term, however, even if successful, the United 
States will have generated more enemy capability it will have to deal with eventually.  
Unfortunately, the non-state actor enemy the US is stoking is harder to address than a 
state-centric opponent.  
Tthis strategy is based upon a highly questionable premise. At root in this 
approach is the contention that Sunni jihadists will see their fellow Muslims, albeit 
Shiites, as the bigger enemy instead of United States and its allies. This is not a safe bet. 
The 2005 letter from Ayman al Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s chief ideologue and one of 
the leading ideologues of the greater jihadi movement, to Abu Musab al Zarqawi 





possibility of acting differently after gaining victory against the United States, he noted 
that it was politically and strategically improper to do so before the greater common 
enemy had been defeated.173 
The implicit Bush administration calculus is that all Shiites in general, and 
Hezbollah in particular, are firmly under the sway of Iran.174 This, however, is neither a 
comprehensive and accurate characterization of Hezbollah, nor a safe assessment of how 
it will act. Within Lebanon, Nasrallah is now the nominal leader of the largely sectarian 
political protests against the Siniora government. While acknowledging its violent 
capabilities, Hezbollah is viewed by most Lebanese as “a political force of some note, 
with a role to play inside Lebanon” (Hersh 2007, 64).  
A domestic Arab Lebanese political entity with stature, it is not at all a given that 
Hezbollah, with its own agenda, would blindly follow and sacrifice itself for Persia and 
its interests. At one point when Hezbollah was weaker and overly dependent upon foreign 
aid, it may have been at the mercy and done the bidding of Iran, perhaps even if counter 
to its own short term interests. This situation, however, no longer is the case.175  
Syria and Sunni Jihadists 
 
The issue of Syria connects to Iraq, Lebanon, and Iran. Relative to Iraq, the Bush 
administration views Syria as serving at least as a passive, if not an active, abettor of the 
Iraqi insurgency.176 Relative to Lebanon, the Bush administration views Syria as a key 
backer of Hezbollah, which the Bush administration views as both a force in Lebanon as 
well as an Iranian terrorist outreach arm.177 The Administration also sees Syria as the link 
between Iran and Hezbollah.178 Relative to Iran, the Bush administration views Syria as 





Lebanon.179 Failed efforts to date to break Syria from its cooperation with Iran or 
significantly alter its policies via diplomatically engaging Syria, which the Bush 
administration has largely been unwilling to do, has left undermining the regime as the 
only option.  
The main way to undermine such a minority dictatorship short of overtly 
overthrowing it through military force is to secretly assist its internal opposition. In the 
case of Syria, that means engaging the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Despite the US and 
Muslim Brotherhood’s common goal of deposing the Syrian regime, the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s core ideological identity prevents the United States from engaging it 
directly, and so the Saudis are once again the interlocutor.  
Again, this US approach flirts with the very Sunni jihadists it is trying to defeat. 
Even in the Syrian context where there is a secular component to the Syrian opposition, 
all of the same strengths and weaknesses from the perspective of the United States apply 
as in the case of Lebanon. And, there is no guarantee that the secular companion has or 
will maintain the upper hand and could substantively change the equation.  
Conclusion 
  
The fight against Al Qaeda has temporarily stabilized with Iraq and Afghanistan 
as the foci. Stability, however, does not equate to stalemate. Existing political, economic, 
and military trends favor Al Qaeda. The United States is likely to suffer strategic losses 
when the current tenuous stability exhausts itself.  
The Administration is now expanding the fight to Iran to consolidate its current 
strategic gains. The United States is doing so by pressuring Shiites in Iraq, denying Iran 





perceived Iranian proxy Hezbollah. All the while, the United States is attempting to 
provide for Israel’s security.  
This tack, however, blurs the US strategic focus. It addresses Al Qaeda as a 
function of countering Iran, with whom Al Qaeda is not inherently bound. The US effort 
in Iraq may collapse, the US situation in Afghanistan may weaken, and jihadists under 
dubious US allied control will be empowered. Al Qaeda’s political power will increase, 
as will its organizational depth. 
While strategy indirectly guides the fight and either hinders or empowers tactical 
action, actually combating Al Qaeda to prevent if from killing innocents involves directly 
attacking it. Al Qaeda’s organizational structure, finances, and political ideology must be 
addressed. The next chapters will address Al Qaeda’s organizational dimension and US 



























   Chapter Six 
     
  Al Qaeda’s Organizational Dimension: Herding Cats 
 
“Hence it comes that  
all armed Prophets  
have been victorious,  
and all unarmed Prophets  
have been destroyed.” 
     …Nicolio Machiavelli180 
 
   “The enemy, as the military 
is fond of saying, is both  
thinking and adaptable.” 
…US Government Official181  
 
 The business end of terrorism is killing. To effect this on a sustained basis for 
political purposes requires a secure entity that can 1) plan, support, and execute missions, 
and 2) recruit, train, and support operatives.  All the while, the group must communicate 
its political message while state authorities are trying to eradicate it.   
 Al Qaeda has this capacity because it has constantly adapted to its changing 
environment. Prior to 9/11, Al Qaeda’s had a centralized command structure, which was 
suited for operating from a safe haven. Since 9/11, Al Qaeda has expanded and morphed 
into a more diffuse network.   
This chapter will trace Al Qaeda’s organizational and operational evolution from 
the cusp of 9/11 through fall 2007. It will do so noting Al Qaeda’s operational 
environment, which US actions have substantially altered politically and in terms of 
security, with an eye to how this influences its structural and operational dynamics. 
Particular emphasis will be placed upon Al Qaeda’s activity in Iraq.  
Al Qaeda now leads an emboldened movement as much as it does an 





with Usama bin Laden over both the organization and the global jihadi movement, 
however, is blurry. The outcome, while showing trends, is not clear.   
Al Qaeda - Pre 9/11 Structure and Operations 
 
Structure 
Prior to 9/11, Al Qaeda was a robust organization nestled in its Afghan sanctuary 
that consisted of four main entities. They were vertically integrated in descending order 
by a formal chain of command led by Usama bin Laden (Hirschkorn and Gunaratna 
2001). The center was able to project itself throughout the world by maintaining 
authority, power, and/or influence over subordinate elements. 
First Main Entity 
 The first main entity, the heart of the organization, was a hierarchical command 
and control node located in Afghanistan that consisted of three layers: 
At the top was Usama bin Laden himself as the overall emir of the entire 
organization. He did not have a deputy. He did, however, have informal advisors.  
The next layer in the command and control hierarchy, was a consultative council 
consisting of very senior, experienced, and trusted members. Usama bin Laden appointed 
prominent personalities and trusted followers to ensure legitimacy and loyalty. Merit was 
relevant, but family, friendship, and nationality also mattered (Gunaratna 2002b).  
 The next layer was four operational committees – military, finance, religious 
study, and media/publicity. The military committee planned, prepared, and executed 
terrorist operations while the others performed support roles religiously justifying, 
advertising, and paying for Al Qaeda activities. Each committee, headed by an emir who 





Second Main Entity 
 Al Qaeda’s second main entity was the 055 Brigade. This “International Brigade” 
was integrated into the Taliban’s army of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan from 1997-
2001 as shock troops. It consisted of approximately 2,000 fighters, who were mostly from 
the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region. Populated by 
experienced and motivated fighters, the 055 Brigade was Al Qaeda’s strategic reserve 
(Gunaratna 2002b).  
Third Main Entity 
 Al Qaeda’s third main entity was a global terrorist network. This consisted of 
bona-fide Al Qaeda members around the world conducting attacks or doing logistics. 
These members, many of whom came from the 055 farm team, had a direct connection to 
Al Qaeda and served it from a subordinate position in a hierarchical format. The 
Hamburg Cell involved in the 9/11 attacks exemplifies this entity. 
Fourth Main Entity 
 Al Qaeda’s forth main entity was a loose transnational coalition of guerilla and 
terrorist groups. Al Qaeda was primarily an international network. The Afghan core was 
thought to be only 30 key officials. Al Qaeda’s workhorse was its international network 
consisting of roughly 24 groups in 60 countries comprised of 5,000-12,000 men.182  
Operations 
 Al Qaeda functioned like a network. Despite having a vertical chain of command, 
Al Qaeda was not a strict, top-down hierarchy. It was relatively decentralized, and 





the bottom up. There were loose lateral ties within each main entity (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, 
and Zanini, 1999).  
Apart from establishing its own independent cells, Al Qaeda brilliantly co-opted 
local groups, which had narrow, country-specific agendas. By aligning itself with local 
militant groups, vice subsuming them into the organization, Al Qaeda was able to 
develop roots in the militants’ countries without assuming ownership of their struggle. By 
themselves, these militant cells were too small and weak to make a political impact. 
Those who pledged a measure of loyalty and allegiance to Al Qaeda, however, shared in 
Al Qaeda’s intelligence, money, equipment, and recruitment duties, and these local 
militants used the Al Qaeda network to coordinate their activities (Alexander and 
Swetnam 2001). This vastly increased Al Qaeda’s reach and influence.183  
Al Qaeda - Post 9/11 Structure and Operations 
 
Mass 
Estimates vary widely about Al Qaeda’s overall post 9/11 bench strength. The 
London International Institute of Strategic Studies’ Strategic 2003-2004 Survey cited 
18,000 Al Qaeda militants worldwide. By contrast, a Saudi official, also speaking on 
background, told UPI he estimated there were no more than 5,000 al Qaeda activists and 
supporters.184 The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in turn, claims Al Qaeda can 
draw upon the worldwide support of roughly 6-7 million radical Muslims, of whom the 
CIA estimates 120,000 are willing to take up arms (Gunaratna 2002b).  
 Regardless of the estimate, Al Qaeda has a troublesome manpower reservoir. By 
comparison, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) had no more than 500 militants, of which 





Meinhoff gang had even fewer, with some estimates going as low as 50 hard core 
activists. Yet, both groups wreaked havoc for years.185 
Structure 
 
 Al Qaeda’s post 9/11 structure is dramatically different than its pre 9/11 form. 
The four original entities that comprised Al Qaeda no longer exist in the same format, to 
the same scale, and with the same set of dynamics. Its modus operandi also differs.   
First Main Entity 
 
The first main entity, Al Qaeda’s central leadership, has suffered severely. During 
the 2004 US election, President Bush routinely cited that two-thirds of Al Qaeda’s pre 
September 11th leadership had been killed or captured. The apparent 18-24 month attack 
cycle has been disrupted, and no new, successful 9/11-scale attacks are further evidence 
of the damage.186    
The central command and control node has not, however, ceased to exist. The 
very top of the pyramid – Usama bin Ladin, Ayman al Zawahiri, and key aides – remains. 
They continue to broadcast television and internet messages and dispatch instructions. 
One level beneath the front office, Al Qaeda appears to be functioning as a systemic 
organization, not a uniquely contrived amalgam of irreplaceable personalities. Troop 
losses have been regenerated, and replacement leaders have been appointed.187   
The question is not whether this node exists, but what role it plays relative to the 
third and fourth main entities. No clear-cut consensus or rock-solid evidence exists. To 
the extent discernable, however, it appears the command node has retained centralized 
control over a reduced organizational core while emphasizing expanding its general 





Second Main Entity 
 
 Al Qaeda’s second entity, the 055 Brigade, has become a shadow of its former 
self. It lost roughly 25 percent of its strength fighting alongside the Taliban in the 2001 
US invasion (Gunaratna 2002b). Ultimately, as defeat became inevitable, bin Laden 
ordered its retreat into Pakistan’s semi-autonomous tribal regions, where he is publicly 
suspected of hiding.188 
Al Qaeda’s flight into a limited geographic area presented the opportunity for a 
US-Pakistani hammer and anvil approach to destroy Al Qaeda. Pakistani President 
Musharraf initially refused to engage the tribal areas to round up fleeing Taliban and Al 
Qaeda personnel citing domestic politics and a lack of military capability. Ultimately, 
however, he dispatched 70,000 of Pakistan’s Frontier Corps, a paramilitary auxiliary, into 
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) starting in winter 2003-2004 to flush 
out Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters.189 Clashes between Islamabad’s forces and Taliban/Al 
Qaeda insurgents became frequent.190 Al Qaeda’s foreign fighters, easily identified in a 
homogenous Pashtun area, have lost several hundred, and Musharraf has cited 200-300 
casualties sustained by Islamabad’s forces.191  
Pakistani pressure eased markedly in fall 2006, however, when, responding to 
domestic political pressure and rising tensions with India, Islamabad signed a treaty with 
FATA tribes. In return for removing federal troops, the tribes agreed to police themselves 
and prevent Al Qaeda or Taliban violence. A clause stipulated that federal troops would 
return if the tribes could not uphold their obligations.192 While sound in theory, the deal 





One reason for the failure is that the tribes were either unwilling and/or unable to 
control their territory. This has provided a de facto safe haven for Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban. Since the deal, cross border attacks into Afghanistan have tripled.194 Tribal 
leaders seen as helping Islamabad have been killed.195 
Another reason is that the Taliban and Al Qaeda are popular in FATA. FATA is 
the birthplace of the modern global jihadi movement. Musharraf’s newfound efforts to 
destroy Islamic militancy runs counter to 25 years of Islamabad using many of those 
same Islamic guerillas as foreign policy implements.196  
Moreover, Islamabad has no desire to return to FATA. In spite of rising violence, 
Islamabad, as of February 2007, had pronounced the treaty a success, and it advocated 
more such autonomous zones. Islamabad has even announced plans to salvage the deal 
since insurgent tribal spokesmen pronounced the treaty dead in the wake of federal 
authorities storming the Red Mosque, an Islamic militant center connected to the Taliban, 
and Taliban and Al Qaeda elements retaliated by killing scores of federal troops.197  
Whatever pressure did exist is now off, andI it will likely remain so until 
Musharraf’s succession is adjudicated.198 Musharraf’s declaration of martial law in 
November 2007 has at least temporarily prolonged his hold on national politics.199 It has, 
however, come at the expense of the Pakistani security establishment’s focus on the US-
sponsored counterinsurgency effort against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the tribal areas 
as the state shifts emphasis to detaining dissidents and curtailing anti-Musharraf political 
activity.200 This move, which is both internationally and domestically unpopular, has also 
further weakened Musharraf’s support, thus further constraining his freedom of 





Meanwhile, US leverage on the situation to ensure US priorities are secured continues to 
decline. US pressure did not prevent the current situation from arising, and the United 
States has already stated it will not curtail military aid, the chief US lever.202 Conversely, 
the militants have capitalized on the situation.203  
As described by a senior Pakistani intelligence offical, FATA, especially 
Waziristan, has become the hub of Al Qaeda operations world wide.204 The 055 Brigade 
is the core of a future force to fight in the region or conduct terrorism overseas. It now 
has a new lease on life. 
Third Main Entity 
 Al Qaeda’s third main entity, its global terrorist network, also appears to have 
been severely weakened. This network, primarily a command node offshoot, was 
severely damaged by Al Qaeda’s displacement from Afghanistan - thus destroying the 
centralized headquarters, support, and planning functions - as well as post 9/11 US 
efforts. The low hanging fruit of known and/or suspected operatives not seized prior to 
9/11 were quickly taken down once the political winds shifted. The US Department of 
State puts the number of detained suspects at roughly 4,000 since September 11, 2001.205 
Each interrogation creates a ripple effect that cascades through the remaining Al Qaeda 
members which then snowballs as its effects are manifested in further detentions.206  
Though the scale and sophistication of the attacks appears to have dipped, at least 
temporarily, the command node has not been totally deprived of its action arm as was 
initially thought post 9/11.207 Contrary to initial suspicions, US and Western intelligence 
officials now believe the July 7, 2005 London subway bombers as well as the foiled 





from the Al Qaeda command node.208 Though the network is degraded, “Osama bin 
Laden is still giving direct orders for al Qaeda attacks.”209  
The September 2006 nonaggression pact between FATA and Islamabad holds the 
seeds of rejuvenation for Al Qaeda’s third main entity. Al Qaeda is reported to have 
established several camps in the Pakistani territory of North Waziristan along the Afghan 
border, and there is apparently “no shortage of recruits or arms.”210 With its new 
emphasis on training “white Muslims” who carry Western passports, there is no standard 
jihadi profile for authorities to detect.211 As stated in a July 2007 National Intelligence 
Estimate (NIE), the backbone of the jihadi infrastructure is not only not dismantled, but it 
is regenerating, and the United States now faces a “heightened threat environment.”212  
These new Al Qaeda camps, however, are essentially contracted out to local, 
allied militants, who Pakistan has traditionally used to battle India. Camps now 
permeated by Al Qaeda exist not due to terrorists’ survival prowess, but rather because 
Al Qaeda has interwoven itself into internal Pakistani politics. The United States had 
never pressed Pakistan on indigenous militant group camps because they were viewed as 
localized affairs. Al Qaeda has changed that.213  
The United States and Musharraf are locked in a state of mutual unsustainable 
dependency. The United States relies upon Musharraf to combat Al Qaeda in Pakistan. 
Publicly, Bush praises Musharraf, but he has been critical privately.214 Though Musharraf 
depends upon foreign aid and foreign political support, his “hold on power also depends 
on the support of (Pakistan’s) military and intelligence officials more sympathetic to 
Islamic extremists.”215  





Linked to Al Qaeda’s central command node primarily via the web, Al Qaeda’s 
fourth entity, a loose network of affiliated and associated transnational groups and 
sympathetic individuals, has risen to the fore as the most capable and active element. 
While Al Qaeda cells mostly operate in the West, its associated groups are more 
numerous in the global South. Its affiliates operate in Muslim societies or countries with 
Islamic communities (Gunaratna 2002b). Inspired individuals, by contrast, are 
everywhere. Each component has a varying degree of closeness and supplication to Al 
Qaeda’s central command node, though no component of this node is under direct and 
total control.  
Groups affiliated with Al Qaeda continue to gain adherents as time goes on. 
Counterterrorism experts note that some regional Islamic radical groups function 
independently of Al Qaeda, but that they enter into mutual alliances for specific 
operations or campaigns and slowly become affiliates.216 The most recent, most 
significant addition to Al Qaeda, which has “grown in the past few years into 14 to 16 
separate networks,” occurred in September 2006 when Algeria’s Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat became Al Qaeda in the Maghreb as it and Al Qaeda central 
declared a mutual alliance.217 The story of this self-developed group that subsequently 
pledged fealty to bin Laden is emblematic of other members of this component of Al 
Qaeda’s fourth main entity. 
Al Qaeda forged its alliance with the GSPC despite an antagonistic history with 
the Algerian radicals. The Algerian conflict initially attracted enthusiastic support from 
Islamic radicals the world over, and Al Qaeda sent money, weapons, and fighters. The 





fundamentalist Islamic state. The jihadist movement universally denounced them, 
however, when Algerian rebels under Armed Islamic Group (GIA) leadership began 
slaughtering thousands of innocent civilians.218 
The US response to 9/11 changed everything. With the loss of Afghanistan, Al 
Qaeda’s leadership needed a safe place to relocate. The alliance had the potential to be 
mutually beneficial. If the Algerians could win Al Qaeda’s endorsement, it would erase 
their network’s pariah status in radical Islamic circles. It would then be easier to raise 
money and logistical support.219 In turn, Al Qaeda would gain a local affiliate and an 
operational foothold in North Africa.220 Finally, in 2006, Al Qaeda assented. 
Al Qaeda has pursued this strategy of partnering with local underground groups in 
an effort to extend its name and influence in multiple Muslim countries. The Algerian 
network, with Al Qaeda’s assistance, has rapidly transformed itself from a local group 
devoted solely to seizing power at home into a global threat with cells and operations 
across North Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. It now sponsors training camps in the 
Sahara and the Sahel, and it supplies fighters to Iraq and Chechnya. The network has also 
planted deep roots in Europe. Authorities have broken up cells since 2006 in France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland.221  
Al Qaeda’s associated groups are also rising in number and lethality. In contrast 
to affiliated groups, Al Qaeda’s command and control node does not maintain direct 
connections with associated groups. Though these groups share an ideological affinity 
with Al Qaeda and their very existence is often Al Qaeda-inspired, they operate 
independently, though in line with Al Qaeda’s general philosophy. The Army of Islam, a 





Corporal Gilad Shalit, for whose return the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese war was ostensibly 
fought, exemplifies this newfound phenomenon.222  
It is, however, individuals and self-originating cells that have risen to the fore. 
These components are filled with people who self-actualize themselves into becoming 
Islamic militants. Though less sophisticated, their attacks are “still lethal.”223  
Though self-militating individuals and self-generating cells can exist anywhere, 
they are most successful and most prevalent in European and other liberal 
democracies.224 They manipulate asylum and civil liberties laws to both secure their 
persons and continue their activities. By contrast, cells in Middle Eastern dictatorships do 
not have the legal and/or political freedoms in which to hide.225 
Al Qaeda’s level of control over these self militating groups and cells varies 
dramatically. In some cases, there is virtually no organizational contact, as with many 
associated groups. In other cases, there are organizational points of contact that exert 
moderate control and/or influence. On the whole, however, rather than being a 
hierarchical organization dictating orders to the third and fourth components of this main 
entity, “Al Qaeda has become an enabler for myriad terrorist groups and sympathizers to 
fight the jihadist holy war.”226 
Operations 
 Al Qaeda, a consummate user of technology, has now harnessed the internet to 
the point where terrorism has become a “web-directed phenomena.”227 Twelve terrorist-
related web sites prior to 9/11 have grown to more than 4,500.228 “The internet is the 





basement, redundant system for distributing information…(that) can’t (be) shut…down 
anymore.”230  
Al Qaeda has exploited the web in several ways. The web has proven to be an 
excellent recruitment tool. Its anonymity masks ancient prejudices and offers a “‘virtual 
sanctuary’ on a global scale” to propagandize.231 It has become a training resource: “if 
you want to conduct an attack, you will find what you need on the internet.”232 Compared 
to its Afghan jihad predecessors, the newest generation of Al Qaeda members is far more 
technologically sophisticated. The internet has also enabled terrorist activities. On the one 
hand, flowing from its training utility, Al Qaeda has facilitated computer hacking against 
government authorities. On the other hand, real world operatives have used the internet’s 
anonymity, pervasiveness, and reliability to communicate information and increase 
operational security.233  
Internet’s Organizational Impact 
The media writ large, and the internet in particular, have, however, proven to be a 
two edged sword. To the positive, as noted above, Al Qaeda has been able to dramatically 
expand its outreach, and it has reaped operational and organizational benefits. To the 
negative, however, Al Qaeda’s traditional leadership – Usama bin Ladin, Ayman Al 
Zawahiri, and a coterie of key aides who previously played a dual role as both intellectual 
and operational leaders - now has competition. This is causing Al Qaeda’s first main 
entity to loose the direct control it once had not only over its entire organization, but over 
the movement for which it sought to serve as a vanguard.  
Politically, the Department of Defense has found that a series of Saudi and 





high profile standard-bearers such as Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al Zawahiri. Usama 
bin Laden’s political agenda and religious justifications are well known. It is the deeper, 
more tailored arguments, however, that are bringing new people into the movement. 
These new, young, educated, capable, easily-accessible, internet-based clerics are making 
the more resilient arguments.234  
Dramatic political change is occurring in the Middle East, and the Sunni jiahdist 
movement is now global in scope with its own momentum.235 While the names of Usama 
bin Ladin and Ayman al Zawhiri continue to have great cache, they are losing their 
immediacy. The challenge before the traditional leadership is to avoid becoming a 
detached, yet revered, iconic figurehead. 
Operationally, Al Qaeda is becoming more of an enabler than a direct command 
element. Mustafa Semariam Nasar, the foremost author in “jihadi strategic studies” (Lia 
and Heggmhammer 2004) whose 1,604 page tome entitled “The Call for a Global Islamic 
Resistance” analyzes and determines the “best practices” and lessens of 20th century 
Islamic insurgencies, advocates decentralized personal contact. Because of 
disproportionate US power, centralized secret groups, which are vulnerable if one 
member is arrested, and open combat, which focuses jihadists energy on superior US 
firepower instead of the Islamic awakening, are ineffective.236 By contrast, the “Jihad of 
Individualized Terror,” which employs centrally-dispatched singleton trainers to link up 
with local, self sufficient militants to enable terrorism behind enemy lines, directly 
focuses on inspiring a political awakening along Islamist lines while avoiding superior 





(Lower level attacks like the 2004 Madrid train bombings, technically unsophisticated 
and inexpensive yet still effective, are thought to exemplify this.)237    
The fight is rapidly changing. Field operatives are now given general guidance by 
ranking command nodes, and they then have extensive operational autonomy in 
execution – a more secure way to operate when organizationally weakened in a high 
threat environment. The trade-off, however, comes at the expense of operational control, 
efficacy, and targeting precision. The challenge before the traditional leadership is now to 
maintain operational control and relevance in a much more crowded field. 
The Rise of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia 
 
As Al Qaeda has morphed organizationally into a more decentralized network, it 
has simultaneously expanded its geographic scope as new affiliates have been brought 
into the fold. Formerly unorganized Islamic militants have, for example, congealed into 
Al Qaeda of the Maghreb and The Secret Organization of Al Qaeda in Europe.238 These 
organizations consist not only of previously existing militants, but of new militants who 
have become politically mobilized by US post 9/11 actions. 
One of the great ironies of the US “war on terror” is that it has resulted in a 
powerful new franchise, Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, which in contemporary times 
constitutes the modern day state of Iraq. The US “invasion and occupation of Iraq has 
helped spawn a new generation of Islamic radicalism and the overall terrorist threat has 
grown.”239 Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia (AQM) under the leadership of now deceased Abu 
Musab Al Zarqawi stepped up to harness this new jihadist exuberance.  
AQM has become Usama’s flagship franchise. In line with the changing 





affiliated groups, it is clear that there is a center-periphery connection. At the same time, 
there is neither a strong consensus nor rock-solid evidence on the degree of center-
periphery control. The evidence, however, suggests only nominal political and 
operational control by Al Qaeda central.   
Prior to the Death of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi 
 
While occasionally engaging US forces, AQM, from the start, emphasized putting 
an overlay of terrorism atop a guerilla warfare directed at US and Iraqi national 
government forces. AQM played upon Iraq’s incipient social instabilities to spiral 
sectarian violence to deny Iraq’s nascent, US-backed democracy its requisite social 
stability, and thus sink the whole US endeavor. AQM tried to affect the political 
environment, not the military balance, to influence the war’s outcome.240   
 AQM worked through terrorism’s four step process. First, AQM chose its target 
set – Iraq’s Shia population. This target set was important not only for religio-political 
reasons from Al Qaeda’s religio-political perspective, but also for reasons of power 
politics, for the Shia were most closely wedded to the United States. Second, AQM killed 
innocent Shia through horrific car bombings and other suicide attacks in a manner never 
seen in Iraqi history. Sectarian violence spiraled as fear permeated Iraq’s communities 
and the previous social fabric disintegrated. Third, through killing Shia, that national 
government’s primary backers, AQM sent the message that a US-backed democracy was 
not acceptable. Fourth, the targeted publics began to press their respective authority 
centers for change. This terror had two particular audiences in mind – Iraqi society 
directly and the American public indirectly. AQM directly antagonized the Shiites by 





violence, which has killed more US troops and created perceptions of chaos. The result 
has been to dishearten the US public with more casualties and no discernable political 
and security progress, which exacerbates the contest of wills inherent to the guerilla war 
in which US troops are engaged. AQM simultaneously relied upon each newly-mobilized 
populace, the US public and Iraq’s Shia, to pressure their political leadership. AQM 
expected the US public to pressure its representatives to withdraw US forces, which 
would sink the nascent Iraqi national government. AQM expected the Shia public to 
pressure its representatives into less political compromise with the Sunnis, the Shia’s 
attackers within whom AQM was hiding, to stifle the political process, and thus 
undermine Iraq’s nascent democracy. 
As was suggested in chapter two in the discussion on the dynamics of terrorism, 
AQM gained three secondary benefits from these successful attacks:241 
 AQM’s morale rose and unity/teambuilding solidified. Foreign volunteers, the 
vast majority of suicide bombers, were not in short supply.242 This rolled over positively 
into AQM’s efforts to recruit soldiers, and it became one of the few “foreigner brigades” 
to seize and hold towns, such as Falluja and Al Qaim, for prolonged periods before 
honorably retiring before overwhelming US firepower.243 
AQM eliminated opposing forces. In line with AQM’s ideology, AQM killed 
Shiites, which it deemed heretics, to purify Islam. This political dimension created self-
fulfilling power-oriented benefits. If AQM did not kill them now, it would only have to 





Lastly, AQM, and its agenda, remained provocative. AQM’s high visibility, mass 
casualty attacks became among the most politically influential ongoing acts of violence. 
AQM became the insurgency’s de facto political leader.244   
Al Qaeda effectively engineered itself a role by exploiting pre-existing Sunni-Shia 
ethno-religious cleavages. “Zarqawi’s attacks on Shia mosques and police stations, U.S. 
intelligence officials believe, were the main reason for the creation of the fearsome Shiite 
death squads. These in turn have created renewed support among the Sunnis for the 
insurgency” (Nordland and Hirsh 2006). Shia militia retaliation versus AQM-initiated 
attacks spurred Sunni insurgents into at least a marriage of convenience with AQM.245  
 “‘Sectarianism is Zarqawi’s legacy,’ says Mokhtar Lamani, the Arab League’s 
permanent envoy to Iraq. ‘The main thing that all Iraqis share now is being afraid of one 
another. And everybody’s afraid of what is in the future’” (Nordland and Hirsh 2006). 
Zarqawi’s efforts have effectively guaranteed “plenty of fighting…for years.”246  
Despite its high visibility and significant political impact, AQM is only a small 
portion of the overall volume of Iraqi fighters, which is estimated to consist of 20,000-
30,000 men.247 “Foreigners make up 10% of the insurgents – probably less than that.”248 
AQM gained prominence by being the first to exploit the internet’s chief virtues – no 
broadcast standards or censorship – to disseminate its propaganda and spread its 
tactics.249  
Consequently, AQM and its founder, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, obtained global 
operational influence and a political following.250 Zarqawi used this fame to build a 
network with formidable potential beyond Iraq. AQM effectively consisted of two parts - 





international network supporting it. These two elements interacted with and 
complemented one another in a deadly symbiosis.  
The international network funneled new recruits to Iraq. The US National 
Counterterrorism Center stated that AQM’s network consisted of associates of at least 24 
groups in nearly 40 countries in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Europe.251 It also was 
an outreach effort. AQM’s third main recruitment effort, training operatives and 
dispatching them back home for future action, was its heart. AQM wanted a standing 
terrorist capability in the Middle East and Europe, a move that effectively positioned 
Zarqawi to challenge Usama bin Laden for leadership of the global jihadist insurgency.252  
After the Death of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi 
 
Abu Musab al Zarqawi, AQM’s founder, was killed in a targeted US air raid in 
June 2006. Zarqawi’s prominence means his death creates both dangers and opportunities 
for the United States, Al Qaeda, and the greater jihadi movement. His death’s impact 
must be evaluated on four main points. 
First - Operational Techniques 
Zarqawi’s signature invention was internet-focused media manipulation. His 
advertising was unedited, raw, piercing, and timely. And, his work’s power was 
magnified by being the first (Nordland and Hirsh 2006).253 His techniques will very likely 
have a lasting impact.  
This is because he used the internet to advertise externally to the greater jihadi 
movement for his cause. The power of this strategy has been recognized and adopted by 





banned all human images per its interpretation of Islam, for example, now have a video 
department (Nordland and Hirsch 2006).  
Zarqawi also focused the internet internally towards the greater jihadist 
movement. He tried to gain advantage over other jihadist leaders in the struggle to 
captain the movement. In the cyber world, for example, his legend rivals bin Laden.254 
In this specific situation, Zarqawi effectively created a rival power center that threatened 
bin Laden’s previously unilateral putative dominance of the movement. More generally, 
this precedent has enabled other aspiring leaders to non-confrontationally challenge bin 
Laden, and thus diversify and fragment the movement. 
Second – Network Viability 
Contentions AQM would splinter after Zarqawi’s death, thus making it easier to 
combat, have proven wrong.255 Eliminating infighting over succession, bin Laden 
publicly anointed Abu Hamza al Muhajir.256 Under his tenure, AQM has steadily “pushed 
the sectarian violence into a new era,” and there have been roughly 5,000 violent acts per 
month as of spring 2007.257 
By contrast, operations external to Iraq have slowed. Its network external to Iraq 
facilitates passage to and from the battlefield from the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and 
North America. It has not, however, become an active operational terrorist wing.  
While the abrupt personality change must have impaired processes at least 
temporarily, the main reason for this change in organizational focus appears to be the 
new leadership’s philosophy.258 Both Zarqawi and Muhajir marched in the same general 





Muhajir’s prior Islamic militant experience is rooted in bin Laden’s Al Qaeda. 
Likely owing to this, he sees Iraq as an opportunity not just to harm the United States, the 
world system’s central support column, but also as a chance to give jihadists access to a 
state, the first step to inevitable victory per Al Qaeda central’s approach. Focusing effort 
in Iraq accomplishes these two objectives in a single stroke.  
By contrast, Zarqawi’s history was rooted in his own independent thought and 
efforts within the greater jihadist movement. His ultimate goals were to overthrow the 
Jordanian monarchy and to attack Israel. Zarqawi likely saw the fighting in Iraq as an 
opportunity to purify Islam via killing Shia, work closer to these goals, and to bloody US 
forces, thus weakening their ability to defend Israel and Jordan. Unlike in bin Laden’s 
thinking, a sequential process is not necessary.  
Third – AQM’s Relationship to the Iraqi Insurgency 
Without its own territory and a 1980s Afghan jihad-style third country sanctuary, 
AQM cannot survive without the support of an Iraqi sectarian backer.259 The first order of 
business in the fight is thus not to engage the enemy. Rather, it is to stay alive to allow 
for the chance to engage the enemy. 
AQM was slowly isolating itself in the year prior Zarqawi’s death. While 
certainly Zarqawi’s Shia targets despised AQM, Iraq’s Sunnis also resented its horrific 
violence employed purely along ideological lines (Nordland and Hirsh 2006).260 AQM’s 
“efforts to recruit Iraqi Sunni nationalist and secular groups, (though initially achieving 
modest gains, were fundamentally) undermined by its violent tactics against civilians and 





Only a rudimentary level of popular support, upon which Zarqawi depended upon 
for logistical and operational assistance, could protect him from US and Iraqi authorities 
as well as other insurgents. AQM’s fate hinged upon the Sunnis. Zarqawi, however, 
drained his own swamp of politically navigable waters. Already fighting the Shia, he 
angered the Sunnis. A faction of Sunni chiefs forced him to relocate, and US forces killed 
him.262  
With bin Laden in hiding, Zarqawi was the missing hands-on, unifying 
operational jihadi commander. His loss raises concerns for AQM. AQM risks losing the 
political dominance of the battlefield to nationalist insurgents not interested in global 
jihad. AQM must maintain a highly visible role so that it appears to be, if not in the lead, 
at least at the forefront of the conflict to repel invading US troops from historically 
significant Muslim land. If not, its relevance to the global jihadi movement will likely 
quickly diminish.263  
This fear has been realized. It was not, however, because a principled AQM was 
sidelined by stronger nationalist forces. Muhajir has had to deal with unresolved political 
concerns Zarqawi’s stature blunted. AQM has traded its high visibility, ideology-
centered, greater jihad role and ambitions for more local concerns to ensure its survival.  
In contrast to when it began, AQM’s roster is now overwhelmingly Iraqi, “both in 
terms of leaders and foot soldiers.”264 In addition, Muhajir adjusted AQM’s relationship 
to the insurgency. Zarqawi’s death made it easier to form partnerships with groups who 
disliked Zarqawi’s tactics.265 AQM created, but abdicated leadership of, a pan-Sunni 
umbrella group and has eased pressing AQM’s social dictates, which differ from 





On an organizational plane, though by no means the dominating entity, AQM 
remains capable of potent violence. As of July 2007 the US government assessed it to 
have several thousand fighters. It is still responsible for the vast majority of suicide 
bombings.266 The United States must still contest with the security challenge, and the 
resulting political impact, that this group creates.267 
Politically, AQM has survived and maneuvered to the top of the post-Zarqawi 
insurgency by becoming, in effect, a Sunni militia to counter the Shiite death squads it 
inspired (Nordland and Hirsh 2006). It now has a wholly different membership and 
localized agenda. AQM as a transnational jihadi entity now exists in name only.268 AQM 
and the insurgency are now intertwined. 
Fourth - AQM - Al Qaeda Central Relations 
“The Jordanian born militant’s death will test a vital nexus: the partnership 
between his group, Al Qaeda in Iraq, and the core remnants of Al Qaeda.”269 Zarqawi’s 
network publicly boosted Al Qaeda central by giving it a highly visible beachhead at the 
jihadist front while its original leaders were hiding. In turn, by using the Al Qaeda name, 
Zarqawi bolstered his legitimacy and attracted media attention, money, and recruits.270 
The relationship, however, was fraught with tension over goals, the means to achieve 
success, and on a personal level.   
 There was a fundamental clash over goals. Usama bin Laden, as noted in chapter 
four, sought to reorder the entire international system, and Iraq was an end in itself to 
creating an Islamic state as a first step. While not entirely incompatible, Zarqawi wanted 





for Iraq was to exhaust the United States so it would be unable to defend its allies while 
strengthening his own organization and profile for the fight yet to come.  
Iraq served different purposes. By bin Laden’s critique, Zarqawi’s goals were 
superfluous at best and inefficiently squandering resources at worst. By contrast, Zarqawi 
saw Iraq as an incision into the US body politic and employed terrorism to cause harm 
while husbanding resources. 
 Personally, Arab intelligence officials and former Islamic militants noted there 
was a disconnect between bin Laden and Zarqawi when they met in the late 1990s.271 
With the assumption to the leadership post Zarqawi AQM by Muhajir, there is a 
possibility AQM-Al Qaeda relations might improve.  Muhajir and Zarqawi are different 
people with different backgrounds. Zarqawi was a poorly educated ex convict.272 
Muhajir, in contrast, is an explosives specialist with Afghan jihad credentials and links 
with the jihadi establishment. Furthermore, Zarqawi had a different relationship to AQM 
than does Muhajir. Zarqawi built his own network from the ground up, directed it, and 
had a sense of ownership. Only a member, Muhajir, might be more receptive to taking 
guidance when managing and leading the network.  
The fundamental clash over means, and the reasons for it, however, make that 
highly unlikely. Usama bin Laden benefited from having a high-profile commander able 
to draw foreign jihadis to Iraq to fight US troops. Zarqawi, however, killed Shiites en 
masse.   
 From a pure religio-political view, there was no conflict. Both bin Laden and 






 From a power politics view, however, bin Laden’s and Zarqawi’s goals, and their 
respective strategies for implementing these goals, were premised upon differing 
assessments of the power balance. Usama bin Laden and Zarqawi differed over how to 
create and apply power in the context of a global insurgency against the US-led world 
order. Each leader chose a strategy rooted in his respective political geography.   
 Usama bin Laden, purportedly at general but not direct risk in Pakistan’s tribal 
areas, apparently sees himself leading a global insurgency, wherein popularity is the 
currency for both victory and survival. He curbed implementing his full ideology, i.e. 
purging Shiites, as he realized that killing Muslims, even Shiites, would be looked down 
upon by many Muslims and would eliminate potential Al Qaeda troops against the United 
States. This realist concession is necessary to build and sustain short run popularity to 
eventually alter the US-Al Qaeda balance. Iraq is but one battle, and bin Laden must 
curry public favor in the long run regardless of the circumstances.    
 By contrast, Muhajir is at immediate risk on the front lines. He apparently sees 
himself as engaged not in a global insurgency but in a single battle. His focus is the short 
to medium run. Such a fight to wreck the US venture is a tactical and strategic 
competition where popularity plays a lesser and shorter term role.  
 Potential Al Qaeda supporters viewed Zarqawi as leading the militant political 
Islamist global insurgency in bin Laden’s name. AQM-Al Qaeda tension arose because, 
as conveyed in a 2005 letter from Zawahiri to Zarqawi, Al Qaeda feared its name would 
be tarnished by AQM’s violent and controversial tactics of killing fellow Muslims en 
masse.273 In spite of this scolding, AQM’s killings actually increased. This differing 









The 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan disrupted Al Qaeda’s pre 9/11 structure. 
All of Al Qaeda’s four main entities have reorganized. Despite US efforts, “Al Qaeda 
hasn’t been eliminated. It’s metastasized.”274    
Usama bin Laden’s command node, first main entity, has been the hardest hit. 
Roughly two thirds of its pre 9/11 staffing has been killed or captured. Replacements 
have been selected, however, and the node continues to function. The devastation to the 
second and third main entities, those most directly under bin Laden’s command, have led 
to the transformation of the command node from a direct operational authority into a 
more indirect giver of political and operational guidance.  
The second main entity, the 055 Brigade, Al Qaeda’s shock troops and strategic 
reserve, is a sliver of its former self. After taking losses fighting the 2001 US invasion, it 
fled to Pakistan, where it now defends the remnants of the organization against local 
tribal enemies and/or incursion by the Pakistani armed forces. Though weakened, its role 
is the same, and it continues to survive. 
Al Qaeda’s global terrorist network, the third main entity, has been severely 
disrupted. No 9/11 scale attacks have been mounted since September 11th, and the 18-24 
month attack cycle has been broken. Over four thousand terrorism suspects have been 
detained worldwide.  
This component, however, remains viable. Numerous low level attacks have been 





bombing, they have had an effect. According to the July 2007 NIE, this component is 
actually regenerating, and it has done so sufficiently that the United States now considers 
itself to have a heightened vulnerability.275 
In contrast to the first three main entities, a loose coalition of Al Qaeda affiliates, 
the fourth main entity, has blossomed. The 2003 US invasion of Iraq created a new front 
to engage US troops while simultaneously proving a motivational boon. This fourth main 
entity is stronger than before 9/11. It is now Al Qaeda’s front line work horse.  
The fourth main entity is highly decentralized, a major benefit for Al Qaeda in the 
post 9/11 heightened security environment. Self-militating individuals, who are harder to 
detect than organizations, have taken on a new operational prominence. Associated 
groups, which share Al Qaeda’s general outlook but retain organizational autonomy, are 
also growing in number. Affiliates, essentially Al Qaeda franchises, have now come into 
being. Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, bin Laden’s lead affiliate, is now Al Qaeda’s first tier 
front line element against the United States. Legitimate question exists as to whether Al 
Qaeda’s lead affiliate, AQM, which is at the forefront of the action against the United 
States, is under anything more than nominal Al Qaeda central control. 
As of fall 2007, the greater jihadist movement is booming. Al Qaeda, however, is 
no longer its unchallenged operational and political leader. The combination of the 
decentralized nature of the fourth main entity, Al Qaeda central’s reliance upon it, and 
post 9/11 operational dynamics that heavily incorporate the internet has changed Al 
Qaeda central’s role.  
Operationally, Al Qaeda central’s role is in transition. It is still a direct command 





however, increasingly becoming more of an enabler for other like-minded operational 
entities. As a result, Al Qaeda central’s direct operational power and control is decreasing 
while its overall indirect operational influence is increasing.  
Politically, Al Qaeda central’s role is also in transition. Usama bin Ladin and 
Ayman al Zawahiri are iconic figures with tremendous cache in jihadist circles. Their 
immediate relevancy, however, is in question. As other elements score operational 
victories – the political coin of the realm – and other religio-political leaders access the 
media, particularly the internet, with greater regularity than bin Laden, whose visibility is 
requisitely lower while on the run, Al Qaeda central must struggle to ensure that it 
remains politically paramount to direct the front lines within the ever-evolving jihadist 
movement.   
 Each step of the way in response to Al Qaeda’s situation at the time, the United 
States has taken steps to counter it as an organization using hard power. Al Qaeda, in 
turn, has evolved in response to US efforts. It has done so by capitalizing on the political 
context that the US use of hard power creates to generate popular support, which 
translates to operational capability. The US failure to address the political grievances Al 
Qaeda touts or to exploit conflicting political within Al Qaeda and/or between Al Qaeda 
and those upon whom it relies leaves this door wide open. The next chapter will present a 













    Chapter Seven 
 
Countering the Organization: A Three-Pronged Approach 
 
“It does not matter how  
slowly you go as long as  
you do not stop.”   
    …Confucius276 
 
Al Qaeda’s practical terrorist potency is as an organization. As of summer 2007, 
there are three main Al Qaeda organizational centers of gravity. First, Al Qaeda’s 
primary center of gravity, which consists of the first, second and third main entities, is 
hidden along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in Pakistan’s tribal areas, and it is 
rejuvenating. Second, Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the dominant fourth main entity 
affiliate, is ensconced in the chaos of Iraq. Third, there is a diffuse presence of 
individuals, associated groups, lesser affiliates, and occasional Al Qaeda overseas 
terrorist network members scattered around the world. 
Only by destroying Al Qaeda’s organizational capacity to execute violence can 
the United States save innocent lives. The United States has adopted a three-pronged 
approach since 9/11. To counter Al Qaeda’s Afghanistan-Pakistan center of gravity, the 
US forces have attempted to physically destroy Al Qaeda in Afghanistan via the US 
military while attempting to invoke Pakistani military assistance. To counter the Iraq 
center of gravity, the US government has pursued unilateral military options inside Iraq 
while threatening Iran, which the Bush administration blames for US difficulties in Iraq. 
Lastly, the United States has developed a counter-network of allied states to press Al 
Qaeda globally.   
As the United States did not have Al Qaeda’s destruction as a national priority 





execution. The US government efforts, while present, were sporadic and chaotic at best. 
Consequently, this chapter will begin with the US response to Al Qaeda after September 
11th and trace it to fall 2007. It will address Al Qaeda’s three centers of gravity in the 
sequential order in which they have come to the fore in the post 9/11 era – Pakistan 
followed by Iraq, and then the greater Al Qaeda presence world wide.  
The chapter concludes that the United States has not been entirely unsuccessful. 
No 9/11 scale attacks versus the United States or its allies have occurred September 11th. 
Thousands of terrorist operatives have been detained world wide.  
Current efforts, however, have reached their potential. US hard power efforts have 
taken the low hanging fruit, and repetition of existing methods is achieving diminishing 
returns. All the while, the political environment, which has been shaped as a result of US 
hard power actions rather than consciously and intentionally in line with US political 
strengths to capitalize on Al Qaeda’s political weaknesses, allows Al Qaeda to regenerate 
losses and continue the hard power fight. Al Qaeda remains a problem. 
Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Gravity 
The Afghanistan-Pakistan region is a remote mountainous area whose political 
boundary, the ill-demarcated Durrand Line of Britain’s colonial era, intentionally cut 
across ethnic and tribal lines. Much of the local population neither recognizes nor abides 
by it. The intent at the time the demarcation as established by Britain was to create weak, 
destabilized neighbors to help secure the borders of India, then Britain’s imperial crown 
jewel. The modern day impact, apart from regional political instability, which in the era 
of globalization has the potential to spread its impact dramatically, is that any US effort 





Step 1 - Afghanistan 
 
The 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan deprived Al Qaeda of its pre 9/11 
sanctuary. Not only did US forces chase Al Qaeda and depose its protectors, but the 
United States also installed the Afghanistan Transitional Authority (ATA), an allied 
regime under now tribal leader Hamid Karzai, to stabilize the country per agreement of 
senior Afghan figures at the 2001 Berlin Conference. The US intent for the ATA was to 
build an internationally-backed central government complete with power ministries to 
bring security and political stability to the country, thereby insuring against a return of Al 
Qaeda and Taliban forces, in preparation for holding national elections to create a 
working democracy, which would reject any future terrorist political domination. 
Roughly 20,000 US armed forces personnel remained to back the nascent ATA in 
counter-insurgency operations against remaining Taliban and Al Qaeda forces.277     
The US political plan has achieved significant success. In fall 2004, Hamid Karzai 
became Afghanistan’s first democratically-elected president in what was widely viewed 
as a free and fair election.278 In spring 2005, the national legislature came into being in 
what also was widely viewed as a free and fair election.279 
US desires for security, however, have not materialized. After initially beating 
back the Taliban and Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda-backed Taliban resurged in 2006 to seriously 
contest the Karzai government for control in the south and east of the country while 
launching terrorist attacks in Kabul, the national capital.280 The 2007 fighting season is 
proving to be another intense year.281 
Per the classic analysis of the arithmetic of insurgencies by James T. Quinlivan in 





600,000 troops if it is in as bad shape as Iraq.282 Afghanistan, while not faring well, has 
not yet deteriorated to Iraq’s level. A smaller force may suffice. 
The time to act on this option is rapidly approaching. “The commander of NATO 
forces in Afghanistan says that most of the population will switch its allegiance to a 
resurgent Taliban unless things get better by (fall 2007).”283 As of summer 2007, the 
international force presence is wholly inadequate. Roughly 40,000 Western troops and 
roughly 70,000 Afghan soldiers, who vary wildly in capability, are attempting to provide 
security to roughly 30,000,000 people. Depending upon one’s assessment of the situation, 
120,000-600,000 trained and reliable troops are needed. 
This is obviously impossible for the current US force structure.284 If Quinlivan’s 
analysis is accepted, current restraints on US political and military resources requires 
strategic choices and trade-offs amongst competing US foreign policy objectives. The 
United States military cannot adequately pursue US objectives in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan simultaneously without a substantial increase in forces.   
Step 2 - Pakistan 
 
With Pakistan as a US ally, Al Qaeda, in theory, had no place to run from the 
2001 US juggernaut. In practice, however, Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants fled 
Afghanistan to Pakistan’s semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA). Pakistani President Musharraf refused to deploy Pakistani forces into the FATA 
to capture or kill fleeing Taliban and Al Qaeda elements citing domestic political 
considerations and a lack of military capability.  
Yet, in the 2003-2004 winter, despite increased regional anti-US sentiment and no 





He dispatched 70,000 troops from Pakistan’s Frontier Corps, a paramilitary auxiliary, to 
the FATA. This action coincided with the public unmasking of Abdul Qadeer Khan’s 
global black market nuclear activities, which purportedly gave Libya, Iran, and North 
Korea nuclear weapons potential.285    
Four actions followed this Pakistani troop dispersal. First, Abdul Qadeer took sole 
responsibility for any illicit proliferation activity emanating from Pakistan. Second, he 
apologized on television in English, which the average Pakistani does not understand. 
Third, he was placed under house arrest, though he was still allowed to retain the wealth 
he gained from his purportedly illicit activities. Fourth, the US initiated no actions against 
Abdul Qadeer, the government of Pakistan, or any of its members in an international 
diplomatic, political, legal, economic, or military manner. Fifth, and key relative to Al 
Qaeda, the Pakistani Frontier Corps, an auxiliary paramilitary entity, was deployed into 
the tribal regions.286  
Negotiations over this incident between Musharraf and then Secretary of State 
Colin Powell were, and remain secret. Causation, therefore, cannot be proven. There is, 
however, strong correlation between Pakistan’s troop deployment and the potentially 
massive flap over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to two members of the 
“Axis of Evil” emanating from a purported US ally that implies a deal was struck 
wherein Pakistan avoided negative proliferation-related repercussions in return for better 
serving US counter-terrorism interests.287  
Easily identified in a homogenous Pashtun area, Al Qaeda lost several hundred 
fighters. Pakistan has turned over in excess of 700 prisoners to the United States. 





Pakistani pressure eased markedly in fall 2006, however, when, responding to 
domestic political pressure and rising tensions with India, Islamabad signed a treaty with 
FATA tribes. In return for removing federal troops, the tribes agreed to police themselves 
and prevent Al Qaeda or Taliban violence. A clause stipulated that federal troops would 
return if the tribes failed. While sound in theory, the deal has failed because the tribes 
were either unwilling and/or unable to control their territory, which is what made federal 
troops necessary in the first place. Cross border attacks into Afghanistan tripled after the 
deal was inked. Tribal leaders seen as helping Islamabad have been killed.288 
Second, the Taliban and Al Qaeda are popular in FATA. The FATA is the 
birthplace of the modern global jihadi movement. Musharraf’s efforts to destroy Islamic 
militancy runs counter to 25 years of Islamabad using many of those same Islamic 
guerillas as foreign policy implements.289  
Third, Islamabad has no desire to return to FATA. In spite of rising violence, 
Islamabad, as of February 2007, had pronounced the treaty a success, and it advocated 
more such autonomous zones. Islamabad has even announced plans to salvage the deal 
since insurgent tribal spokesmen pronounced the treaty dead in the wake of federal 
authorities storming the Red Mosque, an Islamic militant center connected to the Taliban, 
and Taliban and Al Qaeda elements retaliated by killing scores of federal troops.290  
Despite initial assertions to the contrary and no appreciable change in Pakistani 
military capability or domestic politics, Musharraf was politically and militarily able to 
send forces into FATA. Despite a consistent and acknowledged Taliban and Al Qaeda 
presence, however, Musharraf withdrew Islamabad’s forces. With external factors 





behavior counter to US interests, must either stem from the Musharraf regime’s internal 
dynamics and/or inconsistencies in US policy. Both factors play a role. 
Analogous to US Russia policy in the fluid Post Cold War environment when 
Yeltsin was in power, US policy towards Pakistan was formed in a fluid environment in 
response to a crisis when few options appeared available. This is so at all three of security 
specialist, Arnold Hammer Hall’s levels of analysis (Hall 1953): 
In the first image, each set of US policies depended on a strongman. During the 
1990’s, the United States staked its Russia policy on Yeltsin, a credentialed former senior 
communist who was seen as a workable interlocutor capable of negotiating a political 
system in chaos and at odds with US interests. During the 2000’s, the United States has 
essentially staked its counterterrorism policy on Musharraf, a general seen as a secular 
bulwark against rising Islamic militancy in a nuclear-armed country. 
In the second image, the United States gave de facto blessing to a change in 
regime. In supporting Yeltsin, the United States effectively blessed his assumption to a 
newly emerging democratic Russian regime. Implicitly, the United States blessed 
Musharraf’s coup against Pakistan’s former democracy to obtain Pakistani assistance 
against Al Qaeda.  
In the third image, the United States viewed each man as insurance against 
potential international threats. Even if Yeltsin did not reform Russia’s socio-economic 
system, he would at least secure Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Even if Musharraf is not 
helpful against Al Qaeda, he would at least secure Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. 
Both policies achieved short term goals. The analogy breaks down, however, 





domestic and international context. Unlike Russia, Pakistan is neither a major power nor 
inwardly focused, and it is confronted with antagonistic relationships.  
Pakistan, whose raison de entrée stems from lingering ethno-religious issues, 
lacks strategic depth. Relative to its neighbors, it has a smaller population, military, and 
geographic size. To its east and south, Pakistan confronts India, which has massive 
geographic, population, and military advantages while the Kashmir issue keeps tensions 
simmering. To its north, Pakistan must engage Russia and China, former Cold War 
adversaries who still support India. To its west, Pakistan must engage Iran, which has 
extensive influence over Afghanistan. Yet, Iran conflicts with the United States, 
Pakistan’s primary backer, over Afghanistan, Pakistan’s immediate western neighbor.  
In contrast to Moscow’s defensive, internal orientation, Pakistan’s perennial fear 
of encirclement by hostile, more powerful neighbors forces an outward orientation. With 
actual or potential problems on all sides, Pakistan has always sought to keep its frontier 
with Afghanistan, Pakistan’s second longest border after India, safe and secure. Due to 
strong ethnic, political, and economic ties, Pakistan is influential, and it has always been 
so by either ensuring a placating client in Kabul or adequate chaos to ensure Afghanistan 
would be sufficiently weak, and thus unable to be exploited by hostile neighbors or 
become a threat itself. Afghanistan provides a buffer to enemies and/or their proxies who 
are otherwise cheek to cheek.  
 Set in the context of Musharraf’s reliance upon US military, economic, and 
political assistance, Pakistan’s ability in Afghanistan is exactly what draws the United 
States to it and simultaneously creates conflict. Musharraf must assist US efforts or lose 





stable Afghanistan, which Pakistan views as contrary to its national interests. That would 
only create another competitor in a neighborhood with many overlapping tribal, 
economic, security, and political issues. Most significantly, a strong and self-sufficient 
Afghanistan would force Pakistan to confront its own Taliban-led insurgency instead of 
exporting it to Afghanistan. 
Ideally, the United States would also like to see a democratized Pakistan. 
Musharraf’s dictatorial political system is, however, basically a continuation of a 
previous political and socio-economic system instituted under former dictator Zia-ul-Haq 
that had been interrupted by a brief era of democratic governance. The US wants to see 
Pakistan extend its reach over restive areas vice retire from them. While exerting 
sovereignty over perpetually unstable and restive areas of the country is quite arguably in 
Pakistan’s national interest, doing so is not in Musharraf’s interests.  
The problem is that for its survival Musharraf’s dictatorial system is intertwined 
with and dependent upon the very forces of Islamic militancy that the United States is 
seeking to combat.291 Intensively combating these forces would undermine Musharraf’s 
own position domestically with governmental institutions and political parties upon 
which he depends. Musharraf has to walk a fine line placating the United States while 
looking after his own interests.  
 Musharraf has chosen to do this by splitting the difference between Al Qaeda and 
the Taliban. Despite routine public US and Afghan claims that the Taliban and its 
leadership have taken refuge in Pakistan, the Taliban has suffered far less at Pakistani 





public organization with formal diplomatic relations ties to Pakistan.292 There are four 
main reasons for this discrepancy. 
 First, the long history of public and secret support that Pakistan has provided to 
the Taliban since the anti-Soviet jihad days strongly suggests that Pakistan continues to 
view the Taliban as its primary foreign policy instrument in Afghanistan. The Taliban, 
not total pariahs like Al Qaeda, can affect Afghanistan’s political and military situation. 
This advances Pakistani national interests by keeping Afghanistan weak while keeping 
the United States, upon which Musharraf is uncomfortably dependent, occupied. So long 
as US efforts are focused on securing Afghanistan, US aid and political blessing, both of 
which can be withdrawn at any time, will flow and longer term political reform that 
might install democracy and alter the internal balance of power will be postponed. 
Second, Musharraf views Al Qaeda as a threat. It has made attempts on 
Musharraf’s life. Unlike the Taliban, Al Qaeda is hostile to the Pakistani state 
structure.293 
Third, attacking Al Qaeda is more politically palatable because it is composed of 
foreigners. While Usama and Ayman al Zawahiri are popular figureheads whose arrest 
might cause a political backlash, rank and file members can be detained without local 
political trouble because they are devoid of social, economic, and largely political roots 
in Pakistan. The Pakistani government can thus due harm to Al Qaeda as an organization 
while maintaining the current internal political balances.  
Fourth, and on a related point, the Punjabi-dominated Islamabad’s failure to 
persecute the Taliban avoids political difficulties with their ethnic brethren, the Pashtun 





ill-defined Afghanistan-Pakistan border, the colonially-drawn Durand line. There is a 
tighter localized ethnic nationalism than there is patriotism to either the Afghan or 
Pakistani states. Persecuting any Pashtuns, regardless of whether they are Afghan or 
Pakistani, is resented by all, which only leads to political calls for an independent 
Pashtunistan that would weaken Islamabad.294 
Though Pakistan may draw a distinction between the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the 
United States cannot. If the Taliban wins in Afghanistan, then Al Qaeda once again has a 
state-backed safe haven. Not only must it be deprived of a state, the Taliban must also not 
be permitted to thrive as a fighting element as to spare the Taliban is to help Al Qaeda 
because the two are intertwined. Unfortunately, as of summer 2007, the Taliban are 
rebounding.295  
The failure to crush the Taliban and catch either Usama bin Laden or Ayman al 
Zawahiri has sparked strong US-based criticism that Musharraf is not effective. These 
criticisms have only risen since Musharraf’s imposition of martial law, which has 
simultaneously undercut his political support and allowed the militants to capitalize on 
his distraction, which they have done. In the context of international regional 
competition, Musharraf repeatedly faults domestic political constraints - he does not 
control the semi-autonomous tribal areas where the Taliban and Al Qaeda are publicly 
suspected of hiding. Not willing to explicitly or obtusely violate Pakistan’s sovereignty, 
and evidently sufficiently convinced of Musharraf’s intransigence and/or the 
precariousness of his position, the United States has even closed the CIA’s Alec Station, 





US foreign policy elites are cognizant of Musharraf’s position. A 2007 Council on 
Foreign Relations poll found that 11% thought that Musharraf was making significant 
headway against terrorism. By contrast, only 23% thought that Musharraf was being 
unhelpful in the struggle against terrorism. The vast majority, 66%, however, thought that 
while Musharraf could perhaps be more helpful, it was unlikely another general would be 
strongly more helpful.297 From the perspective of combating Al Qaeda, Musharraf the 
man is not the problem. His supporting political system is.  
 Current US policy towards Pakistan, however, omits several key factors that 
suggest the United States has the flexibility to pressure Musharraf for action: 
First, Islamists lack broad public support. “Islamic parties have never garnered 
more than 13 percent in any free parliamentary elections in Pakistan.”298 In 2002, 
Pakistan’s last major election, religious political parties received just 11% of the vote. By 
contrast more than 28% was won by the secular party led by Benazir Bhutto, the former 
prime minister. Capitalizing on surging anti-American sentiment after the US invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001, this election was likely the Islamist high-water mark.299 The United 
States need not fear an Islamist takeover by pressuring Musharraf.   
Second, as evidenced by how he plays both sides of the coin, Musharraf is not 
afraid of the Islamists. On the one hand, Mr. Musharraf’s status as a personal target of Al 
Qaeda has won him a reputation in the West as a terrorist fighter. He speaks ominously 
about the Islamists’ rising power, and the United States perceives him as a voice of 
moderation. On the other hand, he has regularly brokered agreements with them in the 
provinces as a way to gain allies amid the growing support nationally against civilian 





Musharraf’s natural allies against the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and their political backers.300 If 
Musharraf is able to negotiate with his smaller political enemies to contain more serious 
political enemies, then he mostly likely does not fear their taking power either. 
Third, the United States has significant leverage over Musharraf through US 
foreign aid, upon which Musharraf depends for survival. Musharraf is “the fifth-largest 
recipient of US aid – the Bush administration proposed $785 million in its (2007) 
budget.”301 “To the extent that Mr. Musharraf’s government feels real pressure, it is from 
those within the Pakistani military who worry most about alienating Washington and 
jeopardizing the flow of military aid to Pakistan.”302 The money and military hardware 
from the United States is crucial for Pakistan’s armed forces to keep pace with India, 
Pakistan’s greatest threat. Tying this to action against Al Qaeda could spur new activity 
in the tribal areas by Pakistan’s military.  
Underwriting all of this is an internal conflict in US policy. On the one hand, 
2007 US counter-proliferation policy views it as necessary to support Musharraf. He is a 
force for stability in a semi-stable country with nuclear weapons. One of the only things 
worse than not catching Usama and finishing the dismantling of Al Qaeda would be for 
Al Qaeda to acquire nuclear weapons. On the other hand, this aspect of US policy, when 
combined with the Pakistani political system, gives Musharraf leverage over the United 
States and curtails US counter-terrorism efforts in line with Musharraf’s interests, which 
differ from those of the United States.  
As of fall 2007, US efforts to destroy Al Qaeda as an organization in Pakistan are 
at a standstill. Al Qaeda is ensconced in the tribal areas, and no significant, public 





Pakistani politics that combines Musharraf’s resignation as army chief with his 
assumption to the Presidency - a move still awaiting confirmation from Pakistan’s 
Supreme Court -– and the return of Benazir Bhutto to Pakistan enables the possibility of 
Musharraf pursuing Al Qaeda more doggedly because his base of official political 
support will grow beyond non-Islamist members.303 Nothing is guaranteed, however, for 
the ultimate loyalty of the army, whose leadership Musharraf has packed with stalwart 
followers, is still an open question, and the precise limits of Musharraf’s political reach 
are still not yet defined.304 Until US policy conflict is relieved of its internal 
contradictions, the United States sidesteps the issue by acting unilaterally, or the 
dynamics of the Pakistani political system congeal in US favor, current US efforts in 
Pakistan have reached their limits.  
Iraq Center of Gravity 
 
As with Afghanistan, the post US invasion effort has been dedicated to 
establishing a central government complete with power ministries to bring political 
stability and security to the country, thus denying AQM sanctuary. As noted in the 
chapter on US strategy, this effort has not proceeded according to plan, and there are 
structural contradictions in the US approach that will likely prevent it from achieving 
better results. Starting in late fall to early winter 2006, the Bush administration made two 
key decisions to try to alter existing dynamics; it is now implementing these. 
First, the Bush administration escalated US troop levels by 30,000 men, 
approximately one third of whom are support troops, to increase US military capacity. 





is where Al Qaeda incubates.305 The stated intent was to create sufficient stability and 
security to enable political reconciliation amongst Iraq’s competing sectarian factions.306   
This troop influx, while bringing higher US casualty levels, has brought some 
localized security and political stability in the areas where it has been employed.307 In 
Baghdad, for example, the United States has gone from controlling fewer than 20% of 
neighborhoods to roughly 40% of the city.308 When the increased US troop presence has 
been significant enough to change the local tactical balance, some tribal leaders have 
even temporarily allied with US forces against Al Qaeda, though those alliances are of 
dubious durability.309  
At the macro level, however, the 2007 US troop surge has brought little 
fundamental change in the political or security situation. In terms of security, the 2007 
US troop surge mostly forced the enemy to readjust its methods, thus altering locations 
and modes of violence, vice reducing overall violence.310 Of the specifically identified 
pre-surge benchmarks that the 2007 effort was to accomplish, only two of nine were 
deemed met, and another two, after revision, were rated “partially met.”311 Reference the 
political situation, only one of eight benchmarks was met, and another two, after revision, 
were deemed “partially met.”312 As of early October 2007, senior Iraqi political leaders 
have effectively abandoned the political reconciliation process, which only validates 
General Petraeus’s September 2007 Congressional testimony that the fight in Iraq is 
essentially a domestic civil struggle for power in a post-Saddam Iraq.313 
The Administration has pursued a two track strategy in assessing the way ahead 
that has effectively prolonged the US military and political commitment. On the one 





claimed a need for more time to allow the full effect of the surge to be made manifest 
before rendering a final verdict on the US venture in Iraq.314 On the other hand, and at the 
same time, the Administration is claiming that the surge has proven successful to date 
and that the emergency troop plus-up can be eliminated. Talk of further reductions has 
even been circulated by senior administration officials.315  
Apart from being belied by the Administration’s acknowledgment that it failed to 
meet its own political and security benchmarks, the evidence suggests that claims of 
significant political and or military headway allowing for US troop reductions based upon 
success to date are not strongly backed by the evidence. No serious discussion has 
surfaced about altering the pre-surge baseline of roughly 130,000 troops. Any discussion 
of future draw-downs is overtly premised on yet-to-be-determined factors on the ground, 
and no administration official has offered a positive prognosis either at or since the 
September 2007 Petraeus/Crocker testimony.316 Most significantly, the timing of the 
surge draw-down directly correlates with the US Army’s ability to maintain that volume 
of forces in the field given current manning constraints while having absolutely no 
correlation to achieving a significant portion of any of the surge’s political or military 
goals. Until such time as events on the ground significantly alter or there is a significant 
increase in US political and military commitment to the US venture in Iraq, political 
inertia appears to be indefinitely perpetuating the status quo. The mathematics of 
occupation outlined when discussing Afghanistan, however, strongly suggest that neither 
the baseline US presence nor the US troops surge will stem the Iraqi insurgency, and thus 





Second, the Bush administration has increasingly focused on Iran. The US goal is 
to deter what the Bush administration sees as empowering Iranian assistance driving the 
Iraqi insurgency, thereby denying AQM sanctuary in Iraq’s sectarian conflict and thus 
making AQM vulnerable by exposing it to US forces. As discussed in chapter five, the 
Administration has ratcheted up tensions politically and militarily, and it is intimating the 
possibility of punitive military strikes. 
While it is also too early to tell how well this second decision is proceeding, 
initial results do not appear positive. No public reports have surfaced that Iranian 
assistance to the Iraqi insurgency has either decreased or stopped. At the same time, US-
Iran tensions are rising. Given Iran’s potential for detrimental impact both in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, this is not a positive development.  
In contrast to US efforts in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, the Iraq situation as 
of summer 2007 is more fluid. Concurrent with greater US political attention, the Bush 
administration is devoting more military resources as well, and this gives the United 
States more options. In each case, however, current approaches have been relatively 
unsuccessful to date. A new political strategy to shape the military environment is 
needed.   
Diffuse Global Presence Center of Gravity  
 
Though crucially important and highly visible, Afghanistan/Pakistan and Iraq are 
not the only problem locales. Al Qaeda has “cells (that) operate in about 60 countries, 
and Islamic insurgencies exist in nearly 20.”317 A global solution is required is avoid the 





Al Qaeda is a network. By design, a network is akin to a balloon. Pressure on one 
point will only cause the network to dissipate at the contact area. It will not only still 
exist, but it will expand elsewhere. Pressure must be applied holistically throughout to 
shrink the balloon.  
 To apply holistic pressure upon the Al Qaeda network, the United States has taken 
two steps. First, the United States has created a countering network consisting of two 
components - intelligence liaison relationships and public-private partnerships with 
technology firms. The United States uses these tools to attack Al Qaeda personnel and 
communications on a global scale. Second, the United States is striking unilaterally at Al 
Qaeda targets wherever they can be found via renditions. 




The CIA has established joint Counterterrorist Intelligence Centers (CTIC’s) 
financed mostly by the United States in more than two dozen countries in the Middle 
East, Europe, and Asia. Foreign and US intelligence officers work side by side to track 
and capture suspected terrorists and to destroy or penetrate their networks. The US 
officers and their counterparts at the centers make daily decisions on when and how to 
apprehend suspects, where and how to interrogate and detain them, and how to disrupt al 
Qaeda’s logistical and financial support.319  
This network of centers co-opting foreign security services is the essence of the 
CIA’s strategy. Virtually every capture or killing of 3,000 suspected terrorists external to 





where the information originates, the CTIC assesses it and coordinates with the local 
service for action.320   
This cooperation has largely persisted despite other political tensions. In 
Indonesia, for example, the State Department doled out tiny amounts of assistance to the 
military when it made progress on corruption and human rights, but the CIA poured 
money into Jakarta and developed intelligence ties there after years of tension. In Paris, 
as US-French acrimony peaked over the Iraq invasion in 2003, the US and French 
intelligence services were creating the agency’s only multinational operations center and 
executing worldwide sting operations.321 
 This purposefully constrained and focused agenda focuses on common national 
interests, the basis for cooperation, as defined in security terms. No state benefits from 
being terrorized by Al Qaeda and/or its allies. At the same time, it permits competing and 
conflicting priorities elsewhere in the course of normal political relations.  
There are no serious opponents to this approach. The existence of this program 
correlates with no major international terrorist attacks against the US homeland as well as 
with numerous foiled plots.322 The program leverages host nation strengths - access to 
and understanding of their society - to US weaknesses - knowledge of and access to 
foreign publics. And, this program produces clearly quantifiable results that would not 
likely have been obtained otherwise. 
Attacking Al Qaeda Communications 
 
US efforts have been attacking Al Qaeda’s communications simultaneous to 





be either interdicted or exploited, the network’s members will fragment and not operate 
as a coherent entity. 
“While terrorists plan with great secrecy, the lack of their own critical 
infrastructure forces them to frequently emerge from the shadows. They contact one 
another on mainline communications networks and the Internet. They move and launder 
money through established financial channels. They utilize commercial, air, rail and 
shipping networks…Nearly all the global infrastructure that terrorists use, exploit and 
could target is operated and controlled by private business.”323  
In particular, the internet is ripe for exploitation. The anonymity upon which the 
terrorists are so dependent is a two edged sword. Just as actual and/or potential Al Qaeda 
operatives can communicate with one another in secrecy and safety, they can be engaged 
anonymously in secrecy and safety by the counterterrorism officials posing as terrorists. 
Disinformation is easily spread, internal dissension is easily created or fanned, sting 
operations are easily run, and terrorist information can be gathered. 
The Defense Department’s Partnership To Defeat Terrorism (PTDT) was created 
to capitalize upon this situation.324 “More than 1,000 executives of Fortune 500 
companies and experts in academia have become part of what until now has been an 
informal PTDT network, according to a STRATCOM briefing paper. That group has 
been tapped more than two dozen times for assistance, the paper says.”325 
The United States and its allies have leveraged their world position to co-opt the 
technological edge upon which the world is, and will continue to be, dependent. Public-
private partnerships against such a reviled threat have allowed the state to effectively 





The combined results of the intelligence liaison and communications initiative, as 
earlier noted by the Department of State, have netted thousands of suspected terrorist 
operatives. These initiatives against this Al Qaeda center of gravity should continue. 
Three factors, however, suggest that the effectiveness of these efforts have plateaued.  
 First, the US countering network is now well established with key countries 
relative to combating Al Qaeda. There is little room for it to grow. This thrust made 
offensive headway against Al Qaeda at first by eliminating as-yet-untouched enemy 
forces. Now, however, this effort plays a defensive role by working against new 
operatives engaging in the fight vice preventing new operatives from joining. 
 Second, to the extent that it does grow, it will only absorb lesser actors. The key 
ones are already involved. The question of the cost of further dissipating US resources on 
new members versus the potentially marginal gain that can be ascribed from new weaker 
states arises.  
 Third, this US countering network is no longer a novel invention. It has now been 
around since shortly after the 9/11 attacks. Al Qaeda has had time to adapt to it and adjust 
its operational activity accordingly. 
Renditions - A Unilateral Approach with Global Scope 
 
While the US countering network is global in scope and emphasizes multilateral 
action, the US rendition program is global in scope and emphasizes unilateral action. This 
process involves US authorities unilaterally seizing non-US citizens abroad. In theory, 
this does not require the permission of the national’s government and/or the government 





 The rendition process has existed since the 1990’s, when terrorism emerged as a 
post Cold War concern on the international scene. It was used throughout the 1990’s, 
though individuals were generally rendered to the United States for trial, as with Mir 
Amal Kansi.326 While there is little serious opposition within the United States to 
plucking terrorists off the streets, there is serious opposition to the current rendition 
program on the grounds that current rendition practices equate to torture. Under current 
practices, “rendered” suspects are sent not to the United States, but to either countries 
with bad human rights records, such as Egypt and Uzbekistan.327 Or, they are sent to 
secret CIA prisons, whose interrogations methods have been acknowledged to include 
“water-boarding” and other forms of “enhanced interrogation.”328  
Critics claim that the George W. Bush administration assurances that this practice 
is not “outsourcing torture” are false.329 The Washington Post’s Dana Priest, who has 
broken many stories about this practice since late 2002, quoted a CIA official engaged in 
renditions that assurances torture will not happen are “a farce.” A “US government 
official who visited several foreign prisons where suspects were rendered by the CIA 
after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, said: ‘It’s beyond that. It’s widely understood that 
interrogation practices that would be illegal in the US are being used.’”330 Numerous 
innocent people rendered by mistake and then released describe being tortured.331 
From a power politics perspective, there are three main issues of concern: 
First, the reliability of information obtained from torture is questionable. Anyone 
under sufficient duress will ultimately confess to almost anything to make the process 
stop. The inherent presumption in rendering people to countries other than the United 





practices permitted in the United States, where torture is constitutionally banned. 
Important decisions risk being contaminated by bad information. This is not conducive to 
maximizing utility against one’s enemies. 
Second, objections are raised concerning the political damage that is incurred 
should these operations be exposed. The main problem is that they cannot be done with 
sufficient secrecy. Collaborating governments risk falling victim to domestic political 
fall-out from criticisms attached to the human rights and civil liberties concerns 
associated with the program. The electoral defeat of Italian Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi one President Bush’s most stalwart supporters, for example, is significantly 
credited in part to his involuntary public association with and then implausible denial of 
assisting in CIA rendition activities.332 
Such losses do not hold to the realist maxim of increasing power. Again, in the 
case of Italy, the benefit of transporting one or more terrorism suspects exacted a friendly 
government from power that had influence in Europe and Africa, key parts of the world 
for battling Al Qaeda. The costs simply outweigh the actual and potential gains. 
Third, even when not directly exposed, the very program itself is controversial 
internationally and generates political problems for the United States. This program 
effectively disavows extradition treaties and puts US citizens at risk under the principle 
of reciprocity. Regional organizations of critical political importance with human rights 
clauses, such as the European Union, take umbrage and reduce overall political 
cooperation if any of their wide memberships are even suspected of being involved.333  
 From a raw power politics perspective, it can be argued that the risk of any harm 





interrogation, which could save the lives of innocent Americans. This position, however, 
does not take full account of the political dynamics of terrorism. Moral standards, as 
manifested in political values, matter.  
The moral standards as reflected in political values are necessary to evaluate the 
terrorists’ political agenda. Only then can differences between the polity and the terrorists 
be delineated and measured. This enables the terrorists’ true goals to be determined, and a 
policy response fashioned.  
Al Qaeda’s political basis differs significantly from that of the United States. Al 
Qaeda is rooted in religion and Middle Eastern history. The United States is rooted in the 
Enlightenment and Western history.  
Al Qaeda’s basis of legitimacy also differs. Al Qaeda seeks to reestablish the 
caliphate over all Muslim lands on a religious premise. The United States government’s 
premise is the consent of the governed. Once established, Al Qaeda seeks to implement 
its version of Islamic law, as compared to US-style man-made laws.  
Al Qaeda’s permissible means of persuasion also differs. Al Qaeda views the 
force of arms as a legitimate means of political persuasion to advance an agenda. The 
United States, by contrast, emphasizes argument and reason with a historical recourse to 
arms only in self defense against external aggressors. 
These political values impact the treatment of prisoners. As noted in chapter two, 
terrorism is a political contest fought in the real world with violent means. Al Qaeda 
terrorists are engaging in extreme activity to force extreme reactions. Their hope is to 
drive a wedge between a government and its people over controversial government 





glue. The terrorists hope to create exploitable disunity that will paralyze the targeted 
polity and give their previously un-embraced political agenda a chance. The values that 
underwrite political decisions are implicitly being challenged. These political values are, 
therefore, not just a zone of conflict. They are both the prize of the conflict as well as a 
strategic resource.  
United State’s political values, which emphasize human rights and civil liberties, 
do not condone the torture associated with the US rendition program. These US values 
are not upheld by failing to practice them. The cost of systematically violating them is 
two-fold. 
Internally, US political standards and identity are undermined. The terrorists are 
forcing US society into change via illegitimate violence. An inherent part of a terrorism 
struggle is to avoid becoming akin to the side one is struggling against. The United States 
self-inflicts an intrinsic political loss upon itself. 
Externally, the US strategic position is undermined. The US social and political 
values Al Qaeda challenges are unique, respected, and sought after the world over. Their 
integrity is in itself a strategic strength. Their erosion hurts US political credibility in a 
political struggle, and is thus a strategic liability. These values alone allow the United 
States to bypass other state structures and directly engage on multiple levels with the 
worlds’ publics, the critical mass of any terrorism struggle.   
 The rendition program’s capabilities are limited, and so it cannot be considered a 
strategic approach in its own right. There are numerous political considerations involved 
when executing a rendition, and the whole affair can go badly in terms of both 





the stakes are so high relative to US political identity in the fight against Al Qaeda, a vast 
global network with unknown thousands of members, possible reliance upon this tool as 
well as its possible strategic impact are limited.  
Conclusion 
 From the US perspective, a scattered Al Qaeda is a mixed blessing. To the 
positive, Al Qaeda has less capability than a unified, centralized entity that can pool and 
direct resources. This makes Al Qaeda less capable, and it should be easier for US forces 
to kill Al Qaeda’s component parts. To the negative, however, it will be harder to 
eliminate Al Qaeda as whole because there is no central node upon which to focus. The 
US government must now broaden its capabilities to deal with Al Qaeda’s diverse 
manifestations. The US response has been a three pronged approach. 
 The United States began by focusing on the Afghanistan - Pakistan center of 
gravity, Al Qaeda’s traditional locus, to deprive it of sanctuary. First, the United States 
invaded Afghanistan to devoid Al Qaeda of its sanctuary. Second, the United States 
followed up by pressuring Islamabad to exert its sovereignty over the tribal areas. In 
contrast to the first step, the second step has been only marginally successful. This is 
primarily due to a combination of the internal political dynamics of Musharraf’s regime, 
which actually make him dependent upon the Islamic militants the US is trying to 
combat, and conflicting US counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation goals. 
 The next center of gravity attracting US focus was Iraq. Though the 2003 US 
invasion to destroy Al Qaeda’s Iraqi sanctuary was misplaced, no one denies Al Qaeda’s 





will have stateless chaos to exploit. Bush administration policy equates politically 
stabilizing and securing Iraq as defeating Al Qaeda. 
The Bush Administration has recognized that the current political and military 
dynamics in Iraq are not trending toward an outcome conducive to US interests.. The 
United States has attempted to alter these dynamics by escalating the US troop 
commitment as well as threatening Iran to deter it from stoking the Iraqi insurgency. As 
of fall 2007, however, neither step appears to be having a significant impact.   
 Lastly, US efforts have been directed against Al Qaeda’s diffuse global presence. 
The United States has employed a countering network of states to attack Al Qaeda’s 
personnel. This continues to be a key venue for globally combating Al Qaeda. The United 
States has employed public-private partnerships to seize upon Al Qaeda’s 
communications and technologically-based operational vulnerabilities. While this effort 
made initially significant headway, it has effectively maximized its offensive capacity 
and now plays more of a defensive role combating new Al Qaeda arrivals to the fight.  
 The United States has backed up these efforts with a unilateral extraordinary 
rendition program. This program is a double edged sword. On the one hand, it gives the 
United States a last-resort unilateral capability. The cost, however, is high, and it lacks 
the necessary scale to have a truly strategic impact. Domestically, this process, as 
currently implemented, is actually complicit in the process of terrorism and inflicts 
intrinsic political damage upon the United States. Internationally, this practice 
undermines US political standing, which is a strategic asset in the US-Al Qaeda 





The US approach to counter each Al Qaeda center of gravity has the potential to 
inflict organizational harm. In each case, however, the factor that either enables or 
undercuts a particular technical effort, such as military action or intelligence operations, 
is political – US political interests, the political interests of other actors whom the United 
States must engage, and/or US political values – because political factors frame the 
situation. Generally accepted as being proficient in military and intelligence operations, 
the key weakness in the US approach to each of these Al Qaeda centers of gravity is 
therefore political. The next chapter, which will address Al Qaeda’s economic situation, 



































Al Qaeda Financing: The Tide Overflows the Dam 
 
  “Endless money forms the sinews of war.” 
    …Cicero334 
 
“There are two things a brother must always  
have for jihad, the self and money.”  
 …captured Al Qaeda operative (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004) 
 
  “Follow the money!” 
    …LTC Oliver Cass335 
 
Prior to 9/11, Al Qaeda’s finances were steady and secure. It derived sustenance 
from the enduring remains of its non-state anti-Soviet jihad financial network. Neither the 
United States nor its allies aggressively pursued Al Qaeda finances as a priority.  
After 9/11, however, the United States systematically worked to dismantle Al 
Qaeda’s financial capabilities. The US government has rated its efforts against Al 
Qaeda’s financing as effective.336 It is clear that the measures taken to date have had a 
significant effect. In the captured 2005 letter from Ayman al Zawahiri to Abu Musab al 
Zarqawi, for example, al Zawahiri bemoans that “many of the lines have been cut off.”337  
Despite initial success, however, US progress has stagnated. “As al Qaeda’s cash 
flow has decreased, so too have its expenses, generally owing to the defeat of the Taliban 
and the dispersal of al Qaeda” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004). 
Because its expenses are not radically out of proportion to its resources, Al Qaeda 
remains financially viable, albeit at an overall lower level.  
The questions to be considered are: From where does Al Qaeda get its financial 
support? How has the organization’s financial structure and health changed as a result of 





This chapter’s starting point will be an assessment of Usama’s personal wealth. 
This chapter will then engage in a pre and post 9/11 comparison of the way in which Al 
Qaeda generates, handles, moves, and spends its money. Lastly, this chapter will review 
the steps taken against Al Qaeda financing and identify weaknesses in the US approach.  
Comparatively speaking, US efforts against this key dimension of Al Qaeda’s 
ability to sustain itself have been relatively successful. Al Qaeda is now financially hard-
pressed. While effective, the existing US approaches have, however, reached their limits. 
Few new technical means exist to further counter Al Qaeda’s adaptation to the post 9/11 
financial environment. To make more headway, the United States must begin to address 
the political environment that give context to the technical processes it employs. 
Establishing a Baseline - Usama’s Finances 
Usama bin Ladin’s wealth is fabled. He is alleged to have inherited approximately 
$300 million when his father died. He is also supposed to have garnered further 
unspecified millions from multiple business endeavors in Sudan. This money was 
believed to have been Al Qaeda’s financial base.338 Usama did not personally bankroll Al 
Qaeda, however, because neither contention about his fortune is true (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004).339   
Usama bin Ladin’s family’s money had been greatly exaggerated. From about 
1970 until 1993 or 1994, bin Ladin received roughly one million dollars per year. While 
no small sum, it was not a $300 million fortune. In 1994, the Saudi government forced 
bin Ladin’s family to find a buyer for his share of the family construction business and 





would otherwise have been that $300 million fortune (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks 2004).340   
Usama bin Ladin’s Sudanese assets were also apparently greatly exaggerated. He 
was reputed to own 35 companies in Sudan when he lived there from 1992 to 1996. 
Actual ownership, however is in question, and many of the companies were small and/or 
not economically viable. His investments, at least in part, were designed to gain influence 
with the Sudanese government rather than to be a revenue source. Upon leaving Sudan in 
1996, Sudan’s government expropriated bin Ladin’s assets and seized his accounts.  
Al Qaeda Finance Pre 9/11 – Generating Income 
 
By 1996, bin Ladin had almost nothing left.341 Because he could not finance his 
organization independently, Al Qaeda had to generate revenue from external sources. The 
changing international climate around the time of Al Qaeda’s formation dictated that 
states would play a declining role in international terrorism. The end of the global Cold 
War rivalry eliminated the need for states to fund proxy groups, though significant 
amounts of aid disbursed during the 1980’s remained viable long into the 1990’s. And, 
the overall political tolerance for terrorism, and the possibility that it could be justified 
under certain circumstances, was declining. Non-state actors rose to the fore (Gunaratna 
2002b; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004).342  
First and foremost, individuals were Al Qaeda’s mainstay. Wealthy and generous 
Arab benefactors, particularly Saudis, had contributed heavily. Throughout the Middle 
East, the jihadist cause in general, and Al Qaeda in particular, had great popularity.  
Directly or indirectly, much of this money ultimately made its way to Al Qaeda 





of fighters. These contributors had a significant enabling influence over the operational 
capacity of the greater movement and its constituent organizational members. 
Second, charities and non-governmental organizations played a key role. Al 
Qaeda exploited culture and religion to its advantage. The religious obligation to give 
alms, known as “zakat” in Arabic, is one of the five pillars of Islam, which are mandatory 
practices. This form of giving is much more broadly used and understood than in Western 
society’s conception of secular charitable donations as there is no conceptual civic-
religious divide in Islamic society. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the Quran is officially 
proclaimed as the country’s constitution. Due to this intertwining of church and state, the 
giving of alms not only has charitable implications, but civic ones as well.343 Throughout 
the Middle East, zakat “functions as a form of income tax, educational assistance, foreign 
aid, and political influence” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004). 
Al Qaeda successfully infiltrated legitimate organizations unbeknownst to the 
hosts and siphoned their resources for its own illicit purposes. In the mid 1990’s, the CIA 
estimated that fifty Islamic charities “support terrorist groups, or employ individuals who 
are suspected of having terrorist connections” (Gunaratna 2002b, 83). The KindHearts 
association of Toledo, Ohio exemplified this type of activity.344 
While in some cases Al Qaeda specifically targeted and penetrated specific 
foreign branches of large and well recognized international charities, more often than not 
Al Qaeda simply exploited cracks in the philanthropy system writ large, and the actual 
charity in question was not significant in itself. Weaknesses in oversight and organization 
structure in these non-profit institutions, when combined with the time and distance of 





for Al Qaeda operatives to siphon money. If not done at the headquarters level, it was 
easy enough to do so in a remote corner of the world at the field level once donated 
money was received (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004).  
In addition, Al Qaeda thoroughly co-opted existing charities. The organizations’ 
employees, or, at a minimum, their leadership, knew that their purpose was to funnel 
money to Al Qaeda. Assistance, either active or passive, was present. “In those cases, al 
Qaeda operatives had control over the entire organization, including access to bank 
accounts” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004). The Wafa Charitable 
Foundation exemplified this type of activity (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
2004). 
Third, Al Qaeda operated a sizable network of front companies and organizations. 
These were designed not just to facilitate operational activity. They were also meant to 
ensure that those operations were, at a minimum, self sustaining if not producing a profit. 
“For instance, (Al Qaeda) owned boats and had a fishing business in Mombasa; in 
Sweden it invested in the hospital equipment industry; in Denmark in dairy products, and 
in Norway in paper mills” (Gunaratna 2002b, 84). 
Fourth, Al Qaeda operatives at the working level were engaged in criminal 
enterprises to facilitate their terrorist activities. Al Qaeda went so far as to establish a 
special camp in Afghanistan to train its European members in financial crime, including 
credit card counterfeiting. Captured training manuals provide detailed instruction in these 
criminal enterprises.345  
Numerous fraud and other financial crimes cases have mushroomed into terrorism 





Millennium, for example, were mostly self-financed by bank robberies, burglaries and 
forging checks. Al Qaeda’s financial network in Europe, which is dominated by the 
Algerians, relies heavily on credit card fraud. European security and intelligence agencies 
estimated Al Qaeda raised nearly one million dollars per month via this work. A British 
Algerian cell found in 1997, for example, raised nearly $200,000 in six months.346 
Despite these large sums, cell members did not live in luxury. Those committing 
the fraud and other financial-related crime on behalf of Al Qaeda transferred the money 
to banks in the Middle East and Pakistan. Al Qaeda as an organization retained control 
(Gunaratna 2002b). 
Fifth, in some cases, Al Qaeda openly made legitimate financial investments to 
generate revenue. The true purpose of these legitimate businesses was to use their profits 
to support Al Qaeda and/or further Al Qaeda’s terrorist operations. Most prominently, 
Usama helped to capitalize Sudan’s leading bank. Usama also opened multiple other 
companies, such as construction firms, in Sudan in his own name.   
Al Qaeda Finance Pre 9/11 – Handling and Moving Money 
 
Acquiring money was the essential first step. Managing and dispersing these 
resources to ensure that they were handled safely, securely, and effectively, however, was 
equally necessary. Elaborate means and guidelines existed. 
Terrorist operators and support staff were two separate, albeit complementary, 
categories of personnel. Al Qaeda support cells generated money and distributed it to 
operational cells, which expended the funds. Though Al Qaeda conducted operations on a 





concurrent with one another. As a result, Al Qaeda constantly transferred funds within 
the organization around the world.  
Al Qaeda managed its financial networks via a series of regional financial 
officers. This approach compartments both personnel and information, thereby limiting 
the damage to the overall network should anyone be detained. Rather than centrally 
selecting, training and dispatching personnel, Al Qaeda chose locally-based financial 
officers. Their strong sense of the local financial and political communities aided 
manipulating and blending witting and unwitting sources.   
These financial officers adhered to five key financial security principles. First, 
monies were divided between operational funds, which were to be expended in pursuit of 
operational objectives, and support money, which was to be invested for financial return 
to grow more operational resources for the future. Second, operational funds were not 
stored in just one place. Third, access to the money was restricted, and only a necessary 
few had knowledge of the operational funds. Fourth, security precautions were taken 
when transporting large amounts of money. Fifth, when not in use, money was held by 
sympathetic non-members to lessen the chance of compromise. Sixth, money was only 
spent when necessary.347  
Financial officers had multiple mechanisms to move money. Banks, hawala 
dealers, and couriers were the primary means. While charitable and non-governmental 
organizations played a significant role in fundraising, they played only a minor role in 
transferring money. Financial officers piggy backed upon established, legitimate bank, 





an organizational counterpart may well have been the recipient on the other end. Al 
Qaeda usually used a mix of these means and blended witting and unwitting participants.  
Banks were a leading tool. Al Qaeda’s bank account network had support 
accounts, which were registered in the names of Al Qaeda-controlled charities and 
companies, and operational accounts, which were registered in the names of either 
reliable sympathizers or the names of Al Qaeda members who were not publicly 
suspected. Al Qaeda usually transferred money from support accounts to the operational 
accounts through several bank accounts in order to disguise their true purpose (Gunaratna 
2002b).  
Al Qaeda often used highly respected Western banks. They were less subject to 
regulatory and intelligence scrutiny. As such, they were unwitting conspirators. 
Al Qaeda also used Islamic banks to transfer funds (Gunaratna 2002b).348 The top 
100 Islamic banks possessed a multibillion dollar global capitalization in 2000, and the 
annual turnover was approximately 100 billion dollars (Gunaratna 2002b). While the vast 
majority of banks were most certainly unwitting collaborators, several individual banks 
acted as witting facilitators. 
 The hawala system was, and remains, interwoven with the banking system. 
Hawala dealers, both those associated with Al Qaeda as well as hawala dealers in general, 
often rely on banks as a means of transferring money to other hawala dealers. For a single 
transaction, hawala dealers will often use both fellow hawala dealers and either the 
formal banking system or money remitters.  
This blending of formal and informal systems is very conducive to terrorist 





it easy for hawala dealers to move money. Terrorist operatives using hawala dealers 
could thus take advantage of the formal banking system one degree removed without 
having to actually formally register for an account, which might draw scrutiny (National 
Commission on Terorist Attacks 2004).    
 Charitable and non-governmental organizations also unwittingly partook in the 
system to assist Al Qaeda. Organizations had accounts at banks, and these moved money 
for terrorists. Fund-raisers for Al Qaeda also used banks to store and move money 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004). 
 Such exploitation of the banking system, either directly or indirectly, was only 
possible due to the underdeveloped nature of government financial regulations. Industry-
imposed oversight practices in non-Western financial hubs, such as the United Arab 
Emirates and Pakistan, were, and are, weak. Al Qaeda exploited the gap.  
Of equal if not more importance than the official banking system were hawala 
dealers in their own right. Via a hawala dealer, a person is able to transfer money at an 
exceptionally small commission to friends, family, business associates, etc. A customer 
requests to transfer money. This is usually paid up front, but it may be paid at a later time 
at the hawala dealer’s discretion. A hawala dealer of whom a request to transfer money is 
made calls a corresponding hawala dealer on the other end of the transaction, who then 
gives the intended recipient the “transferred amount.” The hawala dealers involved in the 
transaction, both of whom are businessmen, then square accounts, either in cash or 
through subsequent business deals, at a later point.  
The hawala dealer informs the customer that he will transfer the money, and that 





the area, and the wealth of the two customers, the exchange may or may not be verifiable 
by the requesting customer in a timely manner before the bill is due. Profits are by 
commission. 
The non-Western world’s group-oriented social structure, with its particular 
emphasis on the extended family buttressed by clan and tribe, serves as an informal yet 
powerful enforcer of the trust. A violator of the trust incurs the wrath of those he 
wronged not just upon himself, but also upon his family and those to whom he owes, and 
is owed, a social obligation, which is primarily clan and tribe. Because the family, clan, 
and tribe would struggle under such a burden and be shamed as well, they ensure that 
their member adheres to the rules.349 
The consequences of intentional malfeasance in such a trust-based, easily-violated 
system are severe. Unlike in a Western society where the individual is the primary social 
unit, one cannot begin anew by moving from one location to another due to society’s 
atomization. If enforcement fails, an individual will be shunned. Being shunned in such 
an interconnected society not only prohibits prosperity, but it can effectively expel one 
from a region or condemn one should they choose to stay.350  
Though informal the hawal system can handle volume. Roughly 1000 Pakistani 
hawala dealers processed roughly three times the exchange volume handled by the 
official banking system in the year 2000 (Gunaratna 2004).351 Some of this was done in 
transactions as large as 10 million dollars (Wechsler 2001). In 2001, for example, it was 
estimated that between two and five billion US dollars would pass through Pakistan’s 





Because these transactions generally take place in economically underdeveloped 
areas, a hawala dealer’s true worth is rooted not in his capital baseline, but in his personal 
contacts and networking. These get him access to more capital. They simultaneously 
expand his geographic and demographic reach, which makes him a more effective dealer.  
As a general rule, neither party is provided a formal receipt stating the details of 
the transaction. The literacy rate in the societies where hawalas are prevalent is low, and 
few, if any, records are kept. When records do exist, their content, detail, and method of 
notation differs from dealer to dealer. There is no standardizing, regulatory government 
entity to oversee this sort of financial activity.  
The hawala system is thus ripe for criminal and terrorist exploitation. They lack 
paper trails and government oversight. These circumstances are compounded by the 
intensely personal and discreet nature of the hawala networks. 
Al Qaeda had no choice after it moved to Afghanistan in 1996 but to heavily use 
the hawala system as Afghanistan’s banking system was antiquated and undependable. 
Once Al Qaeda’s profile rose after the August 1998 East Africa bombings and 
government scrutiny of the formal financial system increased worldwide, hawals again 
rose in importance. “Al Qaeda used about a dozen trusted hawaladars, who almost 
certainly knew of the source and purpose of the money. Al Qaeda also used both 
unwitting hawaladars and hawaladars who probably strongly suspected that they were 
dealing with al Qaeda but were nevertheless willing to deal with anyone” (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004). 
 Lastly, couriers were a primary means of conveyance. Couriers are a secure way 





within al Qaeda. Traits that could help the traveler keep a low profile, such as language 
skills, ethnicity, or documentation were key considerations. Practicing operational 
security, Al Qaeda’s couriers simply carried the money without knowing its intended 
purpose. To further blur any traceable pattern, Al Qaeda occasionally blended hawala and 
courier segments into a single transaction.353 
Al Qaeda Finance Pre 9/11 – Spending Income 
 
 Once Al Qaeda moved back to Afghanistan, bin Laden sought to turn it into a 
fully operational organization. This meant an overall increase in the volume of expenses 
as well as a more diverse array of expenditures as the organization fleshed out. The CIA 
and academic researchers estimate that Al Qaeda’s overall expenditures pre 9/11 were 
roughly 30 to 35 million dollars per annum (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
2004; Gunaratna 2001).354 Four main expenses existed.  
First, Al Qaeda had to stay in the good graces of the Taliban, who were 
notoriously strapped for cash. The US estimates put this annual amount, Al Qaeda’s 
single largest expense, at roughly 10 to 20 million dollars. Over time, the Taliban 
increasingly relied on al Qaeda for their military needs, to include arms and vehicles, as 
well as social projects. In turn, the Taliban resisted pressure to expel Bin Ladin or turn 
him over to a third country (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004). 
 Second, Al Qaeda covered expenses associated with maintaining and building the 
organization. These expenses included military training and support, jihadist salaries, 
training camp infrastructure, and propaganda (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 





physical infrastructure, transportation, housing, offices, etc. were tabulated at roughly 50 
million dollars. 
 Third, Al Qaeda strategically used its finances to create alliances with other 
Islamic militants around the world and broaden Al Qaeda’s reach. Al Qaeda’s money 
enabled it to establish connections with these groups and harness their members, contacts, 
and facilities. Not a blanket program, Al Qaeda selectively funded new groups for 
specific operations. On the whole, however, Al Qaeda generally provided logistical 
support and other operational assistance rather than money (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks, 2004).  
 Fourth, and smallest in overall volume, Al Qaeda expended money on actual 
terrorist operations. Most significantly, these included the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings 
in East Africa (approximately $10,000), the 9/11 attacks (roughly $400,000–500,000), 
the October 18, 2002, Bali bombings (around $20,000), and potential maritime operations 
against oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz (about $130,000). These centrally-directed, 
major attacks, however, were not the norm (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
2004). 
In line with its operational dynamics, Al Qaeda functioned akin to a research 
foundation. Certain projects were driven, and thus funded, by the main organization. 
Most projects, however, were submitted from outside the organization for review with a 
request for funds. A few projects were selected, but most were rejected (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks).355 Operational funding, vice being a sustained flow of 





(Gunaratna 2002b).356 Daily living and other associated bills were the responsibilities of 
the operatives themselves. 
Al Qaeda Finance Post 9/11 – Generating Income 
 
 The political impact of the September 11th attacks was so dramatic that it overrode 
preexisting political interests in the financial world that had previously staved off 
government oversight. New laws and regulations, at both the national and international 
level, were enacted that not only empowered governments around the world to take direct 
action, but that also required them to do so. The changed political climate not only 
ensured follow-through in this new regulatory environment, but it also induced 
governments to take political action not specifically accounted for in the legal realm. 
 Al Qaeda’s financial structure took quick, repeated blows in short succession. 
Every aspect – generating income, handling and moving money, and expenditures – was 
markedly reduced in volume. Nevertheless, Al Qaeda has managed to adapt to its 
financial environment of international intelligence, regulatory, and legal scrutiny. Though 
hard pressed, Al Qaeda remains financially viable.   
Most prominently, the post-9/11 international political environment eliminated 
any remaining vestiges of direct or indirect state aid. Major Al Qaeda allies, such as the 
Taliban, who served as a cut-out for the Pakistanis in passing aid to Al Qaeda, have either 
been eliminated or are under siege by local governmental authorities at US behest. 
More significantly, after the September 11th attacks the US government and other 
governments around the world aggressively pursued and froze terrorism-related monies. 
Governments revamped existing financial laws, regulations, authorities, and protocols to 





permanently altered the legal, regulatory, and political environment and made it far less 
hospitable to terrorist financing.  
On the domestic side, President Bush publicly signed Executive Order 1324 on 23 
September 2001. This order, directed against terrorist financing, focused US government 
efforts against “al Qaeda, Bin Ladin, and associated terrorist groups, freezing any assets 
belonging to the listed terrorists or their supporters and blocking any economic 
transactions with them” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004).357 The US 
government struck a quick, hard blow that Al Qaeda either did not anticipate or was 
unable to respond to in a timely manner. 
The Office of Foreign Assets Control moved from a counter narcotics focus and 
began to block terrorists’ assets. It added a host of new terrorist front, cover, and other 
sympathetic organizations to its existing list. At 12:01 A.M. on September 24, 2001, the 
freezes began, and within one month US and foreign financial institutions froze nearly 
$100 million in terrorist assets. The US Office of Foreign Assets Control then released 
the names of 2,500 companies and individuals whose assets were to be blocked 
(Gunaratna 2002b). The U.S. government publicly issued additional lists of designated 
terrorist supporters into the winter of 2002. “The goal was to try to deprive the terrorists 
of money, but this approach also served to assure the general public that action was being 
taken in the area of terrorist financing and to keep the intelligence and world 
communities focused on identifying terrorist financiers” (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks 2004). 
Congress enacted numerous financial institution regulations that had been largely 





part, were designed to empower the Secretary of the Treasury to address the terrorism 
problem over the concerns of competing interests that had dominated prior to September 
11th. The Secretary of the Treasury now had the power to name countries, institutions, or 
transactions found to be of primary money-laundering or terrorist-financing concern and 
implement new requirements that US banks more closely scrutinize their relationships 
with foreign persons and banks. A multitude of financial industries - insurance 
companies, money service businesses, broker dealers, and credit card companies — were 
potentially subject to a host of new requirements, including reporting suspicious financial 
activity on the part of their customers to the Treasury Department. Federal Reserve 
examiners were now tasked with inspecting banks for compliance with antiterrorism 
directives (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004). 
These steps, though effective against their target, still left the larger problem 
unaddressed. “The United States is not, and has not been, a substantial source of al Qaeda 
funding.”358 Most Al Qaeda money was and is simply not connected to US banking 
entities, and so much of Al Qaeda’s money fell outside the scope of unilateral US 
government efforts. So, the United States also pursued international efforts. These have 
been both bilateral with states and multilateral via non-state actors.  
Significant new multilateral norms are now in place to set standards preventing 
terrorist use of the formal financial system (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
2004). With the United States as a driving force, the United Nations Security Council 
passed Resolution 1373 on September 28, 2001. It mandated that member nations had to 
formulate laws to designate individuals and entities as supporters of terrorism and freeze 





These resolutions have established sanctions and travel bans against Al Qaeda, the 
Taliban, affiliates, and splinter groups to clamp down on terrorist financing. New UN 
committees were set up to implement the resolutions.360 Shortly thereafter, more than 100 
nations drafted and passed laws addressing terrorist financing or money laundering. As of 
2006, approximately 170 nations have the legal ability to freeze terrorist assets (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004).  
The work of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the heart of this effort. 
This non-governmental entity is a group of more than 30 countries and non-governmental 
organizations at the heart of the modern financial world.361 FATF seeks to tighten 
controls on monetary and financial transfers to prevent abuse furthering criminal, and 
now terrorist, activity. Prior to 9/11, it had been the multilateral body responsible for 
setting international standards for the detection and prosecution of money laundering. In 
the months after 9/11, the FATF expanded its remit to include setting standards for 
preventing terrorist financing. It made eight recommendations, the most prominent of 
which included creating the ability to freeze terrorist assets, licensing informal money 
remitters, and regulating nongovernmental organizations (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks 2004; Caruana and Norgren 2004). Having been endorsed by the United 
Nations Security Council, these recommendations now carry the weight of mandatory 
international law.  
The United States bolstered this multilateral work by engaging in bilateral 
diplomacy. Most importantly, it did so with Saudi Arabia, the primary source of Al 
Qaeda donations. Ideologically, this country is closest to Al Qaeda’s prescribed religious, 





Saudi public. In terms of personnel, many of Al Qaeda’s members and leaders have 
familial ties to the kingdom.362 
 The limited and inconsistent cooperation Saudi Arabia provided against Al Qaeda 
both before and after the September 11th attacks changed dramatically after Al Qaeda 
attacked Riyadh on 12 May 2003. “Saudi leadership, now finally understanding the al 
Qaeda threat, is by all accounts providing significantly higher levels of cooperation” 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004). Much of the Saudi government’s 
efforts focus on killing or capturing terrorist operatives, but the Saudis are also moving 
against fundraisers and facilitators, sharing intelligence, and enacting financial controls, 
such as requiring that all charitable donations destined for overseas be administered by 
the government and banning cash donations in mosques. They have taken significant 
action against al Haramain, for example, a charity suspected of funneling money to 
terrorist organizations (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004). 
The Saudis are also participating in a joint task force on terrorist financing with 
the United States in which U.S. law enforcement agents are working side by side with 
Saudi security personnel to combat terrorist financing. The Saudis have accepted 
substantial U.S. training in conducting financial investigations and identifying suspicious 
financial transactions in furtherance of this effort that they had previously refused. 
Though “Saudi Arabia likely remains the best and easiest place for al Qaeda to raise 
money, the Saudi crackdown appears to have had a real impact in reducing its funding. In 
addition, the Saudi population may feel that as a result of the attacks against their own 
people, they should be more cautious in their giving” (National Commission on Terrorist 





This altering of the international financial environment has hit three of Al Qaeda’s 
means of revenue generation hard: 1) Al Qaeda is no longer capable of openly and 
legitimately investing in its own name and/or via known or suspected associates, 2) Al 
Qaeda’s front companies have been disrupted, and 3) Al Qaeda’s involvement with 
charities and non-governmental organizations has been severely hindered.  
Two critical sources of long term funding, however, remain largely intact. First, 
despite a heightened general political awareness and some increased attention from 
authorities, numerous wealthy individuals continue to contribute funding to the jihadist 
movement and Al Qaeda. Second, crime, effective in the past for meeting the daily 
expenses of Al Qaeda operatives, continues to be effective today in helping to sustain the 
organization’s working-level networks abroad. If anything, the viability of this venue has 
increased post 9/11. Governments have shifted more emphasis to national level resources 
against classically defined terrorism. This often has come at the expense of more local 
police forces who engage against routine criminal behavior that, on its face, has no 
ostensible connection to terrorism but actually plays a key role in supporting terrorists 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004).  
 Amidst the reduction of so many previous options, one new revenue stream has 
opened up: named franchises. Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, which is assisted by Al Qaeda 
in the Maghreb,363 is directly confronting US troops in Iraq via high visibility attacks. 
Their high publicity work has enabled them to raise funds more successfully than the 
more isolated, lower-visibility Al Qaeda central. As with Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, they 
are remitting money to the center instead of vice versa (National Commission on 





Al Qaeda Finance Post 9/11 – Handling and Moving Money 
 
Despite the multitude of government actions noted above, Al Qaeda’s financial 
methodology and personnel structure remain largely intact. The method of transferring 
money, however, has changed. “The money seems to be distributed as quickly as it is 
raised, and (the United States government has) found no evidence that there is a central 
“bank” or “war chest” (to and) from which al Qaeda (reposes and) draws funds” 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004). Banks no longer play a significant 
role.  
Al Qaeda and its affiliates now rely increasingly upon couriers to haul money 
across borders, and, as of mid 2006, “it is a trend that has accelerated.”365 The trend 
began shortly after the 9/11 attacks as the world community rapidly mobilized. Trusted 
couriers are relied upon for significant cash transfers. When necessary, for added 
security, the operatives themselves avoid support personnel altogether.  
Using couriers has slowed down al Qaeda’s movement of money. Physically 
transporting money over large distances necessarily takes much longer than electronic 
means. There is also evidence that the limited supply of trusted couriers has caused 
significant delays in moving money, especially to al Qaeda operatives in distant 
locations. Lastly, moving funds by courier requires planning, coordination, and 
communication, and these things take time (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
2004).  
 Hawala networks, while still existent, now play a lesser role. “The hawala 
network that existed prior to 9/11 seems to have been largely destroyed. Several of the 





and the identities of others have been revealed in seized records. Al Qaeda may have 
developed relationships with other hawaladars, and it most likely uses them to move 
some of its money” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004).  
Al Qaeda Finance Post 9/11 – Spending Income 
 
 The combination of the markedly reduced size and capability of Al Qaeda central 
and the drastically changed post 9/11 financial environments have combined to 
dramatically decrease Al Qaeda’s overall expenditures. Current US government 
projections assess Al Qaeda’s overall annual budget to be roughly three to five million 
dollars per year (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004). Nevertheless, Al 
Qaeda remains financially viable because its expenditures are not disproportionate to its 
dramatically reduced expenses. 
Al Qaeda no longer makes payments to stay in the good graces of the Taliban as 
the Taliban can no longer provide a sheltering state structure. Instead, Al Qaeda, which is 
publicly presumed to be hiding in the ungoverned areas of Pakistan, is now most likely 
providing money to local tribal chiefs and governmental authorities. Such a payment is 
almost certainly lower than when Al Qaeda was helping to support the Afghan state 
structure. Apart from the lesser need for money and a lesser developed economy in which 
to actually spend it, which only magnifies its effect, Al Qaeda has strong popular support 
throughout Southwest Asia. When combined with Al Qaeda’s propensity for violence, it 
is highly unlikely that Al Qaeda’s senior leadership would be extorted for protection and 
thus re-incur a voluminous Taliban-style rent.     
 There is also less existing organizational structure to maintain both in terms of 





now than when Al Qaeda was in its heyday with thousands of acknowledged and 
documented members actively performing a multitude of military and terrorist functions. 
The 055 Brigade, as noted in chapter six, is significantly reduced. Beyond this, over 4000 
Al Qaeda personnel have been detained world-wide, and Pakistan alone has extracted 700 
from its tribal areas and cities. There are simply far fewer fighters and their families to 
support, though Al Qaeda still supports those remaining.366 Even with the reported 
restoration of training camps in the Pakistani tribal areas, their hidden nature means that 
their scale can never rival the volume formerly processed in Afghanistan.  
 Expenses associated with Al Qaeda’s extensive physical and training 
infrastructure are also presumably markedly less now than when Al Qaeda was in its 
heyday. Al Qaeda’s industrial scale physical and training infrastructure built up in 
Afghanistan during the mid to late 90’s is now in US hands, and so it no longer needs to 
be maintained. Even with the reported restoration of training camps in the Pakistani tribal 
areas, international political pressure prevents them, and thus expenses, from 
demonstrably growing, for that would increase Al Qaeda’s visibility and lead to its 
annihilation. Concurrent with purportedly hiding in the tribal areas of Pakistan, Al Qaeda 
can now rely upon physical and training infrastructure investments made long ago during 
the jihad against the Russians, thus precluding significant new building and expenses. 
 Third, the demand for building alliances has waned. Al Qaeda central still 
occasionally provides funding to other terrorist groups, particularly in Southeast Asia, but 
circumstances have changed.367 In the wake of the September 11th attacks, Al Qaeda is 
now an established player and is no longer seeking to make a name for itself. Many lesser 





jihadist community, Usama bin Ladin is revered. This increase in political capital means 
that Al Qaeda has to devote fewer resources to buying influence.  
 Fourth, Al Qaeda is less operationally active than it was prior to the September 
11th attacks, so fewer resources are being devoted to centrally-directed terrorist 
operations. The 18 to 24 month major attack cycle has been broken. Al Qaeda central is 
no longer plugged in as a fully functional terrorist command element managing day to 
day issues, and so it has fewer expenses in that regard. The attacks that have been 
witnessed have been smaller in scale, and thus cheaper to execute. They have relied more 
on indigenous personnel, who are generally less expensive than those Al Qaeda imports 
who are not integrated into society and must be supported from abroad.  
 Though Al Qaeda’s tendency toward frugality and its grant-foundation-approach 
to supporting non-centrally directed terrorist activity are not assessed to have changed, 
the awarding of this money is now done differently. “Al Qaeda has become decentralized 
and it is unlikely that the Finance Committee still exists. Sa’id 
continues to operate, but given the difficulties of communication, it is doubtful that he 
exerts much control. The direction and financing of operations are now based more on 
personal relationships with operatives than on a management structure.”368 
Existing US Procedures to Combat Al Qaeda Finance 
 
 The financial dimension of the US government’s counterterrorism campaign to 
reach the current level of pain it has inflicted on Al Qaeda has evolved through two 
stages. The initial emphasis on denial of funds has given way to the exploitation of funds. 







The first stage was to deny Al Qaeda resources and seize the low-hanging 
financial fruit. The post 9/11 political sea change meant that any future known and/or 
suspected monies could also be pursued, and thus denied to Al Qaeda. In one fell swoop, 
as noted earlier, in excess of 100 million dollars, the known and/or suspected Al Qaeda 
resources at the time, was quickly seized.  
Treasury officials argued that this approach had multiple benefits. Designations, 
for example, prevent open fund-raising and assist in preventing al Qaeda from raising the 
amounts of money necessary to create the kind of refuge it had in Afghanistan, or from 
expending the sums necessary to buy or develop a weapon of mass destruction. Plus, 
freezing groups or individuals out of the world’s financial systems forces them into slow, 
expensive, and less reliable methods of storing and moving money. Also, there is 
significant diplomatic utility in having the world governments join together to condemn 
named individuals and groups as terrorists.  Wary of being publicly named and their 
assets frozen, donors and al Qaeda sympathizers may have become more reluctant to 
provide overt support (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004). 
Though symbolically and politically significant, this effort did not yield 
overwhelmingly tangible results in preventing terrorist attacks. It is virtually impossible 
to completely starve Al Qaeda of funds. Save for notable exceptions, most terrorist 
attacks are remarkably inexpensive to execute. “Al Qaeda can apparently still draw on 
hard-core donors who knowingly fund it and sympathizers who divert charitable 
donations to it” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004). And, multiple venues 





Apart from weaknesses at the conceptual level, this approach also had weaknesses 
at the implementation level. These weaknesses were a function of politics, process, and 
enforcement. Three main flaws existed. 
First, the ineffectiveness of making the international financial system the primary 
point of emphasis is highlighted by the industry’s inability to identify the intended target. 
Efforts within the financial industry to create financial profiles of terrorist cells and 
terrorist fund-raisers have proven unsuccessful. The ability of financial institutions to 
detect terrorist financing is limited at best. 
Second, inherent conflicts between the innate dynamics of law and intelligence 
led to counterproductive implementation. Initial designations were undertaken with 
limited evidence, and some reflected more suspicion than factual evidence. Legal 
challenges resulted. Faced with having to defend actions in courts that required a higher 
standard of evidence than was provided by the intelligence that supported the 
designations in the first place, the United States and the United Nations were forced to 
“unfreeze” assets.  
The problem not fully understood by policymakers was that the intelligence 
community “linked” certain entities or individuals to known terrorist groups primarily 
through common acquaintances, group affiliations, historic relationships, phone 
communications, and other such contacts (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
2004). This is not the same as showing complicity in terrorism. It is far more difficult to 
actually trace the money from a suspected entity or individual to an actual terrorist group 
and prove intent. This standard is what is necessary in a court of law, the realm where 





This required a wholesale change of practices for intelligence officers. During the 
Cold War, information was gathered over long periods of time before it ever became 
public, action became necessary, or both. Now, however, information not only needed to 
be quick and action-able, but it had to be able to survive a court challenge.369 
Early mistakes that induced numerous legal challenges have sapped the 
enthusiasm of other countries to either freeze assets at all or act simply because America 
made a request. Multilateral freezing mechanisms now have waiting periods before 
money can be frozen. This change in process means that the element of surprise is gone, 
and so virtually no new money is actually frozen. To compound the problem, existing 
freezes on assets around the world have not been adequately enforced, and they have 
been easily circumvented, often within weeks, by simple methods (National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks 2004). 
Third, whatever success was achieved by either systemically adjusting existing 
global financial practices or creating new ones, however, was only tentative due to the 
absence of an impartial enforcement mechanism for international law that could override 
local political and economic concerns (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
2004).370 Historically, the US financial community and some international financial 
institutions have generally provided US law enforcement and US intelligence agencies 
with solid cooperation, particularly in providing information to support quickly 
developing investigations, such as the search for terrorist suspects. Much of this 
cooperation, such as providing expedited returns on subpoenas related to terrorism, 





history, it is an open question as to whether or not such cooperation will continue 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004). 
Subsequent to this initial flurry of multilateral, financial-system-centric activity, 
the United States complemented these efforts with bilateral approaches to other states. 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States were a particular focus. While problematic at first, the 
result has since proven moderately successful, though assigning credit to US persuasion 
efforts would be a dubious claim. 
Saudi Arabia is crucial to fighting terrorist financing. The intelligence community 
has identified it as the primary source of money for al Qaeda both before and after the 
September 11 attacks. Fund-raisers and facilitators from throughout Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf raise money for Al Qaeda from witting and unwitting donors and divert funds from 
Islamic charities and mosques. The 9/11 Commission staff found no evidence that the 
Saudi government itself or any individual senior officials knowingly are assisting or have 
assisted al Qaeda. De facto passive assistance is ripe, however, due to a lack of awareness 
of the problem combined with a failure to conduct effective oversight that has created an 
environment conducive to terrorist financing (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
2004). 
The year 2003 was a watershed. From the 9/11 attacks through spring 2003, most 
U.S. officials viewed Saudi cooperation on terrorist financing as ambivalent and 
selective. The U.S. efforts stymied by Saudi recalcitrance suffered from the lack of a US 
strategy to counter Saudi terrorist financing, the failure to present US requests through a 
single high-level interlocutor, and US unwillingness to obtain and release actionable 





these deficiencies. Not just a more effective U.S. message, but, more importantly, Al 
Qaeda operations within the Kingdom in May and November 2003 focused the Saudi 
government’s attention on its terrorist-financing problem. Cooperation with the United 
States soon dramatically improved (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004). 
Again, this newfound diplomatic cooperation is tentative, and changing political winds 
could dissipate it.  
Stage Two 
 
Stage One weaknesses gave way to State Two US counterterrorism efforts on the 
financial front, a sustained effort to “follow the money.” Al Qaeda’s money trails, vice 
being an end, can be a used as a means, as a beacon, to identify terrorist operatives. 
Alternative approaches to these now-identified terrorist operatives can then be devised. 
The complexity of Al Qaeda’s handling and moving of money means that 
providing actionable intelligence is particularly difficult. The U.S. government’s reliance 
upon foreign government intelligence reporting only compounds the problem. At the end 
of the day though, the US government can often show that certain fund-raising groups or 
individuals are “linked” to terrorist groups via common acquaintances, group affiliations, 
historic relationships, phone communications, or other such contacts. As noted, it is far 
more difficult to show a suspected NGO or individual actually funds terrorist groups 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004). 
This type of identifying and associative information – which falls far short of 
legally sufficient evidence - is ideal for law enforcement and/or intelligence exploitation. 





other information pertaining to known and/or suspected individuals. Independent 
investigations against likely terrorists can then be pursued from this indirect guidance.  
Though far less visible than seizing funds, following the money is a necessary 
process. This approach does not unnecessarily force irreversible decisions when 
navigating the terrorist financing web, which is filled with both witting guilty people and 
the innocent unwitting. It is a long term approach that draws upon multiple sources of 
information, which can then be preserved for future exploitation because they do not need 
to be revealed in court. Over time, a holistic picture can be painted and a network can be 
taken down through simultaneous pressure on all nodes at once rather than selectively 
attacking identified nodes, which can then be replaced.  
Weakness in US Procedures to Combat Al Qaeda Finance 
 
Al Qaeda has been forced into informal systems. To raise money, it now relies 
primarily upon personal donors and crime. To move money, Al Qaeda depends primarily 
upon couriers and hawala dealers. Nearly all of this takes place beyond US shores. 
 Other states, therefore, are the key to access for the United States in dealing with 
these issues. The chief remaining venues are outside of the formal societal system. No 
foreign government knows the society of another country better, much less its private 
sphere activity, than does a society’s own government. No foreign government is in a 
position to pursue private sphere elements of another society that are hostile to it better 
than that society’s own government.  
 Two key mutually complementary weaknesses in the US approach emerge: 
First, the United States is at the mercy of the capacity of foreign states. Al 





at a systemic disadvantage in having to rely upon weak governing authorities of 
developing countries.  
Second, the United States is at the mercy of local politics. It is the politics of the 
developing world that sustain Al Qaeda to begin with and enable it to strike its developed 
world targets – the United States and Europe. Hostile politics only further weaken 
whatever actual state capacity exists.   
Conclusion 
 
 Contrary to popular mythology, Al Qaeda was not financed by a multimillionaire 
Usama bin Ladin, and so it had to develop external fundraising abilities to ensure its 
financial vitality. This was significant. Since Al Qaeda was and is not self sufficient, 
there is a window of opportunity to pressure the organization on a crucial dimension.  
Prior to 9/11, Al Qaeda operated virtually unhindered. It relied upon five key 
means - wealthy individuals, charities, front companies, criminal activity, and legitimate 
investments. It exploited the formal financial system to manage its money. Its 
expenditures – rent to the Taliban, organizational maintenance such as salaries and 
physical infrastructure, lobbying payments to other organizations, and monies for actual 
terrorist operations - were reflective of a vibrant and growing organization.  
The September 11th attacks, however, drastically changed the political 
environment, and this, in turn, altered the financial environment. Political interests that 
had kept increased government regulation at bay were swept aside, and a host of new 
laws and regulations, at both the national and international levels, empowered state 
authorities to freeze suspected monies. Unilateral and multilateral state-centric efforts 





The unbridled flow of terrorist money has been hemmed, and terrorists have been 
forced out of the legitimate financial world. Al Qaeda’s money raising is now largely 
reduced to crime and individual donors. Its movement of money is now largely restricted 
to informal means, such as couriers and hawala dealers.  
Nevertheless, despite being hard-pressed, Al Qaeda still remains financially 
viable. Its intake has been reduced. Its financial outlays, however, also appear to have 
correspondingly declined.  
No state, no matter how powerful and totalitarian in nature, can totally dominate 
the private sphere, which is where Al Qaeda derives its sustenance. As long as Al Qaeda 
has political appeal, people will continue to give money, and Al Qaeda will have the 
resources to act. Whether via multilateral or bilateral means, attempting to starve Al 
Qaeda of money, a technical process to seize or trace funds, ultimately rests on a political 
cornerstone. Seizures and other punitive actions stemming from tracing the money are a 
race between government action and countervailing public.  
Unfortunately for the United States and its allies, Al Qaeda holds the advantage. 
Not only does it have more operational and political agility than cumbersome state 
authorities bound by law, but the United States is not addressing the political currents that 
Al Qaeda manipulates to create bedrock of support. The ultimate potential of the 
technical processes of tracing and/or seizing funds is thus unlikely to ever enable 
fundamentally financially undercutting Al Qaeda; it will, at best, only mange the 
situation. Hostile politics, which Al Qaeda will incite and manipulate, will create a buffer 





unaddressed root of Al Qaeda financing – the politics that is driving the US-Al Qaeda 

















































Politics and Ideology: The Yardstick of Terrorism 
 
“He who rules by moral forces is like the  
pole star, which remains in place while all  
the lesser stars do homage to it.” 
…Confucious371 
 
Terrorism is, at root, a political contest. Both the legitimate political authorities 
and the terrorists fight for public support. Both seek control of the political agenda.  
The case of Al Qaeda presents a paradox. On the one hand, Al Qaeda should be 
struggling. Terrorism is universally condemned. Al Qaeda’s professed political goals 
garner widespread public disapproval. On the other hand, Al Qaeda survives. Al Qaeda 
terrorists “are being replaced as fast as we can kill or capture them… Even if they are 
reduced as an organization, they’ve been able to enlist…others to do their bidding.”372  
 This chapter will discuss how Al Qaeda has been able to continue as a viable 
terrorist entity and spearhead the global jihadist insurgency in the face of constant US 
pressure to eradicate it and in spite of the apparent unpopularity of its political agenda. 
This discussion will be framed by the dynamics of terrorism in the US-Al Qaeda struggle. 
 The United States, as the world’s dominant power, has largely shaped the political 
context in which the US-Al Qaeda struggle is occurring. Al Qaeda is reacting to US 
policy. The United States, therefore, is positioned to engineer a political solution, or at 
least mollify the struggle’s intensity. Implications for existing US policy will be noted. 
Looking at Al Qaeda  
The US-Al Qaeda struggle is, at its heart, a political contest. Terrorism is a tactic 
to influence this struggle’s political discourse. Competing political agendas, and thus 





 As theory suggests, the terrorists’ political agenda serves three main roles. First, it 
unites and defines the terrorist entity, which is an artificial creation rooted in adherence to 
political goals. Second, with the hope that their agenda has incipient potential for as-yet-
unrealized popularity, the terrorists’ agenda will serve as the beacon to rally incipient but 
not yet mobilized supporters to the terrorists’ cause once these unmobilized people 
become aware of the terrorists’ agenda. Third, it serves as the yard stick of political 
action for the terrorists’ targeted population to measure the amount of further terrorism 
needed to persuade the targeted population to bring its political agenda into line. 
Conversely, in the eyes of the targeted populations, the terrorists’ political agenda 
becomes a yardstick. It measures the probability for future violence with the chances of 
terrorism increasing in direct proportion to the distance the targeted public is from the 
terrorists’ political goals.  
Public Support for Al Qaeda’s Political Goals and Terrorist Tactics 
 
 Al Qaeda’s political goals, as laid out in chapter four, do not have widespread 
popular support. A 2006 Zogby poll queried Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia about support for Al Qaeda’s primary political 
goal – a single Islamic state under sharia. Support never broke single digits.373    
 Despite being extremely diverse in terms of ethnicity, geography, political 
situation, economic situation, etc., the vast majority of the world’s Muslim population is 
strongly unified and unequivocal in condemning terrorism. The 2002 Gallup Survey of 
the Islamic World showed strong majorities in eight of the nine Muslim countries polled 
condemned the 9/11 attacks.374 A spring 2007 poll by Pew and Terror Free Tomorrow 





Majorities in Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan and Iran say that attacks against civilians can 
never be justified.376  
 After initially raising its profile, and that of its political issues, Al Qaeda’s 
terrorist acts have politically wounded it. A 2006 Zogby poll of Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia revealed mostly single digit 
support for Al Qaeda’s “methods of operation.”377 This sentiment has only increased the 
more Al Qaeda has executed post 9/11 strikes in Muslim countries.378 As shown by 
Jordan, this increased exposure has lessened support not only for terrorism, but it has also 
reversed support for bin Laden.379 More concretely, a February 2007 World Public 
Opinion survey of Muslim countries showed strong disapproval of “groups that use 
violence against civilians, such as Al Qaeda.”380  
US-Al Qaeda Struggle 
 
Muslim Publics and US Political and Economic Values 
 
 At the end of World War II, competing political agendas amongst the Allied, 
which were both a reflection of and were powered by alternative political values, rose to 
the fore. These political differences were cast against a background of very stark power 
disparities. Though US naval power reigned supreme, Soviet land power dominated, and 
this aspect of military prowess would control the fruits of the Nazi defeat. The United 
States, militarily backed by its less powerful political allies, and the Soviet Union, 
militarily backed by both its less powerful political allies and those polities it had 
conquered in the name of defeating the Nazis, became embroiled in a cold war.  Tensions 





 The United States responded with a two track approach. In the short term, the 
United States used its hard power assets to temporarily hold the Soviet juggernaut at bay. 
In the longer term, vice proclaiming an empire, the United States invoked the appeal of 
its political and economic values to create a rival politico-economic system that would 
ultimately be capable of producing sufficient hard power to counter the Soviets in a hot 
war if necessary. In short, the United States created a participatory system that involved, 
benefited, and constrained all actors, to include itself.  
 Politically, the United States promoted international law and embraced 
participatory international institutions. In doing so, the United States endorsed the United 
Nations, limited the use of force to self defense, and respected sovereignty. The United 
States also championed democracy and human rights. These positions not only offered 
political appeal to less powerful states whose political, and thus hard power, support the 
United States was attempting to win, but they both presented a stark contrast to the 
Soviets while simultaneously advancing US interests.   
 Sixty years later, US political values have permeated the world. A May 2003 
Zogby poll revealed majorities in all five Arab countries surveyed held a favorable view 
of US “freedom and democracy” (Telhami 2002). A 2005 Gallup International poll found 
78% in the Middle East, as a whole, agreed that “democracy may have problems, but it is 
the best form of government.”381 Separate 2006 Pew polling found that most Muslims 
around the world rejected the proposition that “democracy is a western way of doing 
things that would not work in most Muslim countries.”382 A 2007 BBC poll found that in 
30 out of 32 states, people thought the UN - the world’s chief embodiment of 





world (Telhami 2002).383 Economically, the United States promoted private enterprise 
and an open international trading system. At its root, doing so was about increasing 
mutually beneficial participatory economic opportunity for all. In doing so, the United 
States backed institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
Further, US foreign aid and economic policies integrated poorer countries, particularly 
ones with strategic value, into the US-dominated international economic system. This 
was done to the Soviet’s exclusion, thus undercutting Soviet hard power production 
capability as well as weakening a potential tool for generating political appeal. 
 Sixty years later, these US economic tenets have been strongly embraced. In 
2006, the BBC found publics in 19 out of 20 countries agreed that “the free enterprise 
system and free market economy is the best system on which to base the future of the 
world.”384 In December 2001, Pew found overwhelming majorities in the Middle East 
(81%) and Islamic states in general (81%) viewed the United States as the land of 
opportunity. Overwhelming majorities in the Middle East (86%) and Islamic states in 
general (73%) revered the scientific and technical achievements of the US system.385  
In contrast to Al Qaeda’s contention, there is not a fundamental clash in political 
values between the United States and the world’s “Muslim publics.” In fact, there are no 
indications that support for these US political and economic principles that underpin the 
world system is declining.386 Al Qaeda, not the United States, is the politico-economic 
ideological outlier.  
Global public perceptions back up this finding. Rather than clashing political 
values, combative and intolerant minorities, who by definition reject the inviting and 





problem. Findings in a 2006 BBC World Service poll of 27 countries found 58% of 
respondents in 27 countries cited intolerant political minorities as the primary source of 
tension as opposed to clashing political values.387  
US Public Standing 
 The United States not only possesses well-regarded political values, but it is the 
source of those values. By this logic, the United States should be an exceptionally 
popular country. This is not, however, the case.    
 The US public image, which suffered a sharp drop with the 2003 US invasion of 
Iraq, continues to degrade. A 2006 BBC World Service Poll shows the average 
percentage saying that the United States is mainly a positive influence in the world 
dropped seven points from 2005 – from 36 to 29 percent – after dropping four points 
from 2004. Across all 25 countries polled, one citizen in two (49%) now says the US is 
playing a mainly negative role in the world.388 Negative views have risen from 46% in 
2005 to 52% in 2007.389 Germane to Al Qaeda, a February 2002 Gallup poll when 9/11 
sympathy for the United States was high found more unfavorable than favorable in all but 
one of the nine Muslim countries surveyed.390 
 A 2006 Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll surveyed publics around the 
world that represented about 56% of the world’s population. In 10 out of 15 countries, the 
most common view was that the United States could not be trusted “a great deal”, 
“somewhat”, or even “not very much” to act responsibly in the world.391 Amongst 
Islamic states, there is a general perception that Western nations are not fair in their 





 By contrast, Europe’s ratings are positive. A November 2006 – January 2007 
BBC World Survey poll found that, in 24 out of 27 countries surveyed, 53% worldwide 
say the EU’s influence is positive while only 19% say it is negative. Even when EU 
members were excluded from the polling, 16 out of 19 non-EU countries said the EU 
plays a constructive role in world affairs. On average, 48% say the EU is a positive 
influence while only 22% say it is negative. In fact, majorities around the world prefer 
that Europe be more influential than the United States.393  
Policies versus Values 
 
 Such disparate ratings for two entities of the same highly respected value sets 
begs the question of why. Policy, which is either an implicit expression of values 
manifested in interests or a direct implementation of values, as opposed to the values 
themselves, is the issue. Given the dichotomous US-European approval ratings, US 
policies, not Western policies, are the point of objection.  
 Polling supports this contention. Pew’s December 2001 survey of opinion makers 
in Islamic states found, to the tune of 76%, that “most/many people believe” that US 
policy caused the 9/11 attacks. Within the Middle East, a vast majority (81%) of opinion-
makers stated that “many/most people believed” US policies vice values were the 
problem.394  
 A March 2002 poll in Saudi Arabia, a relative hotbed for Al Qaeda support, 
queried Saudi elites about their source of frustrations with the United States; the poll 
found that 86% saw US policies as the source of their frustrations. Amongst the general 
public, 59% identified “policies” as the cause whereas only 19% identified “values” 





respondents overwhelmingly cited “conflicts about political power and interests” over 
“differences of religion/culture” as the “cause of Islam-West tensions.”395 
 Three key policy disagreements stand out: 
 First, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is a highly visible point of contention. A 2001 
Pew survey of opinion-makers found that while a range of non-Islamic societies spanning 
from 36% in Asia to 7% in Latin America cite US support for Israel as a major reason for 
not liking the United States, the global average is 29%. By contrast, 57% of opinion-
makers in Islamic countries in general and the Middle East in particular cited US support 
for Israel as a major reason for disliking the United States.396 Even in places where US 
support for Israel is not a front line issue and most people register a particular sympathy 
for neither side, such as Western Europe, the underlying current amongst those who do 
express a sympathy favors the Palestinians.397 The US policy stance on the issue is 
simply not in concert with the rest of the world.  
In spring 2001, when noted Middle East scholar Shibley Telhami polled “five 
Arab states – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Egypt – 
public attitudes on this question were decidedly clear. In the first four countries, about 
60% of the respondents identified the Palestinian conflict as the ‘single most important 
issue’ to them personally, while about 20% more said it was among their top three issues. 
In Egypt, 79% identified it as ‘the single most important issue’” (Telhami 2002, 98).  
This issue has applicability throughout the Muslim world. In spring 2002, 
approximately 2/3 of all Arab countries queried in a subsequent survey stated that the 
Palestinian question was either “the most important” or a “very important” issue 





Indonesia, two of the most important non-Arab Muslim states (Zogby International 
2003).398  
 Second, the US war in Afghanistan has been generally unpopular around the 
world, especially in the developing world, Al Qaeda’s primary emphasis. The March 
2002 Gallup Poll of the Islamic world found a majority in every country viewed US 
military action in Afghanistan as either “largely or completely morally unjustifiable.”399 
A majority of respondents in more than half of the countries actually viewed the US 
military actions in Afghanistan as less defensible than the 9/11 attacks.400 The remainder 
of the developing world, especially Latin America and Africa, also opposed the war.401   
 Only Europe differed. An April 2002 Pew poll showed support was highest in 
Great Britain, which revealed a 73 percent approval rating and an 18 percent disapproval 
rating. Larger minorities in France, Germany, and especially Italy dissented, but 
majorities in all three nations agreed with the US and Britain.402 
 Third, the US invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq has strongly piqued 
potential supporters and adherents of Al Qaeda. A 2006 BBC World Service poll of 27 
countries showed an overall average of 76% disapproval of how the US is handling the 
Iraq war.403 Subsequent to the US invasion, the overall volume of global terrorism has 
skyrocketed. “Comparing the period before the war (Sept 12, 2001 to March 20, 2003) 
and the period since, there has been a 607% rise in the average yearly incidence of 
attacks – and a 237% jump in the fatality rate.”404 Not only have fatal jihadist terrorist 
attacks around the world as well as the number of civilians killed in those attacks risen 
sharply since the US invasion of Iraq, but analysis also shows that terrorism is not 





there has been a 35% rise in the number of terrorist attacks globally and a 25% increase 
in attacks on Western targets.”405 Indeed, Al Qaeda has increasingly attacked US allies, 
both European and Middle Eastern, since the US invasion.406  
Perceptions of Muslim Publics of the United States 
 
 The US “war on terror” writ large is roundly disapproved of by global public 
opinion. The world’s reaction has not, however, been uniform. Unfortunately for the 
United States, the segments most crucial to enabling terrorism are the ones least 
supportive. 
 A December 2001 Pew poll found nearly three fourths (74%) of opinion-makers 
in the Middle East and nearly two thirds (59%) of opinion-makers in Islamic states in 
general thought that the war on terrorism against Al Qaeda was worth fighting even if it 
potentially destabilized Muslim states. A vast majority (85%) of Americans were willing 
to chance destabilizing authoritarian Muslim regimes to combat Al Qaeda. A strong 
majority (61%) of Europeans were also willing.  
 The United States, however, is strongly suspected of having ulterior motives by 
the world’s Muslim publics. A December 2006-February 2007 popular survey in Egypt, 
Morocco, Pakistan, and Indonesia found that, on average, 79% say they “definitely / 
probably” perceive the weakening and dividing of the Islamic world as a US goal. At the 
same time, 79% also claim that the United States is trying to maintain “control over the 
oil resources of the Middle East.” A sizeable majority (64%) even believe it is a US goal 
to “spread Christianity in the region.” People in the Islamic world clearly perceive the 





 The perception of US ulterior motives has caused public sentiments favoring 
some of Al Qaeda’s interim political objectives. The December 2006-February 2007 
popular survey in Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and Indonesia noted above found that an 
average of 70 percent or more in each country support Al Qaeda’s intermediary 
objectives of pushing the US to remove its bases and its military forces from all Islamic 
countries and pressuring the United States not to favor Israel. Substantial numbers also 
favor attacks on US troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the Persian Gulf. Approximately 
half support such attacks in each location while 3 in 10 are opposed.408 
Perceptions of Muslim Publics of Al Qaeda 
 
 Despite its terrorist tactics and widespread lack of political approval, Al Qaeda is 
sufficiently popular to remain viable despite being hunted by almost every state in the 
world. The 2006 Zogby poll found that Al Qaeda was perceived by a small but still 
notable percentage of respondents as standing up for Muslim causes (Lebanon 7%, Egypt 
12%, Jordan 16%, Morocco 18%, the UAE 29%, and Saudi Arabia 20%).409 Second, and 
more importantly, Al Qaeda was more strongly perceived as confronting the United 
States (Lebanon 18%, Egpyt 33%, Jordan 38%, Morocco 34%, the UAE 28%, and Saudi 
Arabia 36%).410 “Arabs may deplore (Usama’s) violence, but few will not feel some pull 
of emotions. Amid Israel’s brutality toward Palestinians and American threats toward 
Iraq, at least one Arab is prepared to hit back” (Fisk 2002). 
Possibilities for the Future 
 
 Despite adverse perceptions of the United States and its actions, all is not lost.  
December 2001 Pew polling reveals that opinion leaders in both the West and Islamic 





West against Islam.411 A subsequent 2006-2007 BBC World Service poll of 28,000 
respondents across 27 countries backed these initial post September 11th findings. It 
found less than one third (28%) thought violent conflict was inevitable while more than 
half (56%) thought “it is possible to find common ground,” the most common response in 
25 countries.412 A February 2007 BBC poll found that, on the whole, while 28% of all 
respondents thought “violent conflict is inevitable,” twice as many (56%) believe that 
“common ground can be found.”413 Overall, 35% of Muslims felt that “violent conflict is 
inevitable” while 52% said that “it is possible to find common ground.”414 “Most people 
around the world clearly reject the idea that Islam and the West are caught in an 
inevitable clash of civilizations.”415  
Implications for the US-Al Qaeda Struggle  
 
 These findings create the underlying political bedrock upon which the US-Al 
Qaeda struggle plays out. Either party ignores these political dynamics to its peril. Three 
key themes emerge when these findings are contrasted with terrorism’s dynamics: 
 First, the United States is inadvertently helping Al Qaeda resonate and foster 
unity amongst its ranks on a global scale. Al Qaeda is an ethnically diverse transnational 
terrorist organization whose central node associated with Usama bin Ladin is 
experiencing weakening suzerainty over both the organization itself and the greater 
jihadist movement writ large. While the United States and Al Qaeda are in an enduring 
conflict with mutually exclusive goals, the three main issues of contention outlined 
above, especially when associated inflammatory policies (e.g. the US military presence in 
the Middle East, the US handling of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war in Lebanon, and the 





political glue for Al Qaeda because they resonate among disenchanted, angry, or 
otherwise dissatisfied Muslim groups from Morocco to Jakarta. These US policies unite a 
transnational terrorist entity espousing a pan-Islamic identity in an age of nationalism to 
internally unite and focus otherwise disparate, albeit not unrelated, forces against the 
United States.  
 Second, Al Qaeda is harnessing and co-opting the political outrage of 
disenchanted, angry, or otherwise dissatisfied Muslim groups around the world. Its goals 
will never be realized. The world’s Muslim publics do not support and will never rally to 
its vision. Al Qaeda derives its popularity, and thus its potential for operational viability, 
not by struggling against US values, but by struggling against the US policies that the 
world’s publics do not view as being in line with those values. The world’s publics are 
not pro Al Qaeda, but rather anti United States.  
 While this situation is unfortunate, it also gives the United States the initiative. As 
the leader of the international system, the United States, however, largely controls its own 
destiny. It has significant political leverage over Al Qaeda and can politically undercut it. 
In contrast to the clash of civilizations thesis, the intensity of any conflict between the 
United States and various Muslim, particularly Arab, polities will be governed by 
clashing national interests.417 These can be massaged, manipulated, and even resolved as 
compared to enduring socio-cultural politics.   
 Critics will argue that any political change in response to terrorism is giving in to 
and empowering the terrorists. To the extent that a country caves to the terrorists and is 





contention is entirely correct. Such an act is knowingly and intentionally subjugating 
oneself to terrorist demands.  
 Another side of the coin also exists. In the wake of a devastating terrorist attack 
announcing the emergence of a serious, potent, long-term, self-declared terrorist enemy, 
the international political and strategic landscape has been altered. A new international 
environment requires a reassessment of a nation’s national interests in response to a new 
international context. Any actions that are then taken in line with newly defined national 
interests in response to events are a prudent evolution of national policy recognizing new 
realities. It is only “giving in to terrorists” if a state acts counter to its self-defined 
interests in the new international context even if redefined in response to the new threats.  
 The only other option is to continue the same policies as prior to the threat’s onset 
and attempt to quash terrorists via force. Relying solely on force has the possibility of 
success against a very weak and isolated terrorist group, for its political appeal is likely to 
have been low and it would likely have been doomed to failure anyway. Eliminating the 
membership may effectively squelch the political current it embodied. A capable group 
speaking to potent political currents, however, is highly unlikely to be undone. The 
underlying political currents ensure that the political energy embodied by a terrorist entity 
will continue beyond any particular membership set at any one point in a group that 
manifests it. Al Qaeda is such a group. 
 Terrorism is most effective when there is an incipient yet unrealized potential for 
the terrorists’ political agenda that terrorist violence can awaken and mobilize. The US 
population, Al Qaeda’s main target public, however, has firmly rejected Al Qaeda in both 





primarily from Muslim publics in different countries from whom Al Qaeda hopes to 
derive terrorism’s secondary benefit of rallying assistance from potential adherents and 
supporters, however, rejects both Al Qaeda’s political goals and its means of achieving 
them. Popularity is the currency of survival in the global jihadist insurgency, and Al 
Qaeda, if left to its own devices, rapidly depletes its stock. It is only by rallying against 
US actions, which are perceived as a greater evil, that Al Qaeda gains traction with its 
potential adherents and supporters.  
 Third, as of 2007, the perceived discrepancy in the eyes of Al Qaeda’s potential 
adherents and supporters between US actions and self-professed US values hampers the 
US ability to deal with terrorism on a political level in the long run because it deprives 
the United States of both popularity and credibility.418 Short term success can be gained 
by yoking foreign state structures. As outlined in chapter seven, that has been done since 
2001. The dynamics of terrorism, however, dictate that long term success can only come 
by winning popular support not just among the public targeted by the terrorists, but also 
among the public with whom the terrorists seek to have an audience and upon whom they 
depend for survival. This audience is where Al Qaeda lives and from where Al Qaeda 
draws its recruits. Only the public can refuse Al Qaeda sanctuary and/or cooperate with 
state authorities. No US effort focused on a culturally-based terrorist entity from a 
specific realm of world society can succeed with so little support from that realm.   
 Fortunately for the United States, the US actions that draw international ire are 
clearly delineated. Not only are they identified, but the gap between the action itself and 





gaining popular support, either by actually enacting steps that manifest a popularly 
embraced US political value and/or at least giving the appearance of doing so, is evident. 
Each of these situations are either of US making, or the United States can bring to bear 
significant leverage against the issue. As the leader of the international system, the 
United States is in the position to marry its power to popularly-accepted political values 
in service of the US national well being. 
Conclusion 
 
 US political and economic values have permeated the international system since 
World War II, and they are now highly respected. They set a yardstick by which to 
measure both policy ends and means. Yet, the United States remains deeply unpopular.  
 From the perspective of Al Qaeda’s actual and potential adherents and supporters 
– disenchanted, angry, or otherwise dissatisfied groups throughout Muslim countries - US 
policies are to blame. Major US actions post 9/11, (e.g. the US invasion of Iraq, the 
perceived US disregard for human rights, perceived US unilateral tendencies) have 
generated resentment. This is so not because of any significant differences in political 
values amongst the culturally disparate combatants in the US-Al Qaeda struggle, but 
because of the the differing political power and interests beneath the surface of the sea of 
common political values and the way those interests are furthered in conflict with self-
professed US political values. The United States self-inflicted damage to US credibility 
and legitimacy. In a political struggle like terrorism, these are gaping wounds. 
 Al Qaeda - whose own agenda and means of pursuing it is highly unpopular with 
both the United States, its target audience, and the world’s “Muslim publics” with a 





audience from whom it hopes to rally support – capitalizes on this situation. It shrouds its 
own agenda in opposition to US policies. The support that Al Qaeda receives is thus 
largely not pro Al Qaeda. Rather, it is an expression of anti-US sentiment, and Al Qaeda 
is simply the instrument of that expression.  
 Per the dynamics of terrorism, force cannot be used to solve what is inherently a 
political conflict. Only politics can achieve a lasting, stable solution. The current, state-
centric US approach can yield short term gains, but it is not a long term strategy. To 
simply try to muscle the problem is not prudent policymaking because it is not taking 
account of political realities driving the situation. Such an approach ensures the struggle 
will continue, and time is not on the US side given that Al Qaeda is presumably seeking 
weapons of mass destruction and ever more potent means of attack. Responding with 
force alone all but guarantees future US casualties.  
The United States must narrow Al Qaeda’s political, and thus operational, 
breathing space and defeat it in the long run. The polling lays out the path to follow. The 
United States can do this by paying greater heed to the appearance of, it not actually 
adhering to, popularly embraced US political values in the formulation and execution of 
US policy on issues directly or indirectly relevant to Al Qaeda.  
 Despite generally unfavorable views of the United States, there is still a general 
public sentiment around the world that peaceful accommodations can be made in disputes 
with the United States. This is significant as it shows the United States is not inherently 
hated. The United States is not doomed from the start, and the raw potential for the 





 The next chapter is this dissertation’s final analysis and recommendations. It will 
place these political sentiments, which permeate all of the previous dimensions, in the 
context of the greater US effort. In doing so, it will explore the relationship between 
political values and power in the US-Al Qaeda terrorism struggle and submit policy 









































     Chapter Ten  
 
 Final Analysis and Recommendations 
 
“Take the diplomacy out of war and the  
thing will fall flat in a week.” 
  …Will Rogers419 
 
  “Strategic theory must…study the engage- 
ment in terms of its possible results and of  
the moral and psychological forces that  
largely determine its course.” 
     …Carl Von Clausewitz (1976, 177) 
 
 In chapter one, the hypothesis was offered that the failure of Coalition forces to 
quickly subdue Al Qaeda as was suggested would occur in the first months of the war is a 
result of the US government’s failure to place sufficient emphasis on the US-Al Qaeda 
struggle’s political dimension.  In effect, the Administration’s heavy emphasis on hard 
power tactics to the near exclusion of soft power political ones weakened the ability of 
the US to effectively deal with Al Qaeda. In fact, the July 2007 National Intelligence 
Estimate states a rejuvenated Al Qaeda now places the United States in a heightened 
threat environment.420 The US approach to date emphasizing force to capture and/or kill 
Al Qaeda members has failed to eliminate the security or political threat to the United 
States posed by Al Qaeda. The obvious questions are: Why? What are US options?   
 A hard power approach is necessary. Only hard power can dismantle Al Qaeda’s 
operational capability, the source of Al Qaeda’s security threat, and thus its ability to 
induce political harm. For the United States to effectively and efficiently apply hard 
power, however, the US approach to Al Qaeda must move beyond tactical concerns, 
wherein the dynamics of terrorism systemically disadvantage US efforts, and look to 





 A comprehensive US approach must engage the US-Al Qaeda struggle’s political 
dimension, its most malleable aspect. Internationally, the United States must examine and 
exploit both the internal nature of Al Qaeda as a political actor as well as the interaction 
present between Al Qaeda and the foreign populace of disenfranchised, angry, and 
otherwise disaffected Muslims upon whom it relies for political support, which translates 
into recruits, money, and operational assistance. Domestically, the United States must 
examine its Al Qaeda-related policies, both in decision-making and implementation, to 
ensure they are consistent with traditional US political values. This defends the US 
political character, which terrorism seeks to subvert by inducing controversial and 
unsustainable political choices incompatible with the US political identity. By extension, 
this also improves US public standing and credibility, which better enables the United 
States to engage both foreign states and foreign publics, because traditional US political 
values and foreign policy emphases are widely embraced.  
Al Qaeda has reaped both political and operational success stemming from the 
nearly exclusive hard power US approach. Politically, the United States has self-inflicted 
wounds from undertaking and sustaining policies inimical to the US political character 
(e.g. extralegal detention, illegal wiretapping). Domestically, this gives the phenomenon 
of terrorism traction by subverting US politics. Internationally, US political standing and 
credibility are hurt, and this translates to reduced US leverage. Operationally, US 
political tone-deafness exacerbated by political non-engagement has further enraged the 
foreign populace upon whom Al Qaeda depends. Its operational capacity has managed to 
rejuvenate despite ongoing US efforts as US hard power efforts against Al Qaeda’s 





and Al Qaeda political agendas, the struggle’s driving force, remain untouched, the 
struggle’s duration is lengthened, and this only favors Al Qaeda.   
Traditional US political values and foreign policy emphases – the rule of law, a 
participatory political system emphasizing the importance of international institutions, 
and democratic values, such as human rights – give US leadership global legitimacy. This 
is crucial for US efforts to combat a non-state adversary wherein the actions and attitudes 
of the general population beyond the purview of the state’s coercive power is a crucial 
factor. The current US tack undermines itself by insufficiently accounting for this 
political aspect in forming and executing US policy. Guided by traditional US political 
values, the United States gains both political and hard power national advantage via 
engaging the US-Al Qaeda struggle’s political dimension  
US-Al Qaeda Struggle Synopsis 
 
 The US-Al Qaeda struggle, as noted in Chapter Two, is a conflictive dyad. Al 
Qaeda is a religio-political non-state transnational terrorist network composed of 
members from every Muslim society. An agitator to the world system, its political 
purpose is its internal cohesive. More than just a terrorist group, Al Qaeda presents itself 
as the organizational manifestation of a minority yet ever-present strain of Islamic 
jurisprudence that emphasizes melding thought with action to spread a purified Islam via 
armed jihad to reform and govern humanity. By contrast, the United States, a nation-state 
with multiple political, social, and economic bonds rooted in classical liberalism, is the 





 As explained in Chapter Four, the conflicting political agenda of the United 
States, to structure and remain atop the world system, and that of Al Qaeda, to adjust the 
world system to restore the Caliphate era, are manifested in mutually exclusive interests.  
In particular, the United States is reliant upon the Middle East in general, and the Persian 
Gulf specifically, to meet its energy needs in an economically feasible manner. Al Qaeda 
views current arrangements as economic exploitation of Muslim natural resources at 
Muslim expense. To facilitate this arrangement, the United States has placed US forces in 
the region and backed authoritarian regimes. Al Qaeda views US forces as the tools of 
US imperialism and US-backed authoritarian regimes as traitorous surrogates for US 
power. Lastly, the United States makes no serious active effort to combat other world 
powers, such as Russia and China, who repress their Muslim minorities. Because the 
United States claims to be a model of human rights while also being the most powerful 
country in the world, Al Qaeda equates the failure of the United States to prioritize the 
plight of this repression and the US failure to redress it, an act which runs counter to self- 
professed US political values, as tacit US endorsement of these states’ behavior. 
 The US-Al Qaeda struggle is likely to be a long one. Enabling and reinforcing the 
terrorism struggle, the political ideologies of the United States and Al Qaeda are in direct 
opposition. Further, the stations in the international system of the United States and Al 
Qaeda are in direct opposition, a situation in which the disproportionately strong US 
world position actually encourages challengers to go beyond accepted formal procedures, 
which is where US power and influence is weakest. Driving the US-Al Qaeda struggle, 
the United States and Al Qaeda have conflicting, mutually exclusive political agendas 





power. The enduring US economic interests that tie it to Persian Gulf oil, and the 
necessary supporting military and political arrangements to facilitate this US need, are 
rooted in a global politico-economic system underwritten by US military power. Neither 
the general outlines of the world’s natural resource based politico-economic system nor 
the predominance of US military power are likely to alter in any significant way in the 
short to medium term. This situation creates a self-perpetuating loop of political conflict 
because the sustainment of current arrangements further riles Al Qaeda’s enduring 
religio-political philosophy, which is only antagonized by the increasing impact of 
globalization, while the grievances of those oppressed by this system, the very people 
upon whom Al Qaeda depends, only grow with time. 
 Though its goals and objectives have largely remained constant, as noted in 
Chapter Four, Al Qaeda has varied its strategy over time in response to events. It initially 
emphasized attacking the “near enemy” by launching guerilla and terrorist campaigns 
against regimes victimizing Muslims around the world. By the late 1990’s, however, a 
more developed Al Qaeda shifted its efforts to the United States, the “far enemy,” on the 
theory that it would be more effective and efficient to buckle the international system’s 
main support column, thus causing the entire structure to collapse (Najm). While Al 
Qaeda has had to diversify its targeting to include US allies in order to dissuade them 
from contributing to the post 9/11 US effort, and thus adjust the balance of power more to 
its favor, Al Qaeda has essentially kept its US-centric focus. Iraq and Afghanistan have 
become the centerpiece of Al Qaeda’s efforts. They present not only an opportunity to 





directly at US forces. Al Qaeda knows that time is on its side, and the longer the struggle 
continues, the more the economics of the fight favor it.  
The United States, as noted in Chapter One, has chosen a two track response to 
9/11. On one hand, the United States has precisely identified the enemy as the Al Qaeda 
network and any state sponsors that assist it. The United States is using its military power 
to destroy this target set. On the other hand, the United States has attempted to politically 
isolate Al Qaeda by declaring it separate from mainstream Islam. The United States has 
attempted to blunt Al Qaeda’s political impact, and thus stunt the terrorism process, by 
refusing to engage the US-Al Qaeda struggle’s political dimension. Conceived and 
implemented only after 9/11, this two-track US approach to countering Al Qaeda has 
been implemented via two consecutive parts.  
Part I, the initial US reaction to the 9/11 attacks, directly centered on combating 
Usama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda. This process, as described in Chapter Seven, has consisted 
of three main actions. First, the United States invaded Afghanistan to depose the Taliban 
government and then attempted to secure its gains by instituting a democratic government 
as a bulwark against the revival of a terrorist state while working with Musharraf’s 
Pakistan to capture and/or kill fleeing Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Second, the 
United States has attempted to capture Al Qaeda’s membership around the world through 
a series of bilateral intelligence liaison relationships coupled with a rendition program to 
either detain suspects unilaterally and/or interrogate suspects in a manner not acceptable 
under US law. Third, the United States has devised an alternative prison system beyond 





Hard power progress has been made. Thousands of terrorism suspects have been 
detained. Multiple terrorist plots have been disrupted. No new 9/11-scale attacks have hit 
either the United States or its allies.  
Though far from eliminated, the Al Qaeda organization, as explained in Chapter 
Six, is a shadow of its former self. It has had to decentralize and rely increasingly on 
impersonal computer-based communication at the expense of internal cohesion and 
organizational development. Al Qaeda affiliates, such as Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, 
backed by associated groups and individuals now play the main frontline role. This 
operational diffusion has altered the political balance within the greater jihadi movement, 
and it has reached the point where the certainty of Usama bin Laden’s control over both 
his organization, as well as the greater jihadi movement, is of dubious certainty.  
The US administration also ordered a public relations campaign to accompany 
these hard power steps to improve US public standing. This initiative, however, failed 
miserably. Rather than focus on the policy issues reflecting US interests that generated 
resentment against the United States, such as the US military presence in the Middle East 
and US support for the Israeli occupation of the Palestinians, this public relations 
campaign touted US political values. The increasing divergence, however, between US 
political values of democracy, law, and human rights and US policy actions of backing 
dictatorships, supporting Israeli acts against the Palestinians perceived by much of the 
world as repression, acting unilaterally in contravention of international law, and 
arguably violating human rights through US detention and interrogation policies deprived 
the United States of its political credibility. The United States could not be its own 





Part II, which has been in progress since the military situation in Afghanistan 
stabilized in fall 2002, is expanding US military action under the guise of combating Al 
Qaeda. To date, it has consisted of two steps. In contrast to Part I, however, US focus has 
become blurred. These US policy steps are not only slowing Al Qaeda’s descent, but they 
are also unwittingly helping Al Qaeda to rejuvenate. 
The first step involved invading Iraq by asserting Saddam Hussein’s actual and/or 
potential involvement with Al Qaeda and weapons of mass destruction – arguments to 
which a traumatized post 9/11 US public was readily receptive. The US invasion of Iraq, 
however, was counterproductive to combating Al Qaeda. Internationally, not only did Al 
Qaeda organizationally expand to combat US forces in a new theater of operations, but 
overall recruiting increased. Al Qaeda gained a de facto sanctuary in the chaos of Iraq. 
The US resources now tied up in Iraq are not available to confront Al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere. And, global public opinion, particularly in Muslim countries 
crucial to Al Qaeda’s support, has swung against the United States. Domestically, the US 
public is no longer unified, thus limiting the US government’s freedom of action.  
As of 2007, the US effort in Iraq is faltering. As evidenced by the establishment 
of a new democratically elected government, some progress has been made. Underlying 
trends, however, are not positive. The Iraqi economy is anemic. The security situation is 
slowly deteriorating. And, the Iraqi political system is gridlocked. The United States 
simply does not have the force presence necessary to defeat the Iraqi insurgency. 
At the same time, the US effort in Afghanistan is also faltering. As shown by the 
establishment of a democratically elected national government and a national army, 





Afghan economy, though growing, is drowning in opium production unequalled in 
Afghanistan’s history. The Taliban have revived, and the security situation is 
deteriorating. And, the Afghan political system, while apparently established, is losing 
public support due to corruption and an inability to deliver services. The United States 
simply does not have an adequate force presence to help enforce the writ of the Afghan 
national government and defeat a Taliban-led, Al Qaeda-backed insurgency. 
In order to consolidate strategic US gains in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United 
States has engaged in the second step to date, raising tensions with and intimating 
military action against Iran. The Administration sees Iran as holding a decisive position 
vis a vis US success in both Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other US regional interests, 
most notably Israel’s security. With Saddam Hussein’s Iraq gone and US forces stretched 
too thin for decisive action elsewhere, Iran is now the regional power. It can needle US 
interests not just in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also in Lebanon and Israel via Hezbollah 
and in Palestine via Hamas.  
Iran has become the regional US foreign policy issue prism, and the United States 
is working with the Israelis and the Saudis to counter a mutually-perceived Iranian threat. 
This has resulted in four political understandings. First, Israel’s security is assured. 
Second, as a concession to US Arab allies, the Israeli-Palestinian issue should be elevated 
in importance. Third, the United States will work to counter general Shiite ascendance 
throughout the Middle East, which the Administration perceives as a proxy force for 
Iranian interests. Fourth, using Saudi Arabia as a proxy, the United States is working to 





This US focus shift, however, makes combating Al Qaeda a function of 
countering Iran, a state with whom Al Qaeda is not inherently bound. In Iraq, pressuring 
Iran entices it to either intensify the insurgency militarily through increasing lethal aid to 
and/or leveraging Iraq’s Shiites against the United States politically by enabling their 
defiance against US-backed national reconciliation efforts. This scenario perpetuates 
Iraq’s internal chaos and thus provides Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia a de facto sanctuary 
amidst the sectarian conflict in territory bereft of central government control. The US 
attempts to direct Al Qaeda-styled jihadists against Iranian allies Hezbollah and Syria is 
akin to the 1980s US policy of trying to yoke jihadist zeal against the Soviets in 
Afghanistan. As then, the United States is stoking a potent enemy. The certainty of US 
control, however, is a very open question as the effort rests on the questionable premise 
that the jihadists view Shiites in general, and Iranians in particular, as a worse and more 
immediate enemy than the United States and its allies.  
As with efforts to counter Al Qaeda organizationally, the US efforts to counter Al 
Qaeda’s financing, as detailed in Chapter Eight, achieved initial success but have since 
atrophied. In the wake of 9/11, the United States seized millions of dollars of suspected 
terrorist financing. Unfortunately, errors were made, and the subsequent safeguards have 
effectively rendered this tool moot. The follow-on approach, tracing terrorist money via 
intelligence work vice law enforcement, has yielded increased data. This tool, however, 
ultimately rests on the political will of other states to then act upon the information.  
All technical means of interdicting Al Qaeda’s financing – whether seizing money 
or tracing it – ultimately rests on a political cornerstone. People will continue to give to 





The problem, as illustrated in Chapter Nine, is that Al Qaeda, despite having little 
political support for its own agenda, has been able to co-opt the global anger directed at 
the United States. Al Qaeda has cast itself as one of the lone antagonists willing to 
challenge US power. Though its terrorism is roundly disapproved, Al Qaeda’s violence 
and political tirades gives voice to peoples’ frustrations against a common enemy.  
As of 2007, US political credibility is ebbing. Though US political values that 
have taken root in the international system since World War II are broadly revered the 
world over, multiple US policies are highly unpopular with foreign publics, particularly 
the disenfranchised, angry, and otherwise despondent segments of Muslim societies that 
have not reaped as many benefits from globalization as the United States. In particular, 
relatively unwavering US support for harsh Israeli treatment of the Palestinians has been 
criticized the world over for apparent US hypocrisy regarding the rule of law and human 
rights. Since 9/11, the US invasion of Iraq has inflamed tensions not just because of the 
cultural impact of a Western nation invading an Arab one, but also because the war was 
unilaterally launched in contravention of international law by sidestepping multilateral 
institutions such as the United Nations and then conducted in a manner that often appears 
callous toward the lives of innocent Muslim civilians. The US capture and treatment of 
terrorism suspects, which is generally perceived to violate human rights and international 
law, also incites resentment. Because of the broad and perpetuating gap between lofty US 
political principles and US policies, the power of US words is weak. Only US policies 
that clearly demonstrate not only new US behavior but also differing results on these and 






Proposed US Political Focus in the US-Al Qaeda Struggle 
 
Because Al Qaeda is a transnational, non-state actor, the world’s publics, vice 
governments, are the core audience to which the United States must cater. It is this center 
of gravity in which Al Qaeda incubates and draws operational support. Though the 
United States has largely co-opted state structures around the world, it is this particular 
global non-state audience that the United States has most alienated. This audience cannot 
be controlled through force of arms. Only creating and preserving a perception of the 
legitimacy of US rule through the appearance of adhering to globally revered US political 
values – most notably a participatory political system, the rule of law, and human rights – 
can this perception of legitimacy be created and sustained. 
Proposed US Objective in the US-Al Qaeda Struggle 
 
The United States must seek to manage the US-Al Qaeda struggle, not eliminate 
Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is an organizational manifestation of a school of religio-political 
thought that cannot be eradicated. Its followers self select into membership. The 
necessary hard power steps to possibly thoroughly destroy such a body of thought by 
eliminating all of its actual and potential followers would so trample US political values 
in the process that it would only increase Al Qaeda’s political appeal, and thus indirectly 
increase its capacity for violence. 
Therefore, US efforts should seek to reduce Al Qaeda to a series of localized 
national movements and eliminate its unified global nature (Goldstone 2002). This will 
reduce the threat to the United States itself and shift the danger to US interests overseas. 






The United States can accomplish this by engaging the US-Al Qaeda struggle’s 
political dimension. Internally, the United States must adhere to its traditional political 
values when devising and executing its counter-terrorism policies to maintain credibility 
and deny the phenomenon of terrorism traction in US politics. Externally, the United 
States, using traditional US political values and foreign policy emphases as a guide when 
devising and implementing US foreign policy, must take account of the perceptions and 
interests of the segments of the world population most supportive of Al Qaeda in order to 
secure US interests. This will weaken the bonds between Al Qaeda and its’ supporting 
population. This, in turn, will empower US hard power efforts, undermine Al Qaeda’s 
efforts to build operational capacity, and exploit Al Qaeda’s incipient internal political 
cleavages.   
Proposed US Security Policy Issue Prism 
  
Until a great power threat arises, this dissertation proposes that transnational 
terrorism, as embodied by Al Qaeda of the global jihadist movement, be the evaluative 
prism of US security policy. Al Qaeda is the only current threat both capable and likely to 
directly attack the United States and kill US citizens. As outlined in chapter two, 
however, Al Qaeda is primarily a political threat, not a military one. The risk is thus not 
to the existence of the United States as a polity, but to the US political character and US 
prosperity, as ensured by US foreign policy to further US interests, as Al Qaeda uses 
terrorism to subvert the US political process that devises and guides the implementation 
of US policy decisions.  
 Al Qaeda threatens, or has the potential to threaten, all of America’s pillars of 





geographical independence. By provoking an extreme reaction to its terrorist violence, Al 
Qaeda threatens US soft power appeal. It has done this by inciting the US to take actions 
inconsistent with its values. This, in turn, threatens to undermine the United States in the 
world’s international institutions if states begin to use them as rallying points to counter 
the US in response to unpopular US policies. This inconsistent behavior also has the 
potential to threaten US economic well being by inducing a reactionary US response to 
world engagement, upon which the US economy is heavily based. Lastly, if the United 
States can be provoked, as with Iraq, Al Qaeda can draw US forces into quagmires. 
Neither the economics nor the politics favor US interests long term. 
Proposed US Policy Approach to Al Qaeda 
 
 Al Qaeda is present on both a political and a hard power plane of existence. Any 
comprehensive US approach must address both of these dimensions, and it must do so in 
an interactive, mutually-complementary manner because of the interactive dynamic 
present between politics and hard power in a terrorism struggle. In the long term, 
however, politics must frame the US strategy and set the limits of hard power actions.  
Political Approach 
 
The United States must seek to politically undercut Al Qaeda. As the most 
powerful actor in the international system, the United States can significantly alter the 
global political landscape to its advantage. By ameliorating salient grievances in the eyes 
of Al Qaeda’s actual and potential adherents and supporters that Al Qaeda exploits to US 
political detriment that do not violate core US national interests, the United States can 
reduce global anger directed at it and deprive Al Qaeda of political fuel, which will lessen 





This can be accomplished via a three-pronged political approach. Each step 
creates breathing space for the others. Execution, however, must be in tandem.   
First, the United States must use its leverage to bring about a negotiated 
settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resulting in a viable, territorially-contiguous 
Palestinian state. The United States has extensive economic, military, and political 
leverage over both the Israelis and the Palestinians. The only time that serious agreements 
have ever been reached, or serious progress has ever come close to being realized, is as a 
result of US involvement.  
Israel will have to conclude if its chosen path of perpetual martial conflict with 
the Palestinians to deny them a state - and the immediate and ever-increasing violence, 
suffering, and polarization on both sides that accompanies it – is truly in Israel’s long 
term interest, or whether the long term peace and stability wrought from political 
accommodation that, for the first time, demarcates Israel’s boundaries is preferable. In 
effect, Israel will be choosing whether to remain in US good graces and, as a lesser power 
and weaker ally, succumb to US interests. It can retain virtually unparalleled US military 
assistance and political backing, or it can cross US interests and attempt to sustain its 
policies without active or passive US backing as the United States should withdraw 
support when US interests are threatened. 
The plight of the Palestinians is an exceptionally powerful issue that resonates 
throughout the world’s Muslim populace. Al Qaeda harnesses the anger stemming from 
the US-backed Israeli treatment of the Palestinians as a potent glue to unite a membership 





will very likely exploit incipient internal fissures amongst Al Qaeda’s myriad 
nationalities, each of whom have concerns endemic to their own country.  
Second, the United States must disengage from Iraq. The negative political 
repercussions from Iraq are costing the United States international cooperation against a 
globally networked terrorist enemy. Ever increasing US blood and treasure is being 
consumed at an unsustainable rate, thereby weakening the United States for the fight 
elsewhere. While Iraq is a focal point for Al Qaeda-style jihadists, the US fight in 
Afghanistan persists to absorb any excess generated by a US pullout from Iraq. Plus, the 
war has proven an overall recruiting boon for Al Qaeda, which outweighs its attention-
grabbing value. Lastly, devoid of a US enemy to fight, the highly unpopular Al Qaeda in 
Mesopotamia is likely to decline. The flagship franchise can be defeated. 
No matter the details of the US exit, Al Qaeda will claim a victory by virtue of 
being the last ones on the battlefield. The United States can, however, choose the price it 
will pay to reach that end. Continued US military action in Iraq operates to US detriment 
vis a vis combating Al Qaeda in both political and hard power terms. 
Third, and more indirectly, the United States must alter how it manifests its 
political values in three main ways (Walt 2005): 
First, spreading democracy, especially if by force, will not help the United States 
beat Al Qaeda. This argument implies that allowing Al Qaeda’s political agenda to come 
to the surface through legitimate institutional means will eliminate Al Qaeda’s need for 
terrorism. Al Qaeda’s political goals, however, have very little popular support. Al 
Qaeda’s party platform would likely lose out to entities spouting anti-Americanism, 





victory in the Palestinian territories. Further, because Al Qaeda’s philosophy cannot be 
falsified, its members would likely take an electoral defeat as justification of their cause 
and validation of their need to work harder.  
Depriving Al Qaeda of the excuse of being denied a fair political hearing will, 
however, likely reduce its support to only a core following. Multiple parties competing 
for political support will distill out various grievances, and possible means to redress 
them, amongst a multitude of actors. Al Qaeda’s ability to mask itself under the guise of 
more germane, salient local issues and usurp those sentiments into support for its own 
agenda will be severely reduced. Al Qaeda will very likely become politically isolated 
and marginalized, which will, in turn, reduce its organizational capacity for violence. ,  
The United States now manages the dissent that Al Qaeda usurps by supporting 
regional authoritarian state structures, which are also threatened by Al Qaeda and assist 
the United States in combating Al Qaeda despite local anti-US sentiments.. This 
framework is not supportive of widely admired US political values in the long run. It is, 
however, a temporary short to medium term necessity until US public standing improves. 
Second, the United States can, and should, return to a 1990’s style embrace of 
international institutions, whose US domination serves as a pillar of US strength in the 
Post Cold War world. Implicit in this act is embracing democratic values, such as human 
rights, and a participatory political system flavored with restraint stemming from the rule 
of law. As shown in Chapter Nine, this is a critical component to improving US public 
standing, which is crucial to combating Al Qaeda.  
As with Athens during the Peloponnesian Wars, it is in the US national interest to 





ensure that the international system is structured to the benefit of US citizens and the 
detriment of US enemies (Thucydides [431 B.C.] 1972). In a situation somewhat 
analogous to Bismarck’s Prussia, however, “only outside Germany (America) can we 
find the means to strengthen our position in the interest of Germany (America) itself” 
(Taylor 1967).421 The United States will have to intensively engage the rest of the world 
politically, militarily, and economically, to nurture these arrangements.  
Ensuring the United States adheres to the world’s rules and traditional US 
political values and foreign policy emphases – the rule of law, a participatory political 
system emphasizing the importance of international institutions, and democratic values, 
such as human rights – is not only an executable action, but it will likely have a more 
immediate effect and carry more weight than will proactive US efforts to force changes in 
domestic governance elsewhere in the world. The United States must seek to avoid 
creating an international framework wherein its opponents will be inspired to perpetuate 
their opposition to the United States and/or unite against it. The “axis of evil label,” for 
example, commits both of these sins. It lumps opponents together by giving them no 
option but opposition or capitulation with no means to resolve a dispute save for on US 
terms. Traditional US political values principles and foreign policy emphases creates 
checks and balances to help prevent such a situation from arising while offering 
peaceable means of dispute that are fair, reliable, and predictable if it does. 
Critics will argue that this philosophic approach and guide to implementation is 
constraining US actions, and thereby inhibiting the United States’ ability to secure its 
interests in the face of a potent adversary. While a modest imposition may result, any 





United States is still preeminent with many levers of power. A major infringement to US 
freedom of action is highly unlikely. Conversely, any lesser infringement upon a 
proposed US policy is likely to ultimately increase the chances of success for any US 
policy ultimately enacted as it will account for and institutionalize the needs of other 
actors, thereby giving them a stake in the US action. The benefits of this legitimation of 
US actions far outweigh any initial restrictions, which can always be reworked in time.   
Hard Power Approach 
 
The United States must simultaneously undertake efforts to organizationally 
disrupt Al Qaeda to lessen its capability for violence. Its leaders and operatives must be 
captured or killed. Its activities must be neutralized. This will not only save lives, but it 
will also show that attempting to engage in Islamic terrorism is futile and against the best 
interests of those who might consider it. As shown by the analysis and options presented 
in this dissertation, this is primarily a tool to be pursued through military, intelligence, 
and other state-oriented means. The United States can take three key actions. 
 First, the United States must work to reduce the likelihood that Al Qaeda will 
acquire a weapon of mass destruction. The United States should take the lead against this 
threat by: 1) securing “loose” government nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union 
and around the world, 2) securing uncontrolled civilian nuclear materials, as can be found 
in research reactors, industrial facilities, medical facilities, etc., and 3) initiate more 
intensive anti smuggling efforts at the inter-state and non-state levels.422  
Second, as US forces disengage from Iraq, the United States must ramp up in 
Afghanistan. Al Qaeda central is publicly reported to be in the Afghanistan-Pakistan 





far more conducive to Al Qaeda than are Iraq. The United States is only able to hold a 
country of roughly 25 million people, to the extent that US forces backed by Afghan 
allies do maintain control, with the support of the Afghan people. This support will 
dissipate unless tangible progress is shown. To meet this objective, US troop strength 
should be increased in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda’s sanctuary should be eliminated, and the 
US must continue to attack Al Qaeda operatives and communications, albeit in a 
reformed manner consistent with traditional US political values. 
Third, the United States should do a “grand bargain” with Iran to address 
contentious issues in the US-Iran bilateral relationship in return for restoring diplomatic 
relations. Iran is the one Gulf state actively hostile to the United States with the power to 
threaten US security and economic vitality. As of fall 2007, the United States is 
attempting to combat Al Qaeda by trying to salvage Iraq through countering Iran. This 
approach makes countering Al Qaeda a function of two other separate, albeit related, 
foreign policy issues. At best, the net result will slow Al Qaeda’s organizational 
development and weaken its geopolitical position. At worst, Al Qaeda will be 
organizationally and geopolitically enhanced. Not even the best option, however, actually 
forces Al Qaeda onto the defense. 
Conclusion 
 
The US-Al Qaeda struggle is likely to be a long term one. The US political 
agenda and that of Al Qaeda are almost entirely mutually exclusive. Each actor has an 
enduring nature. And, given that Al Qaeda draws upon the world’s Muslim community 





to ever kill/capture all of Al Qaeda’s operatives and/or cut off all sources of support. The 
United States, therefore, must manage this conflict vice seek Al Qaeda’s elimination.  
Hard power is necessary. It alone can dismantle Al Qaeda’s organizational 
capacity for violence, the source of terrorism’s security threat, which enables its political 
potency. A macro US approach favoring hard power, however, is likely to fail. 
Terrorism’s operational dynamics favor Al Qaeda, not the United States. Furthermore, a 
pure hard power approach ignores the political core of the US-Al Qaeda struggle that 
both frames and drives the conflict. At best, US hard power efforts might hold Al Qaeda 
in check. At worst, short term tactical gain is achieved at long term strategic expense by 
further aggravating the political base of the conflict through politically offensive means 
of implementation, such as using force in contravention of international law as in Iraq 
and abandoning human rights when detaining terrorist operatives, as with the US 
rendition program.  
Any hard power efforts, however, must be executed in tandem with attention to 
the political context that frames, and thus empowers, their application. Specifically, the 
United States must attempt to better secure loose nuclear materials, ramp up the US force 
presence in Afghanistan, and execute a “Grand Bargain” with Iran. All the while, 
traditional US political values such as the rule of law, international institutions 
emblematic of a participatory political system, and democratic values, such as human 
rights must serve as a guide to US policy formulation and implementation.  
More importantly, US political values can be used to politically undercut Al 





credibility is at an ebb because of the disparity between US policy choices and its stated 
political values. The United States must speak with actions vice words.  
Externally, US efforts can narrow Al Qaeda’s room for political maneuver by 
adhering to the traditional US political values - the rule of law, a participatory political 
system emphasizing the importance of international institutions, and democratic values, 
such as human rights – to increase domestic and international perceptions of the 
legitimacy of global US leadership and weaken Al Qaeda’s potential to find new recruits. 
The stronger this perception, the less likely the potential adherents and supporters 
amongst the disenfranchised, angry, and otherwise disaffected Muslim populace will be 
willing to actively or passively materially aid Al Qaeda. Specifically, the United States 
can withdraw from Iraq and embrace traditional US political values in the formation and 
execution of grander US foreign policy.  
Internally, US efforts can play upon the inherent internal weaknesses, primarily 
the conflicting nationalisms of Al Qaeda’s members, by adhering to stated US political 
values. This will help to weaken the political glue that holds a diverse multinational 
organization with multiple competing centers of gravity together in a unified network 
directed at the United States. Specifically, the United States can work to resolve the 
plight of the Palestinians.  
Making Al Qaeda the primary US security policy evaluative prism for these 
particular data points will reduce Al Qaeda’s capacity for violence. The result will be to 
reduce Al Qaeda to a series of localized national movements and eliminate its unified 
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